

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

RECEIVED

MAY 17 2019

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
Appeal from Florence County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

MELVIN DURANT,

APPELLANT

APPENDIX

SUSAN B. HACKETT
Appellate Defender

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

South Carolina Commission on Indigent
Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
PO Box 11589
Columbia, SC 29211-1589
(803) 734-1330

WILLIAM M. BLITCH
Assistant Attorney General
Rembert Dennis Building
1000 Assembly Street, Room 519
Columbia, SC 29201

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

INDEX

INDEX i

STATE V. DURANT, 2019-UP-083 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 20, 2019)1

PETITION FOR REHEARING.....5

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING.....22

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

Melvin Durant, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001390

Appeal From Florence County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-083
Submitted January 1, 2019 – Filed February 20, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Senior Attorney General William M. Blicht, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of
Florence, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Melvin Durant appeals his conviction for assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature (ABHAN). On appeal, Durant argues the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting two statements he made to law enforcement. We affirm¹ pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting Durant's statement to Corporal Happ: *State v. Baccus*, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); *State v. Moses*, 390 S.C. 502, 510-11, 702 S.E.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he trial [court's] ruling as to the voluntariness of [a] confession will not be disturbed unless so erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion." (quoting *State v. Myers*, 359 S.C. 40, 47, 596 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004))); *State v. Miller*, 375 S.C. 370, 378-79, 652 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2007) ("When reviewing a trial [court's] ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."); *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that, before police questioning can take place, an accused must be warned he has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney; he must be afforded the "[o]ppportunity to exercise these rights . . . throughout the interrogation"; and after these warnings, he may "knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement"); *State v. Franklin*, 390 S.C. 535, 540, 702 S.E.2d 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A statement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under *Miranda* . . ." (alteration by court) (quoting *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 30, 538 S.E.2d 248, 253 (2000))); *Moses*, 390 S.C. at 513, 702 S.E.2d at 401 (providing the State must show the waiver (1) was "voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception"; and (2) was "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it" (quoting *Berghuis v. Thompkins*, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010))); *State v. Goodwin*, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession."); *Moses*, 375 S.C. at 513-14, 702 S.E.2d at 401 ("Courts have recognized appropriate factors that may be considered in a totality of the circumstances analysis: background; experience; conduct of the accused; age; maturity; physical condition and mental health; length of custody or detention; police misrepresentations; isolation of a minor from his or her parent; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; threats of violence; direct or indirect promises, however slight; lack of education or low intelligence; repeated

¹ We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR


and prolonged nature of the questioning; exertion of improper influence; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food or sleep."); *id.* at 514, 702 S.E.2d at 401 ("[N]o single factor is dispositive and each case requires careful scrutiny of all surrounding circumstances."); *State v. Saxon*, 261 S.C. 523, 529, 201 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1973) ("The fact that one is intoxicated at the time a confession is made does not necessarily render him incapable of comprehending the meaning and effect of his words."); *id.* ("[P]roof that an accused was intoxicated at the time he made a confession does not render the statement inadmissible as a matter of law" but rather "goes to the confession's weight and credibility.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting Durant's statement to Investigator Wynn: *Moses*, 390 S.C. at 510-11, 702 S.E.2d at 399 ("[T]he trial [court's] ruling as to the voluntariness of [a] confession will not be disturbed unless so erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion." (quoting *Myers*, 359 S.C. at 47, 596 S.E.2d at 492)); *Miller*, 375 S.C. at 378-79, 652 S.E.2d at 448 ("When reviewing a trial [court's] ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."); *Franklin*, 390 S.C. at 540, 702 S.E.2d at 571 ("A statement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under *Miranda* . . ." (alteration by court) (quoting *Aleksey*, 343 S.C. at 30, 538 S.E.2d at 253)); *Moses*, 390 S.C. at 513, 702 S.E.2d at 401 (providing the State must show the waiver (1) was "voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception"; and (2) was "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it" (quoting *Berghuis*, 560 U.S. at 382-83)); *Miller*, 375 S.C. at 380, 652 S.E.2d at 449 ("Volunteered statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation or spontaneously offered up, are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.")²

² This court finds Durant's contention that his statement was involuntary because Investigator Wynn improperly promised to help him is unpreserved for appellate review. See *State v. Dunbar*, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court]."); *id.* at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693-94 ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."); *id.* at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 694 ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.



STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

MELVIN DURANT,

APPELLANT

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2016-001390

Appeal from Florence County

D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2019-UP-083

PETITION FOR REHEARING

On February 20, 2019, this Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. State v. Durant, 2019-UP-083 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 20, 2019). Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear the matter based upon the significant points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court in arriving at its conclusions. On appeal, Appellant challenged the introduction of two statements purportedly made by Appellant during custodial interrogation. The statements were given to two different police officers under different circumstances and at different times, although the temporal

window was short; thus, Appellant raised the issues separately. Appellant respectfully requests rehearing as to both issues.

Introduction

Appellant and Wiley Jones lived in a transitional shelter in November 2014. R. 66, ll. 3-8. On November 12, 2014, Jones invited Appellant out for drinks. R. 76, ll. 7-14. A conflict arose between the two men. R. 76, ll. 20-23; R. 39, l. 22 – R. 40, l. 20. Appellant returned to the shelter in a very intoxicated state. R. 39, ll. 14-17. When Wiley arrived at the shelter, the two had a heated argument. R. 54, ll. 3-25; R. 92, ll. 7-8. Thereafter, Wiley claimed Appellant stabbed him in the restroom. R. 68, ll. 16-18. Subsequently, Wiley called 911. R. 69, ll. 11-12; R. 70, ll. 5-6; R. 71, ll. 7-10. When the police arrived, Appellant was arrested. R. 43, ll. 12-14. Two police officers interrogated Appellant. The trial judge erred in admitting those statements, and this Court erred in failing to reverse Appellant's convictions based upon those erroneously admitted statements.

Discussion and Analysis

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal matter. U.S. Const. amend. V. Based on the Fifth Amendment's protection, the United States Supreme Court held that in criminal prosecutions, statements by the accused are not admissible unless the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 444 (1966). However, the required use of these safeguards is required only when the accused is in custodial interrogation. State v. Kennedy, 325 S.C. 295, 303, 479 S.E.2d 838, 842 (Ct. App. 1996). The United States Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that “a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession.” To introduce a statement produced during custodial interrogation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made freely and voluntarily, and taken in compliance with Miranda, supra. State v. Von Dohlen, 322 S.C. 234, 243, 471 S.E.2d 689, 694 (1996); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 378, 652 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Compton, 366 S.C. 671, 680, 623 S.E.2d 661, 666 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Crawley, 349 S.C. 459, 463, 562 S.E.2d 683, 685 (Ct. App. 2002).

The waiver has two distinct dimensions. It must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and it must be “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); see also State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 25, 339 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1986). It is not enough that the interrogator advised the suspect of his rights and the suspect made an uncoerced statement. The prosecution must show that the accused understood the rights. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-575 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530 (1987)).

In South Carolina, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial statement. The examining court must answer the question: Did totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial statement defeat the defendant’s will? State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 513, 702 S.E.2d 395, 401 (Ct. App. 2010).

Courts have recognized appropriate factors that may be considered in a totality of the circumstances analysis: background; experience; conduct of the accused; age; maturity; physical condition and mental health; length of custody or detention; police misrepresentations; isolation of a minor from his or her parent; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; threats of violence; direct or indirect promises, however slight; lack of education or low intelligence; repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; exertion of improper influence; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food or sleep.

Id. at 513-514, 702 S.E.2d at 401 (internal citations omitted); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-694 (1993). The test requires consideration of “totality of all the surrounding circumstances – both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000)(citations omitted); see also State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 384, 652 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 2007).

Statement to Happ

When Mark Happ of the Florence Police Department arrived at the transitional shelter, he interrogated Appellant, who was already in custody. R. 3, ll. 10-24; R. 4, ll. 12-20; R. 5, ll. 14-22; State’s Exhibit #1. Happ claimed there was nothing about Appellant’s “physical condition” or “mental condition” that gave him “any pause with respect to him knowing what he was doing there talking” to Happ. R. 6, ll. 20-24. Happ further claimed Appellant “seemed responsive” to his questions and never asked to terminate the interrogation. R. 6, l. 25 – R. 7, l. 5. According to Happ, Appellant did not “appear to be in need of any sort of medical attention or anything.” R. 6, ll. 11-13.

Happ was aware that Appellant had been drinking alcohol that evening.¹ R. 10, ll. 6-8. Happ acknowledged that Appellant’s “words were slurred when he spoke.” R. 10, ll. 20-23. Happ did not conduct “any kind of testing to say what his level of intoxication was,” but it was

¹ The first officer on the scene described Appellant as “extremely intoxicated.” R. 22, ll. 11-25; see also, R. 92, ll. 9-11.

obvious Appellant “had been drinking.” R. 10, l. 20 – R. 11, l. 1. According to Happ, it was “absolutely” possible that Appellant was “to the level of being intoxicated.” R. 11, ll. 2-4. In talking to Happ, Appellant stated he had been drinking – “[s]omething about doing shots” – at a house on Church Street. R. 11, ll. 5-14.

The audio recording confirmed obvious signs of Appellant’s intoxication, including the slurring of words and confusion at times. State’s Exhibit #1. The recording also revealed Appellant was questioned prior to the advisement of rights, specifically about a knife. State’s Exhibit #1. When Appellant initially stuttered and answered in a confusing fashion, Happ directed Appellant to a call the police received earlier in the evening at another location. State’s Exhibit #1. At times, Appellant was completely incoherent. State’s Exhibit #1. During these times, Happ would pose more direct questions to Appellant. State’s Exhibit #1.

At the conclusion of the pre-trial hearing, defense counsel moved to exclude the first statement made to Happ. Specifically, defense counsel argued the evidence showed Appellant “was extremely intoxicated to a point where he was not capable of a free and voluntary waiver” of his rights “and fully understanding those rights at the time he was questioned.” R. 24, ll. 2-7.

The solicitor argued “evidence of intoxication” did not make the statement “per se involuntary.” R. 25, ll. 6-8. According to the state, Appellant indicated he understood his rights and agreed to speak with Happ. R. 25, ll. 10-13. During that statement, Appellant “denied any involvement in the activities that evening and stuck with that story.” R. 25, ll. 13-14. While speaking with Happ, Appellant “did admit to having a knife earlier in the day, which he said fell out of his pocket.” R. 25, ll. 14-16.

After hearing the arguments of counsel, the judge stated he was unaware of any case law “that specifically says that signs of intoxication are per se prohibitive of the admissibility of a statement.” R. 27, ll. 21-23. According to the judge,

There is some case law out there which says - - US v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, which was a Fourth Circuit case, and State v. Saxon, 201 S.E.2d 114, which is a 1973 case, and State v. Crawley, 562 S.E.2d 683, which says that the fact that the defendant exhibits symptoms of drug withdrawal when she confesses does not alone render her statement involuntary.

R. 27, l. 23 – R. 28, l. 4. The judge did “not find simply signs of intoxication or some evidence of intoxication - - that alone does not render the statement by [Appellant] involuntary.” R. 28, ll. 5-7. The judge concluded that Appellant “clearly was appropriately responsive to the questions that were asked of him by Officer Happ – Corporal Happ.” R. 28, ll. 7-11. In conclusion, the judge held Appellant’s statement to Happ was admissible. R. 28, ll. 18-20.²

This Court affirmed the trial judge’s decision. State v. Durant, 2019-UP-083 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 20, 2019). In support of the decision, this Court cited State v. Saxon, 261 S.C. 523, 529, 201 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1973) for the proposition that “[t]he fact that one is intoxicated at the time a confession is made does not necessarily render him incapable of comprehending the meaning and effect of his words.” See State v. Durant, 2019-UP-083 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 20, 2019) (quoting State v. Saxon, 261 S.C. 523, 529, 201 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1973)). Thus, this Court’s decision rested upon the Supreme Court’s statement that intoxication does not render a statement inadmissible. Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear this matter because this Court misapprehended the import of the Saxon decision and failed to rule upon Appellant’s argument against precedent to the extent this Court determined Saxon must be narrowly read.

² Defense counsel renewed his objection when the prosecutor offered the audio recording as an exhibit during the trial. R. 96, ll. 16-18. The judge overruled the objection and permitted the recording to be introduced along with Happ’s testimony regarding the statement. R. 96, l. 19.

The Supreme Court decided Saxon over four decades ago. According to the Court, “proof that an accused was intoxicated at the time he made a confession does not render the statement inadmissible as a matter of law, unless the accused’s intoxication was such that he did not realize what he was saying.” Id. Further, the Court stated that “[p]roof of intoxication, short of rendering the accused unconscious of what he is saying, goes to the weight and credibility to be accorded to the confession, but does not require that the confession be excluded from evidence.” Id. Nevertheless, after making these pronouncements of the law, the Court ruled as follows:

While there is testimony that [Saxon] had been drinking rather heavily and was not acting normally, there is other testimony from which the conclusion may be reasonably drawn that he was not drunk and fully comprehended what he was doing and saying. In fact, [Saxon] testified, and the inferences to be drawn from his own testimony amply support the conclusion that his statement was understandingly and voluntarily given. The testimony was properly admitted in evidence.

Id. at 529-530, 201 S.E.2d at 117. Thus, the Court analyzed the evidence to determine whether there was evidence that Saxon was “not drunk and fully comprehended what he was doing and saying.” This holding contradicted the legal principles previously enunciated, which suggested that unless an individual were intoxicated to the point unconsciousness, then any statements made by the individual were not *per se* inadmissible. The Court’s holding in the case rested upon its view that evidence existed in the record that Saxon “was not drunk and fully comprehended what he was doing and saying.”

Three years after Saxon, the South Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine another case in which a statement was allegedly made while the defendant was intoxicated. State v. Collins, 266 S.C. 566, 225 S.E.2d 189 (1976). Collins and a co-defendant were charged with armed robbery of a local store. Id. at 568, 225 S.E.2d at 190-191. There was no dispute that on the day of the robbery, the men “had been drinking heavily.” Id. at 568, 225 S.E.2d at 191. Collins was arrested on the day of the robbery for public drunkenness. Id. at 569, 225 S.E.2d at 191. A

detective questioned Collins concerning the robbery about an hour after his arrest. Id. According to the detective, he “determined, by means of a field sobriety test, that [Collins] was capable of and did understand his rights before questions were asked.” Id. To the contrary, the officer who arrested Collins “stated that in his opinion, [Collins] was still intoxicated” after being questioned. Id. at 569-570, 225 S.E.2d at 191.

In deciding whether the trial judge abused his discretion in determining the statement by Collins was voluntarily and knowingly given, the South Carolina Supreme Court cited Saxon, supra, for the proposition that “[p]roof of accused’s intoxication, short of rendering him unconscious of what he is saying, does not require in every case, that statements he made while in that condition be excluded from evidence.” Id. at 572-573, 225 S.E.2d at 193. However, the Court based its ruling on the fact that “[t]he evidence, including the condition of the defendant presented a factual situation which the judge determined unfavorably to the defendant.” Id. at 573, 225 S.E.2d at 193. See also Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373, 381 (9th Cir. 1968) (ordering the state court to conduct a hearing on the voluntariness of Unsworth’s statements where the undisputed evidence showed he was “in a state of gross intoxication” at the time of the making of the statements); Reddish v. State, 167 So.2d 858, 863 (Fla. 1964) (holding a defendant’s confessions “should not be permitted to stand as evidence against” the defendant where the “totality of all the circumstances, such as the man’s physical condition, in combination with the impact of narcotics, as well as the lack of clear-cut testimony regarding his mental condition at the time he gave the statements” meant the confessions “were not obtained in a manner consistent with constitutional standards against compulsive self-incrimination”); State v. Young, 875 P.2d 1119, 1123 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)(remanding where the trial court erroneously determined the defendant’s intoxication was irrelevant to the issue of waiver because “voluntary intoxication is relevant to determining whether a

waiver was knowing and intelligent”); State v. Bramlett, 609 P.2d 345, 350 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) overruled on other grounds by Armijo v. State Through Transp. Dep’t, 737 P.2d 552 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (holding the contradictory testimony from the officers that the defendant was too intoxicated to be released and was detained for his own protection, but was not so intoxicated that he could not provide a knowing waiver of his constitutional rights “offends the standards of fundamental fairness under the due process clause” “and is unworthy of the degree of belief necessary to sustain a finding of voluntary waiver”).

To the extent, this Court determines that Saxon stands for the proposition that intoxication short of unconsciousness may *never* render a statement involuntarily made, Appellant argues against precedent. Appellant urges this Court to review the entire Saxon opinion, which demonstrates the South Carolina Supreme Court determined the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding Saxon’s statement was voluntary because there was evidence in the record that Saxon was not intoxicated and fully understood what he was doing and saying. The only evidence in the record was that Appellant was extremely intoxicated at the time Happ interrogated him. There was no contradictory evidence as there was in Saxon, supra. The prosecution presented no contrary evidence that Appellant was not extremely intoxicated, and all of the evidence, including the voice recorder and the video, corroborated Appellant’s version that he was extremely intoxicated at the time he gave a statement to Happ, and as a result, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s statement was inadmissible.

Statement to Wynn

While Appellant remained handcuffed in Happ’s car, Howard Wynn, an investigator, arrived on the scene. R. 16, ll. 1-2. Happ’s car was equipped with a camera that permitted audio and video recording of the inside and the outside of the car. R. 12, l. 23 – R. 13, l. 5. When Wynn

arrived, he began speaking to Appellant through the rear window, and Happ's camera captured the interrogation. R. 13, ll. 9-21; R. 16, ll. 6-15; State's Exhibit #2.

When Wynn warned Appellant of his rights pursuant to Miranda and asked if Appellant wanted to speak to him, Appellant said he did not. R. 19, ll. 4-14; State's Exhibit #2. When Appellant clearly, unambiguously, and unequivocally stated he did not want to speak to Wynn, Wynn responded by saying, "you don't, sort of with an inflection in [his] voice as if ... it would be a question." R. 19, ll. 15-21; State's Exhibit #2. Only after Wynn challenged Appellant's invocation of his right to silence did Appellant succumb and agree to waive his constitutional right and answer Wynn's questions. R. 20, ll. 5-9.

Although Wynn acknowledged Appellant had consumed alcohol prior to the interrogation, Wynn maintained his belief that Appellant did not "appear to be to a level of intoxication" that would have given Wynn "pause as far as speaking with him and getting a statement form him that night." R. 17, ll. 14-19; R. 18, ll. 18-20; R. 21, ll. 20-24. Wynn even noted Appellant's slurred speech during their interaction. R. 18, l. 21 – R. 19, l. 3.

During the interrogation, Wynn told Appellant that what he was saying was not 100% true and he knew this to be the case based on what individuals inside the transitional shelter told him. State's Exhibit #2. Wynn told Appellant that he could not help Appellant if Appellant did not tell him the truth. State's Exhibit #2.

Defense counsel moved to exclude Appellant's second statement based upon Appellant's extreme intoxication and his invocation of his right to silence when Wynn sought a waiver of that right. R. 24, ll. 8-13. The Constitution mandated Wynn stop his interrogation when Appellant invoked his right to silence. R. 24, ll. 11-13. However, "Wynn kept on talking with him until eventually he did say that he would answer questions." R. 24, ll. 14-17. The prosecutor admitted

Appellant “initially” said “no” when Wynn asked if he wanted to speak to Wynn. R. 25, ll. 17-18. According to the prosecutor, however, “in the same stream - - I mean it’s pretty much the same sentence, basically a run-on sentence, and they’re talking over one another as I recall at one point or very close to it, but he does agree without any sort of provocation or anything like that to talk to Investigator Wynn about the case and on they went from there.” R. 25, ll. 17-23. In the solicitor’s view, Appellant “denied any involvement” and said he left his knife at his cousin’s house. R. 25, ll. 24-25. Per the solicitor,

[B]ased on [Appellant’s] ability to recognize the situation he was in - - in fact, there was one point where he gives Investigator Wynn information where to locate the knife and Investigator Wynn says something that appeared to me to indicate he was going to check on that to try to verify the information and shut the door, and then [Appellant] utters several expletives, as if his story were about to be checked up on and it may not be accurate.

R. 26, ll. 3-10. In conclusion, the solicitor argued that “the content of his statement shows that he did know what he was doing because he was providing denials about every accusation they made at him.” R. 26, ll. 11-14.

After noting that Appellant was in custody, which was not disputed, the judge found the state “provided sufficient evidence to show that his statement was knowingly, freely, voluntarily given.” R. 27, ll. 16-20. After ruling on the intoxication aspect of the argument, discussed supra, the judge found that although Appellant clearly told Wynn he did not want to talk, Appellant “continued to initiate conversation with the investigator, showing a willingness to further discuss the investigation with the officer.” R. 28, ll. 12-17. Thus, the judge ruled the statement was admissible. R. 28, ll. 18-20.³

³ Defense counsel renewed his objection when the prosecutor offered the video of Wynn’s interrogation of Appellant during the trial. R. 103, l. 13. The judge overruled the objection. R. 103, ll. 14-16.

This Court affirmed the trial judge's decision. State v. Durant, 2019-UP-083 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 20, 2019). In a footnote, this Court indicated that Appellant's argument on appeal that this statement was involuntary because Wynn improperly promised to help him was not preserved for appellate review. Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear this preservation ruling. When defense counsel argued the second statement was not admissible he stated, "I would include the same argument with regards to the intoxication, but I would add that [Appellant], when asked if he wanted to be questioned after hearing Miranda rights, said no and at that point the questions did not stop and they were supposed to at that point in time." R. 24, ll. 8-13. Appellant readily admits that trial counsel did not specifically say that Wynn's improper promise of help was a basis for exclusion. Nevertheless, requiring trial counsel to mention every point reads the error preservation rules too strictly. See State v. Simmons, 423 S.C. 552, 561, 816 S.E.2d 566, 571 (2018).

"For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, the objection must be made at the time the evidence is presented and with sufficient specificity to inform the circuit court judge of the point being urged by the objector." State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 444, 710 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2011). The four basic requirements to preserving issues for appellate review are that the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court, raised by the appellant, raised in a timely manner, and raised to the trial court with sufficient specificity. Simmons, 423 S.C. at 561, 816 S.E.2d at 571. Trial counsel objected to the introduction of the statement, elicited the testimony regarding Wynn's improper promise, and argued for exclusion of the statement based upon the totality of the circumstances, which necessarily included Wynn's improper promise. Thus, Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear its decision on the preservation of his argument.

The United States Supreme Court held that "[i]f [an] individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.

... [A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-474. If a suspect invokes his right to silence, the interrogators must scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975); State v. Benjamin, 345 S.C. 470, 476, 549 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2001). A suspect invokes his right to silence by clearly articulating his desire to end the interrogation and must do so “unambiguously.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381; Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 42, 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998).

Our state supreme court noted with approval that other courts have set forth five factors to analyze to ascertain whether the defendant’s right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. The first is whether the police warned the defendant of his Miranda rights at the first interrogation. The second is whether the police immediately stopped the interrogation when the defendant indicated he did not want to answer questions. The third is whether the police resumed questioning only after passage of a significant period of time. The fourth is whether the police provided a second set of Miranda warnings prior to the second interrogation. Finally, the fifth factor is whether the second interrogation was restricted to a crime that had not been the subject of the earlier interrogation. Benjamin, 345 S.C. at 476-477, 549 S.E.2d at 261. The Court made clear, however, that these “factors are not exclusively controlling, nor do they establish a test which can be woodenly applied.” Id. at 477, 549 S.E.2d at 261. “Rather, the factors provide a framework for determining whether, under the circumstances, an accused’s right to silence was scrupulously honored.” Id.

Applying the factors to the instant matter requires reversal of Appellant’s conviction and remanding of the case for a new trial. During the first interrogation, Happ advised Appellant of his rights, and Appellant waived those rights, agreeing to speak with Happ. Additionally, Wynn

advised Appellant of his rights. However, when Appellant clearly, unambiguously, and unequivocally invoked his right to silence, Wynn challenged his invocation. Wynn did not immediately cease the interrogation as the Constitution requires. Instead, Wynn confronted Appellant regarding his invocation. This confrontation and the resumption of questioning occurred within seconds of Appellant's invocation – not after the passage of a significant period of time. Wynn did not advise Appellant of his rights again; instead, when Appellant told Wynn that he did not want to speak to him, Wynn said he was going to ask him a couple of questions. Only then did Appellant acquiesce. The entire questioning by Wynn concerned the stabbing at the transitional shelter – not a separate incident.

“A statement may not be ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] obtained by the exertion of improper influence.’” State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 386, 652 S.E.2d 444, 452 (Ct. App. 2007)(quoting State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1990)).

It is not enough that a defendant previously waived his rights to silence. Rochester, 301 S.C. at 200, 391 S.E.2d at 246. “[A] voluntary waiver continues” only “until the individual being questioned indicates that he wants to revoke the waiver and remain silent or circumstances exist which establish that his ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’” Id. (quoting State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 62, 254 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979)). A confession may not be induced by any sort of threats or violence, or obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of improper influence. Id. (citing Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976)). When a statement induced by a promise of lenience is so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise, the statement is involuntary and

inadmissible. Id. at 200, 391 S.E.2d at 246-247 (citing State v. Peake, 291 S.C. 138, 352 S.E.2d 487 (1987)).

The South Carolina Supreme Court held the state failed to meet its burden of showing a defendant's statement was voluntary and not the product of the officer's promise of leniency where the officer "made a suggestion" to the defendant that the state "would not ask for the death penalty" in his case and that the officer "would call the solicitor and have him put it in writing to that effect." Peake, 291 S.C. at 139, 352 S.E.2d at 487. The officer testified that he essentially guaranteed the defendant that the state would not seek the death penalty if he gave a statement. Id.


In Rochester, a polygraph examiner told the suspect that it would be in his best interest to tell the truth. Rochester, 301 S.C. at 199, 391 S.E.2d at 246. Almost immediately thereafter, the suspect gave a detailed confession. Id. According to the South Carolina Supreme Court, "[t]he polygraph examiner's statement was not on its face an inducement or hope of lighter punishment. Standing alone, the polygraph examiner's comment did not constitute the kind of hope of reward or benefit condemned by this Court in Peake." Id. at 200-201, 391 S.E.2d at 247.

Wynn clearly promised Appellant help if Appellant would speak to him. This offer of help is particularly troubling in light of Appellant's invocation of his right to silence, which Wynn failed to honor as required by the Constitution. Wynn did not advise Appellant that it would be in his best interest to tell the truth as the polygraph examiner in Rochester, supra, did. Rather, Wynn offered Appellant help if Appellant would tell him the truth about what happened. This offer of help is more akin to the promise not to seek the death penalty in Peake, supra, because it was the officer affirmatively extending assistance to Appellant concerning the criminal matter in exchange for Appellant waiving his constitutional right to silence.

Examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding Appellant's statement to Wynn requires reversal as Appellant's statement was not made pursuant to a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to silence. Wynn's failure to scrupulously honor Appellant's invocation of his right to silence – not once, but twice – shows the futility of any resistance to law enforcement or the exercise of his constitutional right. Wynn was aware of Appellant's state of extreme intoxication.⁴ Rather than wait to interrogate Appellant when he was less inebriated, Wynn chose to interrogate Appellant immediately – seizing upon his discombobulation resulting from the over-consumption of alcohol. Compounding the failure to honor the invocation, Wynn first took advantage of Appellant's intoxicated state and then made him an irresistible offer of help if only he agreed to cooperate with the police. The trial judge erred in allowing the state to introduce the statements made by Appellant to Wynn where the state failed to carry its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant's waiver was knowing and involuntary.

For these reasons, Appellant respectfully requests rehearing of this Court's decision to affirm the trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of his two statements to police.

Respectfully Submitted,


SUSAN B. HACKETT
Appellate Defender

This 7th day of March, 2019.

⁴ Appellant incorporates by reference his argument that intoxication alone may render a statement inadmissible as presented in his argument concerning his statement to Happ. Additionally, Appellant incorporates by reference the case law concerning intoxication as a factor to consider for the totality of the circumstances.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 Appeal from Florence County

D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,


V.

MELVIN DURANT,


APPELLANT

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-entitled case has been served upon William M. Blicht, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and Melvin Durant, #177063, at Lee Correctional Institution, 990 Wisacky Hwy., Bishopville, SC 29010, this 7th day of March, 2019.


 Susan B. Hackett
 Appellate Defender
 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE
 ME this 7th day of March, 2019.

 (L.S)
 Notary Public for South Carolina
 My Commission Expires: May 2, 2027

The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,




v.

Melvin Durant, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001390

ORDER

After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.

	C.J.
	J.
	J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:
Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire
Susan Barber Hackett, Esquire
William M. Blich, Jr., Esquire
Edgar Lewis Clements, III, Esquire
Doris Poulos O'Hara

FILED

April 19, 2019