

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY

William Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2019-001006

RECEIVED
SEP 26 2019
SC Court of Appeals

South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Edward D. Sloan, Jr., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants,

v.

South Carolina Department of Transportation, and Robert J. St. Onge, Jr., Secretary of Transportation, Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Beacham O. Brooker, Jr.
754 Kilbourne Rd.
Columbia, South Carolina 29205
(803) 315-8951
brookerbo@scdot.org

Attorney for the South Carolina Department of
Transportation

Brooker Law Offices, LLC

754 Kilbourne Rd.

Columbia, South Carolina 20205

(803) 315-8951

b_brooker@bellsouth.net

September 26, 2019

The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings
Clerk of the S.C. Court of Appeals
PO Box 11629
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

RE: Appellate Case No. 2019-001006

Dear Ms Kitchings:

I enclose for filing in this case, an unbound original and seven copies of the Respondents' final Brief with Rule 211 certification of counsel, and a certificate of service on Appellants' counsel.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Beacham O. Brooker, Jr.
SC Bar #909

Enclosures

Table of Contents

Table of Authorities	ii
Statement of the Case	1
Statement of the Issues on Appeal	4
Argument	5
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.....	5
II. Respondents were substantially justified in withholding and redacting the document south on grounds of privacy.....	7
Conclusion	10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<u>Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., Inc.</u> , 340 S.C. 626, 532 S.E.2d 856 (2000).....	8
<u>Heath v. County of Aiken</u> , 302 S.C. 178, 394 S.E.2d 709 (1990).....	9
<u>Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia</u> , 192 S.C. 454, 458, 7 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1940)	8
<u>Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County</u> , 382 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009)	5
<u>Layman v. State</u> , 376 S.C. 434, 444, 658 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2008).....	5
<u>Litchfield Plantation Co., Inc. v. Georgetown County Water and Sewer District</u> , 314 S.C. 30,33, 443 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1994).....	5
<u>Pierce v. Underwood</u> , 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988).....	9
<u>Pope v. Wilson</u> , Op. No. 5657 (S.C. App. June 19, 2019) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. 25).....	6
<u>Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley</u> , 393 S.C. 152, 711 S.E.2d 895 (2011).....	6
<u>Sloan v. S.C. Department of Public Safety</u> , 355 S.C. 321, 327, 586 S.E.2d 108, 110 (2003).....	8
<u>South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Edward D. Sloan, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, and Jane Doe, a DOT employee</u> , No. 2013-CP-40-3677	1, 3
<u>Video Gaming Consultants, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t. of Revenue</u> , 358 S.C:647, 595 S.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 2004).....	9

Statutes

28 U.S.C.A. § 2412.....	8
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A).....	9
S.C. Code Ann. §15-53-10, <i>et. seq.</i>	2
S.C. Code Ann. §15-77-300 (Supp. 2012).....	8
S.C. Code Ann. §30-4-10, <i>et seq.</i>	3
S.C. Code Ann. §30-4-100(b) (Rev. 2007).....	1, 3
S.C. Const. art. X, 11	2

Rules

<u>Rule 12, Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement</u>	8
<u>Rule 37(a)(4), SCRCP</u>	4, 5
<u>Rule 37, SCRCP</u>	3, 5
<u>Rule 413, Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement</u>	7
<u>Rule 7 (b)(3), Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement</u>	7

Treatises

32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts, §260.....	10
--	----

Respondents, the South Carolina Department of Transportation and Robert St. Onge, Secretary of Transportation, respectfully submit this brief in response to Appellants' Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants appeal the Orders of the Honorable William Jeffrey Young, filed July 15, 2015, in Richland County denying their request for attorney fees under the Freedom of Information Act's fee shifting provision, S.C. Code Ann. §30-4-100(b) (Rev. 2007), and noting that fees may still be available under a separate case pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), SCRCF, and that of the Honorable Jocelyn Newman dismissing their complaint on May 22, 2019.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This matter involves two cases arising from the same facts, this one (hereinafter referred to as "Sloan II") and South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Edward D. Sloan, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. South Carolina Department of Transportation; and Jane Doe, a DOT employee, No. 2013-CP-40-3677 ("Sloan I"). Both cases have resulted in final orders of the Circuit Court for Richland County. A Maintenance Inspector at the Department's Chester Maintenance section had directed a maintenance crew in the vicinity to push rocks and clay that had washed from the driveway of her personal residence onto the adjoining highway back onto her driveway. The inspector had been building a new driveway when a rain storm caused significant erosion onto the State-maintained highway that it entered. The crew, consisting of one loader operator and a foreman, responded by using the loader to back-drag the material from the highway back onto the driveway and feather it out. Upon receipt of a complaint

from a neighbor, three of the Department's management personnel were assigned to investigate the matter and produce a written report to the Department's Chief Counsel. The investigation report recommended discipline for the Inspector, the foreman, and the backhoe operator. The inspector received a five-day suspension from work. The foreman received a written reprimand and the backhoe operator an oral reprimand. The Department estimated that the cost to the State totaled \$129.39 including one-hour's wages for the Inspector (who was temporarily present), foreman, and backhoe operator and an hour's operating cost of the backhoe, and the employees' trucks.

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Sloan I on July 1, 2013. That Complaint sought an Order under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, S.C. Code Ann. §15-53-10, *et seq.*, declaring that the use of Department personnel and equipment to repair a private driveway violated Article X, Section 11, of the South Carolina Constitution preventing the credit of the State from being pledged or loaned for the benefit of private individuals or companies. That matter resulted in an Order in plaintiffs' favor by the Honorable Allison Renee Lee after a bench trial on the merits held August 27, 2015. R.p. 32-43. In her Order, Judge Lee found the Plaintiffs had "public importance standing" to bring their suit and that the Department's actions indeed violated the above-cited constitutional provision. The court ordered the Department to collect from the Inspector the cost of the work. Notably, however, the court refused any award of attorney fees or costs to the plaintiffs noting that,

SCDOT took disciplinary action against its employees for violation of state laws prior to this action being filed in 2013. Based upon all the findings and conclusions in this matter, this Court does not find a basis to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-77-300 and declines to do so.

R.p. 42.

The Department and St. Onge responded to plaintiffs' discovery requests in Sloan I on August 20, 2013. In those responses, an internal investigative report prepared by the Department's Director of Maintenance office at the request of the Chief Counsel was withheld on the ground that it was attorney-client privileged material. In its responses, Defendants also objected to requests for the names of its personnel involved and its internal reports on the incident on grounds of invasion of privacy and relevance.

Plaintiffs moved to compel production of the report under Rule 37, SCRPC. In response, Defendants delivered to the court two versions of the report for *in camera* review—the complete report, and a copy with the employee names redacted. On October 24, 2013, Judge Robert E. Hood heard counsel on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents in Sloan I, and subsequently ordered that the full investigative report that Defendant had delivered under seal be disclosed. Defendant complied with that order delivering the full report.

Thereafter, Appellants filed this suit under the caption herein against the Department and the then Secretary of Transportation, Sloan II, seeking the same report under the Freedom of Information Act, S.C. Code Ann. §30-4-10, *et seq.* (FOIA). Following Judge Hood's Order to produce in Sloan I, Appellant's applied for their costs and fees in Sloan II under subsection (b) of S.C. Code §30-4-100 arguing that, because they had successfully obtained the investigation report in Sloan I, they were prevailing parties under the FOIA statute and deserved to be paid their costs and fees.

Defendants argued that allowing a litigant to proceed simultaneously under FOIA and under the discovery rules has the effect of depriving a governmental defendant in court

of substantial rights available to all litigants. The reason lies in the differing language between the FOIA fee-shifting statute and that contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Subsection (b) of §30-4-100 of FOIA states simply: "If a person or entity seeking such relief prevails, he or it may be awarded reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation." By contrast, Rule 37(a)(4), SCRPC, allows the party opposing disclosure the opportunity to assert that its position was substantially justified in order to avoid payment of fees. Allowing a party to file a concurrent suit under FOIA would set a precedent that a government defendant would never be permitted to advance an argument of substantial justification thereby depriving it of a right available to all other litigants.

In his Order, Judge Young noted the fairness to both parties of denying the instant petition for fees explaining that the Plaintiffs still had an opportunity to seek fees under Sloan I the actual case they sought production in and doing so would preserve Defendants' right to argue substantial justification for withholding the documents. Appellants have not moved for their discovery costs and fees in Sloan I.

This Court dismissed Appellants' appeal of Judge Young's Order in an unpublished opinion dated May 11, 2017 finding that the Order was not immediately appealable because there had been no final disposition of the case below. Opinion No. Op: 5657.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its refusal to award fees this action, Sloan II, where fees may be available through the fee-shifting provisions of the Rule Appellants actually pursued?
2. Whether the Respondents were substantially justified in withholding and redacting the records sought?

ARGUMENT

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Because the statute providing for awards to prevailing parties in suits to enforce FOIA uses the term “may,” an award under that statute is discretionary with the trial judge. Litchfield Plantation Co., Inc. v. Georgetown County Water and Sewer District, 314 S.C. 30, 33, 443 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1994). The decision to award or deny attorneys’ fees under a state statute will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 382 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009) (citing Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 444, 658 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2008)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions. *Id.*, 675 S.E.2d at 445. Neither is present here. The trial court noted the unfairness of allowing a litigant against the government to seek production of documents under Rule 37, SCRPC, simultaneously seek the same documents under FOIA, then, after prevailing under the former, demanding fees under the latter. As the trial court’s Order points out, Rule 37 (a)(4) allows losing parties to argue that their litigating position was substantially justified or that other circumstances exist that would make an award unjust. Although Respondents would argue that these factors may be considered in the discretionary decision of the judge under the FOIA fee shifting provision, courts are not expressly directed to consider those factors under that Code section. The result of sanctioning this dual course approach to discovery may mean that a State defendant may never be able to avail itself of the protections provided by Rule 37(a)(4) that is available to every other litigant in our courts. Likewise, courts would be deprived of their discretion under the substantially justified standard if a litigant could simply file a

suit to enforce a FOIA request and have another judge overrule that decision. Finally, as the trial court noted, it is not unfair to the Appellant to be required to seek their fees under the Civil Rules because that is the course they chose to pursue.

Secondly, Appellants were not prevailing parties in their FOIA suit, Sloan II. Rather, they successfully obtained an order for disclosure of the report in their declaratory judgment action, Sloan I. The existence of two lawsuits under two separate statutes suffices to distinguish this matter from Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley, 393 S.C. 152, 711 S.E.2d 895 (2011). There, the Supreme Court declared that producing requested information under FOIA only after suit to enforce the request was filed in order to deny the requester prevailing party status would frustrate the Act's intent and allow agencies to stonewall the request without penalty. Respondents do not argue in this case that Appellants are not entitled to fees because the documents were produced prior to court action in their FOIA suit. Rather, Respondents attempt to assert their rights under the civil discovery rules to argue that withholding employees' names on privacy grounds was substantially justified. Respondents were substantially justified in withholding and redacting the document sought on grounds of privacy.

Appellants' arguments in Section II, pp. 8-12, of their brief regarding citizens' rights under the Freedom of Information Act are irrelevant to this appeal. The documents at issue have been produced in response to the order of Judge Hood. Respondents did not appeal that order and do not argue the production issue here. Rather, we maintain that the petitioner was not entitled to fees for the reasons stated in both Judge Young's and Judge Lee's orders. R.p. 7 and 32. The recent case Appellants cite at length in their brief, Pope v. Wilson, Op. No. 5657 (S.C. App. June 19, 2019) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. 25), does not

support their arguments. That case only involved the relationship between the rules of civil procedure and FOIA with regard to document production in the first instance. As noted above, that issue is now the law of the case herein. With regard to attorneys' fees, the Pope court stated,

“Our supreme court has interpreted this provision (Section 30-4-100(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018)) to mean that even if a person seeking FOIA relief prevails in full, the circuit court has discretion as to whether to award attorney's fees and costs.”

Id. at ____.

Judge Young did not abuse his discretion in denying fees.

II. Respondents were substantially justified in withholding and redacting the document south on grounds of privacy.

The Respondents were substantially justified in seeking to protect the information sought in this matter even though the court ordered the information be disclosed. In Sloan I, Appellants sought an order declaring that a highway inspector's direction to a maintenance crew to clean the highway in front of her house and redeposit the dirt and stone back on her driveway violated the State Constitution's prohibition against the use of public resources for private benefit. Respondents had ordered an internal investigation and issued disciplinary action under the Department's employee disciplinary policy. The inspector was suspended for a week without pay. Having served the time without pay, she is entitled to expect no further penalty. Publishing her name amounts to a public reprimand and additional penalty. Public reprimand is a well-known and frequently utilized sanction or penalty in disciplinary regimes. See, e.g., Rule 413, Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 7 (b)(3) (Public reprimand as the third most severe sanction for lawyer

misconduct.) In the lawyer disciplinary sphere, the complaint and the identity of the lawyer being investigated is confidential until such time as the sanctions of disbarment, suspension, or public reprimand are imposed. *Id.*, Rule 12. Respondents were justified in seeking to conceal her identity even though the court denied its motion due to the discovery rules' bias in favor of disclosure.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has defined the constitutional right of privacy as the right to be left alone; the right of a person to be free of unwarranted publicity. Sloan v. S.C. Department of Public Safety, 355 S.C. 321, 327, 586 S.E.2d 108, 110 (2003) (quoting Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 192 S.C. 454, 458, 7 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1940)). Despite repeatedly printing the name of the inspector in their court filings, plaintiffs have yet to explain why her identity is relevant to the relief it requested. Moreover, plaintiffs have not served the inspector, nor made her a party to these proceedings to afford her the opportunity to defend herself, even though they sought an order that she pay money back to Respondents. Respondents were substantially justified in asserting a right to conceal her identity and thus are entitled to protection from an attorney fee award under the civil rules.

Our Supreme Court has based its consideration of the term "substantially justified" in another South Carolina fee-shifting statute, the "State action" statute, S.C. Code Ann. §15-77-300 (Supp. 2012), on the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of similar language in the main federal fee-shifting statute involving the government, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412.¹ Heath v. County of Aiken, 302 S.C. 178, 394 S.E.2d

¹ Both the federal and the South Carolina statutes negate the "American Rule" that each party to a lawsuit bear its own costs. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., Inc., 340 S.C. 626, 532 S.E.2d 856 (2000). Further, statutes waiving the state's

709 (1990); see, also, Video Gaming Consultants, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't. of Revenue, 358 S.C.647, 595 S.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 2004). That statute, enacted in 1980, provides in part,

(d)(1) ...a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and expenses...unless the court finds the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make and award unjust.

In Heath, our Supreme Court noted,

In Pierce [v. Underwood], 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988)], the Supreme Court discussed the definition of “substantial justification” in the context of attorney’s fees and determined that this term does not mean “‘justified to a high degree’, but rather ‘justified in substance or in the main’-that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” 108 S.Ct. at 2250. To say that there was no substantial justification is not the same as a determination that a claim was frivolous. Therefore, a court need not go so far as to brand a claim “frivolous” in order for it to be found to be without substantial justification. Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S.Ct. at 2251.

Heath, 394 S.E.2d at 712.

There is an abundance of legislative history and case law interpretation of the federal statute. Reference is craved to the annotation at 69 A.L.R. Fed. 130 (“What constitutes substantial justification of government’s position so as to prohibit awards of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, (28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A)).”) With regard to the legislative history, the annotation refers to the House Judiciary Committee Report which states that the substantial justification test is essentially one of reasonableness. Thus, no award is intended where the government can show that its case had a reasonable basis in both law and in fact. The Report explains that the substantial justification standard should not be read to raise the presumption that the government was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case, and indicates that the standard

immunity from suit being in derogation of sovereignty must be strictly construed and the State can be sued only in the manner and upon the terms and conditions prescribed by the statute.)

does not require the government to establish that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevailing. 69 A.L.R. Fed. 130.

Regarding the federal case law, Am. Jur. Fed. has a good summary:


To be substantially justified means, of course, more than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness. However, a position can be justified even though it is not correct and can be substantially (that is, for the most part) justified if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact. It must have enough foundation in law and fact that a reasonable person could think it correct; in other words, such position must be sufficiently colorable to engender "genuine dispute."

32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts, §260. Respondents' position on its employees' rights of privacy was substantially justified and constitutes circumstances making an award unjust.

CONCLUSION

The Court should affirm the Order of the Circuit Court dismissing this case.

Respectfully submitted,



Beacham O. Brooker Jr.

754 Kilbourne Rd.

Columbia, South Carolina 29205

(803) 315-8951

B_brooker@bellsouth.net

RECEIVED

SEP 26 2019

SC Court of Appeals

Columbia, S.C.
September 26, 2019

Pursuant to Rule 211(a), SCACR, the undersigned certifies that this Final Brief of

Respondent complies with Rule 211(b).

