

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

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Certiorari to the Court of Appeals  
Appeal From Charleston County  
Hon. W. Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge  
Appellate Case Tracking No. 2019-001019  
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**RECEIVED**  
JAN 08 2020  
S.C. SUPREME COURT

The State,

Respondent,

v.

Rhajon Akeem Reshae Sanders,

Petitioner.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Opinion No. 2019-UP-100 (S.C. Ct. App. filed March 6, 2019)  
\_\_\_\_\_

**BRIEF OF RESPONDENT**  
\_\_\_\_\_

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## STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CERTIORARI

- I. The trial court did not err in its refusal to charge the requested charges related to self-defense. First, Petitioner was not entitled to a self-defense charge as a matter of law and any error in giving the requested charges would be entirely harmless. Additionally, the court did not err in declining to charge Petitioner had the right to “act on appearances” when it was not applicable under his version of events. Finally, Petitioner was not entitled to a “no duty to retreat” charge because he was not without fault in bringing on the difficulty and was not attacked on his premises, but even if the court should have charged Petitioner had “no duty to retreat” any error was entirely harmless as the failure to charge could not have impacted the jury’s verdict. (Petitioner’s Issues I and IV).
  
- II. The trial court did not err in limiting Petitioner’s ability to go into testimony regarding the type of neighborhood in which he lived because it was not relevant to why the victim was shot and would likely serve to either confuse or prejudice the jury. Additionally, the trial court did not err in limiting Petitioner’s closing argument and in preventing discussion of the characteristics of the neighborhood in front of the jury. Further, any error is entirely harmless in light of the information provided to the jury. (Petitioner’s Issues II and III).

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

### Procedural History

The State agrees with Petitioner's procedural Statement of the Case.

### Factual Background

On the day after Christmas in 2014, Nicholas Washington was visiting his aunt and family on Kent Avenue in North Charleston. (T.67-68; R.28-29). Washington, dressed in black jeans and his Wal-Mart uniform, stepped out of the house about seven in the evening to smoke a cigarette and talk on the phone. (T.70; 87-88; R.31; 48-49). Washington got off the phone, flicked out his cigarette and got up from the step he was sitting on. (T.71; R.32). While he was outside, he saw three people sitting on the porch at the house across the street. (T.71; R.32). Washington had no interactions that night with the people outside across the street. (T.79; R.40). He made another phone call, then got out his headphones and began listening to music on his phone. (T.72; R.33).

Washington put his phone in his pocket and reached into another pocket to grab a lighter to light another cigarette. He saw his little brother come out of his aunt's house and run through a gate. He heard the gate close and then saw something that looked like a firecracker. He heard multiple shots. (T.78; R.39). Washington fell and could not get up because he had been shot. (T.73-74; R.34-35). After he was shot, Washington saw one person drive off in an automobile. (T.74-75; R.35-36). Then, someone else came up to Washington and apologized for shooting him. (T.75-76; R.36-37).

Washington was taken to the hospital where he had surgery on his leg. He sustained a gunshot wound to his left tibia. (T.152; R.113). The result was a "highly broken up fracture of his tibial shaft." (T.152; R.113). A permanent aluminum rod was placed in his lower leg and, as a

result, he walks with a limp. (T.77; 153-154; R.38; 114-115). According to the doctor's note, Washington "was standing on the sidewalk smoking a cigarette when someone walked by and simply shot him in the leg." (T.160; R.121).

## ARGUMENT

- I. The trial court did not err in its refusal to charge the requested charges related to self-defense. First, Petitioner was not entitled to a self-defense charge as a matter of law and any error in giving the requested charges would be entirely harmless. Additionally, the court did not err in declining to charge Petitioner had the right to “act on appearances” when it was not applicable under his version of events. Finally, Petitioner was not entitled to a “no duty to retreat” charge because he was not without fault in bringing on the difficulty and was not attacked on his premises, but even if the court should have charged Petitioner had “no duty to retreat” any error was entirely harmless as the failure to charge could not have impacted the jury’s verdict. (Petitioner’s Issues I and IV).

The trial court did not err in refusing to give a charge that Petitioner had the right to act on appearances or that Petitioner had no duty to retreat. Petitioner was not entitled to a self-defense charge based on any version of the events resulting in Washington being shot. Additionally, even if self-defense was properly charged, the facts of the incident do not support an “act on appearances” or a “no duty to retreat” charge.

### Standard of Review

“An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge’s decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010) (citing State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144 (2007)). “In general, the trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina.” Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004). ““In reviewing jury charges for error, [the Court] must consider the court’s jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial.”” State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011) (quoting State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct. App. 2003)). “To warrant reversal, a trial judge’s

refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant.”  
State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010).

### Merits

“Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law.” S.C. Const. art. V, § 21. “A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law.” Mattison, 388 S.C. at 478, 697 S.E.2d at 583 (citations omitted). “The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial.” State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 302, 555 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2001). “In reviewing jury charges for error, [the Court] must consider the court’s jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial.” Brandt, 393 S.C. at 549, 713 S.E.2d at 603 (quoting State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct. App. 2003)). “Jury instructions should be designed to enlighten the jury and aid it in arriving at a correct verdict.” State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 498, 787 S.E.2d 480, 482 (2016) (citing State v. Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 137, 355 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1987)). “In charging self-defense, we instruct the trial court to consider the facts and circumstances of the case at bar in order to fashion an appropriate charge.” State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 443, 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989).

### Propriety of Self-defense Charge

Initially, the State maintains Petitioner was not entitled to the self-defense charge he received so there can be no error in failing to tailor the charge to the facts and circumstances of this case when those facts and circumstances demonstrated the charge was not warranted. Self-defense is comprised of four elements:

- (1) The defendant was without fault in bringing on the difficulty;

(2) The defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger;

(3) If the defense is based upon the defendant's actual belief of imminent danger, a reasonable prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or losing his own life; and

(4) The defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular instance.

State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984).

Petitioner's own version of the events does not support a charge for self-defense. He indicated he exited where he was living and saw a "suspicious tall guy in all black in a vacant yard" across the street. (T.579; R.530). His response to seeing this individual was to waive at him. (T.579; R.530). He then asked the "suspicious" individual: "Yo, are you all right?" Petitioner took a few steps down toward the man and again waived. Petitioner specifically testified there was no prior interaction between him and Washington. He stated he was not aggressive, Washington did not respond in any way, and that he had never had any problems before with Washington or anyone at the addresses across the street. (T.579; 592-593; R.530; 543-544). He further admitted neither Washington nor anyone else across the street had made threats to Petitioner at any time prior to his seeing Washington. (T.593; R.544).

After Petitioner waived, summoning Washington a second time, Washington dropped his cigarette. (T.579-580; R.530-531). Petitioner testified the person "pull[ed] up his pants from the back and that's when he reached in his waistband." (T.580; R.531). At that point, Petitioner fired the shot hitting Washington in his leg. Significantly, Petitioner never testified he saw a gun, saw

a shiny object, or saw anything in Washington's hands. Instead he saw him pull up his pants by his waistband. (T.580; R.531).

Under Petitioner's own version of events, he saw Washington across the street and waived at him. In other words, Petitioner summoned the victim to come over, a natural reaction to seeing someone waive. Further, without any type of provocation at all, Petitioner fired at Washington. His testimony indicated Washington pulled up his pants in the back by reaching in his waistband. It is much more plausible he was going to finish pulling up his pants instead of Petitioner's unreasonable belief he was reaching for a gun to use against Petitioner, a person Washington did not have any prior difficulties with and did not know.

Based on his own testimony, Petitioner's actions brought on the difficulty to the extent any difficulty existed. He waived at a stranger across the street, thereby inviting that stranger to come in his direction. It was the stranger's movement, and need to pull up his pants to complete that movement, toward Petitioner's house that was the "difficulty" which resulted in Petitioner shooting Washington in the leg.

As to the second prong, Petitioner indicated he was scared, but his own testimony belies his belief he was in imminent danger from Washington. First, he admitted he did not know the individual across the street, but was so scared that he waived at him twice. Then, after waiving to get Washington's attention, he sees Washington come in his direction. He allegedly is so scared now he has to get his gun out and when he sees Washington reach to his waistband, he alleges he was in imminent danger even though he did not see a gun or other object that could cause him harm. After shooting Washington, Petitioner is so scared for his life that he takes his gun inside, puts it on the dresser, and then goes back outside to where Washington is laying—the person he was so scared was armed with a gun he was going to use to kill Petitioner—and apologizes for

shooting him. (T.581-582; R.532-533). Petitioner's own actions of waiving at the individual and then putting his gun away before proceeding over to apologize for shooting him belie his claims that he was scared for his life.

Additionally, Petitioner clearly failed to establish the third prong of self-defense. Under the circumstances presented by Petitioner "a reasonable prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage" would not have entertained the same belief regarding imminent danger. No reasonable person would believe that when a stranger reached toward their waistband to pull up their pants the stranger was going to grab a gun and shoot them completely unprovoked, especially after the stranger is only heading in that direction because the person waived multiple times. Petitioner is essentially asking this Court to conclude anytime a stranger is coming towards someone with his or her hands in their pockets or near their waistband, whether they were invited over or not, then it is reasonable to shoot at them. No "reasonable prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage" would believe shooting under these facts and circumstances was justified. As a result, this Court should conclude, as a matter of law, Petitioner was not entitled to a self-defense charge and, therefore, any charges given or not given by the trial court could not have been in error.

### Act on Appearances Charge

Petitioner contends the trial court erred in failing to give an "act on appearances" charge. First, this Court should find the "act on appearances" charge requested by Petitioner was covered by the trial court's instruction to the jury. The trial court charged:

The second element of self defense is the defendant was actually in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury **or that the defendant actually believed** he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.

....

And in deciding whether the defendant actually was or believed he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury you would have to consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, including the physical condition and characteristics of the defendant and the victim, the relative size, ages and weights of the defendant and the victim may be considered in deciding the **apparent** or actual need for force in self[-]defense and the amount of force needed.

....

The defendant has the right to use so much force as **appeared to be necessary** for complete self[-] protection in which a person of ordinary means and firmness would have believed to be needed to prevent death or serious bodily injury.

(R.677-678) (emphasis added). This is the essence of any “act on appearances” charge—it allows the jury to consider the defendant’s state of mind and his beliefs and not just whether he was actually in imminent danger. This Court should find the jury charge given by the trial court was correct and no additional charge was warranted.<sup>1</sup>

The facts of this case also do not warrant a separate “act on appearances” jury charge because no reasonable man would have believed it necessary to act based on the appearances described by Petitioner. In Fuller, the Court explained the charge regarding the right of the defendant to act on appearances:

A defendant must show that he believed he was in imminent danger, not that he was actually in such danger, because he had the right to act on appearances, and under the circumstances as they appeared to him, he believed he was in such danger **and a reasonable prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief.**

Fuller, 297 S.C. at 443–44, 377 S.E.2d at 331. The “act on appearances” language came from the Court’s discussion in State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955). In Fuller, the

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<sup>1</sup> To the extent some case law seems to require a separate additional charge regarding the ability of the defendant to “act on appearances” the State would move to argue against precedent asking the Court to conclude the only charge necessary is the charge given by the trial court.

defendant had significant difficulties with the victims leading up to the need to fire in self-defense. He was grabbed by the throat by one of the victims, who stated: “that is why we have got to take care of n\*\*\*\*\* like you.” Id. at 441, 377 S.E.2d at 330. After the victims rammed Fuller’s incapacitated vehicle, they shouted: “we’re going to take care of you.” Id. at 442, 377 S.E.2d at 330. Fuller saw the men open the trunk to their vehicle and testified he saw something shiny in one of the victim’s hands. Id. The Supreme Court found, as a result, the trial court should have given an act on appearances charge.

In State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955), the case from which the Court in Fuller pulled its language for the act on appearances charge, the Court explained the relevant facts testified to by the defendant:

[Defendant] was awakened by Williams who told him there was ‘somebody out there’; that the front door was locked but could be pushed open if enough force was used and that the ‘somebody’ was trying to enter the house through this door; that he got up and proceeded towards the front door when he heard his mother say, ‘Whoever that is don’t try to tear my door down’; that he took the gun from over the door between the two bedrooms and had proceeded approximately two steps into his mother’s bedroom when he was blinded by a flashlight which was shone in his face, he fired immediately, and heard the body fall to the floor. Upon picking up the flashlight, which was still burning, and directing its beam upon the body, he learned for the first time that he had shot a policeman.

Jackson, 227 S.C. at 276, 87 S.E.2d at 683.

In State v. Nichols, 325 S.C.111, 481 S.E.2d 118 (1997), the defendant was also entitled to a charge regarding his right to act on appearances. In Nichols, the victim has previously pointed a rifle at Nichols and the two had prior difficulties before the incident in which the victim was shot. Further, Nichols testified he saw a shiny object or a gun in the victim’s hand before killing him. Id. at 117, 481 S.E.2d at 121.

The key to the charge is that it is whether a reasonable prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief. In this case, Petitioner asks this Court to apply the right to act on appearances to a person who was, even under Petitioner's version of events, at most crossing the street and reaching toward his waist. (T.580; R.531). There is no indication of a shiny object, and certainly not a weapon of any kind, being seen in the victim's hand. Further, there is no justification to believe his reaching toward his waist to pull up his pants was a hostile act by Washington.

Based on the facts and circumstances described by Petitioner, no reasonable person would have believed the need to act on what he saw by firing a gun at the individual. Under his own testimony, Petitioner waived at the person across the street and when the person noticed he started coming over—a perfectly normal response to being waived at by someone. Petitioner's testimony indicated Washington threw down his cigarette, and then had to pull up his pants upon walking to where Petitioner had just waived. No reasonable person would believe Washington was going for a gun, unprovoked in any way by Petitioner, when he reached for his waistband to pull up his pants in the back. The facts and circumstances justifying the giving of the charge in cases such as Nichols, Jackson and Fuller are vastly different from the circumstances of the instant case. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in refusing to give an act on appearances charge when Petitioner's own testimony belies the need for such a charge because there were no facts or circumstances upon which a reasonable person could act by firing a gun at Washington.

### **No Duty to Retreat**

Petitioner contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that he had no duty to retreat. The facts and circumstances do not warrant the jury charge. Even if the charge should

have been given, any error is entirely harmless as Petitioner's claim of self-defense failed not on his need to retreat but upon the reasonableness of his actions.

The South Carolina Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the "no duty to retreat" charge as it relates to someone being on their own property. The Court stated:

A person need not retreat or seek to escape, even though he can do so without increasing his danger, but may lawfully **resist** even to the extent of taking life if necessary, where, being without fault in bringing on the difficulty, he **is assaulted** while in his own dwelling house, in his office or place of business, or on his premises at or near his dwelling house or, as sometimes said, within the curtilage, or the dooryard, or such space as is customarily occupied by the dwelling house and outbuildings appurtenant thereto. However, the rule is predicated on the absence of aggression or fault on his part in bringing on the difficulty; **the doctrine is for defensive, and not offensive, purposes.**

State v. Grantham, 224 S.C. 41, 43–44, 77 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1953). Further, "an individual had no duty to retreat if by doing so he would increase his danger of being killed or suffering serious bodily injury." Fuller, 297 S.C. at 444, 377 S.E.2d at 331. Neither situation applies in the instant case.

Petitioner failed to demonstrate how he would increase his danger of being killed or suffering serious bodily injury if he simply turned and entered the home from the porch. There is no indication a firing of a gun by Washington was imminent or even could happen in the time it would take Petitioner to have entered the dwelling. He saw him reach in his waistband when he fired, not when he saw a gun pointed ready to shoot.

Additionally, as Grantham clearly notes, the right not to retreat at one's own domicile is based on the right to defend that castle. In the instant case, the need to defend the castle was not readily apparent. Petitioner waived and invited Washington to come over. There was no indication of an "attack" or a need to resist in the testimony by Petitioner. He was attempting to

use his “no duty to retreat” in an offensive and not defensive posture. As a result, he should not have received the jury charge on having no duty to retreat.

Even if the failure to give the charge was error, it was harmless error. An erroneous jury instruction is subject to harmless error analysis. See State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 611, 685 S.E.2d 802, 809 (2009) (citing Lowry v. State, 376 S.C. 499, 510–11, 657 S.E.2d 760, 766 (2008)). The South Carolina Supreme Court explained the analysis used in determining whether an error in a given jury instruction is harmless:

When considering whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict. In making a harmless error analysis, our inquiry is not what the verdict would have been had the jury been given the correct charge, but whether the erroneous charge contributed to the verdict rendered. Thus, whether or not the error was harmless is a fact-intensive inquiry.

State v. Middleton, 407 S.C. 312, 317, 755 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

A review of the facts of this case makes it clear any error in failing to give the “no duty to retreat” charge had no impact on the jury’s ultimate verdict. As discussed above, it was entirely unreasonable for Petitioner to shoot Washington. Petitioner’s testimony provided no indication Washington sought to attack Petitioner or provided any reason for his belief Washington was reaching for a weapon. Petitioner waived at Washington, which would be a sign of invitation or at minimum hospitality. After, assuming Washington approached Petitioner or his home, he was on the other side of the street pulling up his pants and then reaching to his waistband when Petitioner fired. Petitioner fired without ever seeing a weapon of any kind in Washington’s hands. The failure to give the “no duty to retreat” charge had no impact on the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this Court should find the trial court did not err in

refusing the requested charges by Petitioner, especially in light of the fact he was not entitled to a charge on self-defense based on the facts and circumstances of this case taken from his own testimony on how the incident occurred.

- II. The trial court did not err in limiting Petitioner's ability to go into testimony regarding the type of neighborhood in which he lived because it was not relevant to why the victim was shot and would likely serve to either confuse or prejudice the jury. Additionally, the trial court did not err in limiting Petitioner's closing argument and in preventing discussion of the characteristics of the neighborhood in front of the jury. Further, any error is entirely harmless in light of the information provided to the jury. (Petitioner's Issues II and III).

The trial court properly limited Petitioner's right to present testimony he lived in a high crime neighborhood and to argue regarding the nature of the neighborhood in closing argument. The character of the neighborhood is irrelevant when considering the particular facts and circumstances of this case for self-defense. Additionally, any error in failing to allow the testimony is entirely harmless in light of Petitioner's testimony and the fact no reasonable person could conclude Petitioner's actions were reasonable. Finally, there was no error in restricting the "inference" Petitioner's counsel could draw during closing argument because the inference was not a valid inference from the testimony.

#### Standard of Review

In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001); State v. Butler, 353 S.C. 383, 388, 577 S.E.2d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 2003). "The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." Id.

#### Merits

Pursuant to Rule 401, SCRE: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Additionally: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of South Carolina, statutes, these rules, or by other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. **Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.**” Rule 402, SCRE (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the trial court correctly concluded the nature of the community, including other past crimes in the community, was not relevant to a determination of whether Petitioner shot Washington in self-defense. While a defendant may certainly bring forth the victim’s reputation in a community to demonstrate why he was afraid of that victim, this is entirely different than assigning a generic danger level to any person within a neighborhood simply because of the neighborhood. As the trial court pontificated, the requirements for acting in self-defense do not change based on the neighborhood one lives in. (T.338; R.289).

In State v. Nystrom, the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered whether it was error for the trial court to exclude the testimony of an expert regarding the community crime statistics and criminal activity in the area where the shooting occurred when the defendant sought to admit that testimony to establish his state of mind and to show it was reasonable to shoot the victim. State v. Nystrom, 596 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. 1999). The Court specifically concluded: “Petitioner’s proffered expert testimony would not have been helpful to the jury. Petitioner offered no evidence that he believed crime in general was so rampant in north Minneapolis that a preemptive strike against anyone causing him fear was necessary.” Id. at 260. The Court also found exclusion on the general theory of a high crime neighborhood was appropriate, and articulated: “The appellant’s theory is very general, applying to a community rather than to appellant in particular, and is non-circumstantial, based on a generalized fear of crime in that

community. The trial court acted well within its discretion when it excluded the expert's proffered testimony on grounds of relevancy." Id.; see also, Dowe v. State, 39 So. 3d 407, 410 (Fla. 4<sup>th</sup> Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (finding "neighborhood's alleged dangerousness was not relevant to the defendant's self-defense claim when his testimony indicated it was actions of the defendant which caused his response in self-defense) (quashed on other grounds by Dowe v. State, 139 So.3d 885 (Fla. 2014)); cf., State v. Nolle, 638 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. 2002) (finding the need to carry a concealed weapon for self-defense not established based on four men grouped together at night on a street corner in a high crime neighborhood near where the defendant was changing his tire).

Self-defense has to be specific, directed at a specific victim, and based on specific set of facts related to that victim; it is not, not just a general all-encompassing threat from any person within a community. The testimony presented in proffer regarding the neighborhood indicated crimes such as drive-by shootings, car vandalism, random gunshots being heard in the distance, drug activity occurred in the neighborhood, but provided no specifics and provided no information on how those crimes related to the actions of Washington and why Petitioner felt it necessary to shoot him. (T.438-439; 449; 452; R.389-390; 400). Petitioner's argument is that anyone in a high crime area is vulnerable for being shot at any time in that neighborhood simply by walking down the street with their hands in their pockets or at their waist. Accepting this argument would open up high crime neighborhoods to the rules of the Wild West.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Further, the jury was aware of the nature of the neighborhood through testimony by various witnesses including Washington who testified he knew someone killed in the area (T.90-91; R.51-52), North Charleston Police Officer Christian Rothhaus' testimony that he has investigated more than one shooting in the area (T.244; R. 200), and Cynthia Sanders testified the neighborhood was called a high crime area by her neighbors (T.494; R.445). As a result, even if exclusion was error, it was harmless because it would have merely been cumulative to other testimony in the record. See State v. Blackwell, 420 S.C. 127, 160, 801 S.E.2d 713, 730 (2017) ("[E]ven if the trial court erred in excluding the chaplains' notes, we find the error harmless as the evidence was cumulative to other evidence in the record of Blackwell's remorse."); State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 221, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007) (error in failing to admit testimony found harmless when similar evidence already in the record so outcome of trial not affected).

The trial court properly limited the ability of Petitioner's counsel to go into the characteristics of the neighborhood during closing argument because it previously and correctly found the testimony irrelevant, so argument on the issue would have been improper. Further, addressing it before the jury in closing argument would have only served to confuse the jury. Finally, Petitioner indicates he sought to address characteristics of the neighborhood by drawing inferences from Washington's testimony about having a friend killed in the area. See Hoeffner v. The Citadel, 311 S.C. 361, 429 S.E.2d 190 (1993) (noting that arguments which invite the jury to base its verdict on considerations not relevant to the merits of the case are improper); State v. Patterson, 324 S.C. 5, 482 S.E.2d 760 (1997) (trial judge is allowed discretion in dealing with the range and propriety of closing argument to the jury, and rulings on such matters will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion).

The trial court properly prevented Petitioner's counsel from arguing irrelevant and potentially confusing information to the jury. The jury was to make their decision based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident between Washington and Petitioner. The type of neighborhood would not have aided them in making their determination regarding whether self-defense occurred. Further, Washington testified to a single incident of a person being killed in the neighborhood. It is improper to infer a high crime area or extrapolate anything related to this case from the testimony regarding this single incident at some unknown time in the past. Many perfectly safe neighborhoods have a murder or other crime which has taken place, and it would certainly be incorrect to refer to them as high crime areas as a result. Accordingly, the trial court properly limited the closing arguments of Petitioner's counsel to prohibit irrelevant, confusing, and potentially prejudicial arguments from being made.

**CONCLUSION**

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that Petitioner's convictions and sentences be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

January 8, 2020

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals  
Appeal From Charleston County  
Hon. W. Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge  
Appellate Case Tracking No. 2019-001019

The State,

Respondent,

v.

Rhajon Akeem Reshae Sanders,

Petitioner.

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I, Caroline Collins, certify that I have served the within Brief of Respondent by having delivered two copies of the same to:

Wanda H. Carter, Esquire  
S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense  
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I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served.  
This 8<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2020.



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