

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

RECEIVED

JAN 28 2020

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
Appeal from Greenville County
John C. Hayes, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

JONATHAN DONELL RHODES,

PETITIONER

APPENDIX

VICTOR R. SEEGER
Appellate Defender

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

South Carolina Commission on Indigent
Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
PO Box 11589
Columbia, SC 29211-1589
(803) 734-1330

DONALD J. ZELENKA
Deputy Attorney General

MELODY J. BROWN
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

SUSANNAH R. COLE
Assistant Attorney General
SC Bar No. 68383

South Carolina Office of Attorney General
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-1549
(803) 734-0265

W. WALTER WILKINS, III
Solicitor, Thirteenth Circuit
305 East North Street
Greenville, SC 29601
(964) 467-8282

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

INDEX

INDEX i

STATE V. RHODES, OP. NO. 2019-UP-361 (S.C. Ct. App. filed November 6, 2019)1

PETITION FOR REHEARING.....9

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING.....17

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jonathan Donell Rhodes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002605

Appeal From Greenville County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2019-UP-361
Heard March 14, 2018 – Filed November 6, 2019

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek,
Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, and Appellate
Defender Victor R. Seeger, all of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Melody Jane Brown and Assistant
Attorney General Susannah Rawl Cole, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville,
all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jonathan Donell Rhodes appeals his convictions for two counts of murder, two counts of kidnapping, one count of first-degree burglary, and four counts of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, for which the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, Rhodes argues the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his cell phone records law enforcement obtained without a warrant and (2) admitting expert testimony concerning per call measurement data (PCMD). We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Gary and Helen Wells employed Shirley Rogers as their housekeeper. According to multiple sources, Rogers was implicated as the prime suspect in an identity theft and bank fraud investigation wherein the Wellses were the victims. At least two BB&T employees witnessed Rogers confront Helen Wells regarding the investigation and they feared for Helen's safety. The Wellses ultimately terminated Rogers's employment during the pendency of the investigation. On the morning of October 3, 2012, Rogers approached the Wellses' neighbor to express concern that "a man was down" inside the Wellses' home. The neighbor's son-in-law followed Rogers into the home and discovered the bodies of Gary and Helen Wells, who had been brutally murdered.

The ensuing investigation of the murders led the police to Rhodes. An ATM surveillance camera photographed Rogers exiting a Mini Cooper the day after the murders. The vehicle was registered to Rhodes's roommate, Richard Eric Cade, who consented to a search of the vehicle. The search produced DNA samples from both Gary and Helen Wells.

According to Cade's trial testimony, he befriended Rhodes sometime in 2007 and served as a type of mentor. Cade assisted Rhodes financially by providing money, a place to live, regular use of his vehicle, and paying for his cell phone. Cade testified Rhodes was romantically involved with Rogers. On the night of the murders, Rhodes borrowed Cade's Mini Cooper, was gone most of the night, and did not return until approximately 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m. the following morning. Cade repeatedly called Rhodes and sent text messages trying to contact him, but Rhodes never responded.

Special Agent Richard Fennern testified at trial that Cade's cell phone records provided by Sprint corroborated his account of the night because his attempts to

contact Rhodes originated from a cell tower consistent with him being at home all night; Rhodes received the communications via a cell tower consistent with him being at the Wellses' residence.

After Rhodes was arrested for his involvement in the murders, he was incarcerated at the same facility as Curtis McLeod, a jailhouse informant. McLeod testified Rhodes admitted he was involved in the murders. According to McLeod, Rhodes confessed he was in a relationship with Rogers, who had stolen money from the Wellses and had an ongoing "grudge" against them. Rhodes borrowed his roommate's vehicle and picked up Rogers, went to the Wellses' house, and waited out of sight while Rogers confronted the Wellses. The encounter between Rogers and the Wellses "escalated" and a struggle ensued. Rhodes told McLeod he and Rogers forced their way into the Wellses' home, separated the two victims into different rooms, killed them, and robbed the house before leaving.

The jury ultimately found Rhodes guilty as indicted and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the trial court err by refusing to suppress Rhodes's cell phone records?
2. Did the trial court err by admitting expert testimony regarding PCMD?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." *State v. Baccus*, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "This [c]ourt is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous." *Id.* "The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial [court], whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." *State v. Saltz*, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." *State v. Pittman*, 373 S.C. 527, 577, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007).

LAW/ANALYSIS

CELL PHONE RECORDS

Rhodes argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the cell phone records law enforcement obtained without a warrant. Rhodes contends law enforcement acquired the phone records "without properly complying" with the Stored Communications Act. We disagree.

In *Carpenter v. United States*, the United States Supreme Court held that citizens enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in their physical location data compiled and stored by wireless carriers, otherwise known as cell-site location information (CSLI). 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). Therefore, the government's use of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, which requires a search warrant supported by probable cause. *See id.* at 2221. However, we do not believe the Court's decision in *Carpenter* requires exclusion of the CSLI from evidence in the present case.

Here, investigators acquired Rhodes's phone records by requesting Sprint to voluntarily disclose them pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4), a provision of the Stored Communications Act (the Act), which allows a service provider to reveal a customer's records to law enforcement under certain circumstances. Section 2702(a)(3) of the Act mandates: "[A] provider of remote computing service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any governmental entity." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3). Section 2702(c)(4) outlines the following exception:

A provider described in subsection (a) may divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to a governmental entity, if the provider, *in good faith*, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of information relating to the emergency.

18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) (emphasis added). In the present case, on the request form, the investigator described the "exigency" as an ongoing investigation into a double homicide with an active suspect. Regardless of *Carpenter's* legal effect on this particular statute, the underlying circumstances of the instant matter constitute precisely the type of situation the Supreme Court expressly excepted from the warrant requirement for collection of CSLI: "While police must get a warrant when collecting CSLI to assist in the mine-run criminal investigation, the rule we set

forth does not limit their ability to respond to an ongoing emergency." *Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.

Further, "when investigators 'act with an objectively "reasonable good-faith belief" that their conduct is lawful,' the exclusionary rule will not apply." *United States v. Chavez*, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 278 (2018) (quoting *Davis v. United States*, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011)). In *Chavez*, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the effect of the *Carpenter* opinion on a previously-issued court order authorizing the government's acquisition of the defendant's cell phone records pursuant to section 2703 of the Act. *Id.* The Fourth Circuit held, "Objectively reasonable good faith includes 'searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes'" and, thus, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the investigator's actions. *Id.* (quoting *Davis*, 564 U.S. at 239). See *U.S. v. Carpenter*, 926 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2019) (*Carpenter II*) ("The Government's acquisition of Carpenter's CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court nevertheless properly denied suppression because the FBI agents relied in good faith on [the Act] when they obtained the data.").

As in *Chavez*, Rhodes "cannot[] deny that investigators in this case reasonably relied on court orders and [the Act] in obtaining the cell site records"¹ as they sought Sprint's voluntary disclosure of the CSLI in October 2012, years before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in *Carpenter*. Also, we find law enforcement's request for voluntary disclosure of Rhodes's cell phone records was appropriate given the violent nature of the murders. See *U.S. v. Takai*, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323 (D. Utah 2013) (emphasizing "the violent shooting of [a store] clerk in the face at point blank range" to support the finding of an exigent circumstance supporting voluntary disclosure). Therefore, the circuit court properly admitted the CSLI placing Rhodes's phone within the general vicinity of the murders.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rhodes argues the trial court erred by admitting Special Agent Fennern's expert testimony regarding per call measurement data (PCMD) because the underlying science was unreliable.

"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an

¹ *Chavez*, 894 F.3d at 608.

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Rule 702, SCRE. "[T]he trial courts of this state have a gatekeeping role with respect to all evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 702, whether the evidence is scientific or nonscientific." *State v. White*, 382 S.C. 265, 274, 676 S.E.2d 684, 689 (2009):

When admitting scientific evidence under Rule 702, SCRE, the trial [court] must find the evidence will assist the trier of fact, the expert witness is qualified, and the underlying science is reliable. The trial [court] should apply the *Jones* factors to determine reliability.^[2] Further, if the evidence is admissible under Rule 702, SCRE, the trial [court] should determine if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Once the evidence is admitted under these standards, the jury may give it such weight as it deems appropriate.

State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20-21, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999).

In considering the admissibility of scientific evidence under the *Jones* standard, the [c]ourt looks at several factors, including: (1) the publications and peer review of the technique; (2) prior application of the method to the type of evidence involved in the case; (3) the quality control procedures used to ensure reliability; and (4) the consistency of the method with recognized scientific laws and procedures.

Id. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 517.

While we agree with Appellant that the State presented insufficient evidence of the reliability of the science underlying PCMD,³ we are convinced the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the more general CSLI placing Rhodes's phone within the general vicinity of the murders and the additional evidence of Rhodes's guilt. See *State v. Simmons*, 423 S.C. 552, 566, 816 S.E.2d

² *State v. Jones*, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).

³ Specifically, the State fell short of establishing adequate publication and peer review of the technique and consistency of this technique with recognized scientific laws and procedures.

566, 573 (2018) ("A harmless error analysis is contextual and specific to the circumstances of the case." (quoting *State v. Byers*, 392 S.C. 438, 447, 447-8, 710 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2011))); *id.* ("No definite rule of law governs [a finding of harmless error]; rather the materiality and prejudicial character of the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case. Error is harmless when it could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial." (alteration in original) (quoting *Byers*, 392 S.C. at 447-8, 710 S.E.2d at 60)); *id.* ("If a review of the entire record does not establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, then the conviction shall be reversed."); *State v. Adams*, 354 S.C. 361, 381, 580 S.E.2d 785, 795 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[A]n insubstantial error not affecting the result of the trial is harmless where 'guilt has been conclusively proven by competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be reached.'" (quoting *State v. Bailey*, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989)), *cert. denied*, (2004).

In particular, police were conducting an ongoing fraud investigation against Rogers when they discovered from her phone records that she had repeated contact with a phone number registered to Cade around the time of the murders. Investigators learned that Rhodes had been using Cade's phone. Additionally, Cade testified that on the night of the murders, Rhodes was gone all night with Cade's car, did not answer or return Cade's calls or text messages, and later told Cade at least three different stories concerning his whereabouts on that night. Cade also confirmed that there was a romantic relationship between Rhodes and Rogers.

Moreover, investigators discovered blood from both victims in Cade's vehicle, and on the morning after the murders, a TD Bank ATM surveillance camera captured Rogers exiting the vehicle. Finally, Curtis McLeod, who met Rhodes in April 2015 while they were both incarcerated in the same facility, testified that Rhodes confessed to his involvement in the murders. McLeod stated that he was not promised any benefits for testifying and had no knowledge of the crimes except what Rhodes had told him. Notably, McLeod recalled information unlikely to be known without Rhodes's confession. McLeod noted that (1) Rhodes and Rogers used a .32 caliber handgun, which is the caliber of a bullet discovered at the scene; (2) only the "female victim" was shot, which was corroborated by the pathologist; (3) the victims were separated into different rooms, which is how they were discovered; and (4) Rhodes's roommate, "Richard or something," needed his car back so he could go to work the next morning, which was confirmed by Cade's testimony.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Rhodes's convictions are

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, J.J., concur.

RECEIVED
NOV 06 2019
APPELLATE DEFFENSE

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

COPY

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

v.

JONATHAN DONELL RHODES,

APPELLANT **RECEIVED**

NOV 21 2019

APPELLATE CASE NO 2015-002605

SC Court of Appeals

Appeal from Greenville County

Honorable John C. Hayes, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2019-UP-361

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, counsel for Jonathan Donell Rhodes petitions this Court for rehearing and respectfully submits that this Court misapprehended the United States Supreme Court's holding in Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018) when it wrongfully determined that "emergency" under the Stored Communications Act was a lesser standard than "exigency" as understood under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S Constitution and under Section 1, Article 10 of the South Carolina Constitution.

This Court erred when it determined that in Appellant's case the police who wrongfully gathered Appellant's cell-site location information (CSLI) and per call measurement data (PCMD) had a good faith belief that their warrantless taking was permissible under the emergency exception to the Stored Communications Act because they were investigating a double homicide where the state had no evidence Appellant was a danger to the public at large or that any future crime was imminent. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702; Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018); State v. Rhodes, Opinion No. 2019-UP-361 (2019), p. 5.

In Carpenter, the United States Supreme Court held that obtaining location information from Carpenter's wireless carrier was a search and that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy over his movements captured through his cell phone. Carpenter, at 2217. The Court explained that under the Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C.A., § 2702, "emergency" meant exigency as understood under the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2223.

The Carpenter Court categorized the emergency exception that permitted warrantless collection of cell phone data under the Stored Communications Act in classic Fourth Amendment terms in that, "[s]uch exigencies include the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence." Id. The Court explained that the types of threats that were "emergencies" or "exigencies" that allowed the warrantless collection of cell phone data under the Stored Communications Act were "bomb threats, active shootings, and child abductions." Id. In those cases the warrantless collection of otherwise private data was permissible because it was to "respond to an ongoing emergency." Id. In the present case there was no such "ongoing emergency."

In its opinion, this Court cited to U.S. v. Takai, 943 F.Supp.2d 1315 (2013) to hold that the police officers in Appellant's case had a good faith belief that their taking of Appellant's CSLI and PCMD was in an attempt to stop an ongoing emergency. State v. Rhodes, Opinion No. 2019-UP-361 (2019). In Takai, the United States District Court in Utah held that the warrantless taking of Takai's cellphone data to track his whereabouts was permissible because there was an ongoing emergency in that Takai was likely to commit further crimes. Takai, at 1321.

This Court overlooked that important difference between Appellant's case and Takai. In Takai, the officers' warrantless taking of Takai's cell phone location information was lawful because there were clear and articulable facts that showed the defendant was armed and dangerous and that he would commit another armed robbery imminently. Id. at 1322 – 23. The officer in Takai believed, "based on reliable information from gang unit detectives, [Takai] was armed and dangerous," and that, "another [armed robbery] might be imminently forthcoming." Id. Moreover, in that case, prior to collecting warrantless location data from Takai, the investigators confirmed that Takai was the suspect seen on surveillance footage from one of the prior armed robberies. Id.

In Appellant's case there was no evidence that Appellant was armed and dangerous, nor was there any evidence another crime was "imminently forthcoming." Id. Moreover, there was no evidence offered that the crime in this case presented an "ongoing emergency." Carpenter, at 2223.

Conversely, there was evidence presented that at the time of the request for Appellant's CSLI and PCMD from his service provider, the Greenville County Sheriff's Office knew the crime was not likely to be an "ongoing emergency." R. 213, l. 25 – 214, l. 6. Investigator Hammett used criminal profiler Barton from SLED, and Barton concluded the crime here was "personal in nature" and that the killer knew the decedents. Id.

Defense counsel argued the conclusions Barton told Hammett meant that law enforcement knew the double homicide it was investigating posed “no broader danger to anyone else.” R. 271, ll. 20 – 25. Defense counsel pointed out that Barton gave his profile of the suspect to Hammett before the police requested Appellant’s cell phone records. R. 270, l. 20 – 272, l. 5. Therefore, since the officers in this case knew the crime was “personal in nature” and that the killer knew the decedents before they requested Appellant’s cell phone data, they *could not* have had an “objectively reasonable good-faith belief” that the warrantless taking of Appellant’s CSLI and PCMD was lawful because they knew at the time of the request that the crime they were investigating did not present an “ongoing emergency.” Id.; United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018). Respectfully, this Court’s ruling was in error and should be reconsidered.

Appellant also requests rehearing on the grounds that this Court erred when it held the lower court’s error in allowing expert testimony on the inherently unreliable PCMD was harmless. State v. Rhodes, Opinion No. 2019-UP-361 (2019) p. 6 – 7.

As this Court stated in its opinion, “[T]he trial courts of this state have a gatekeeping role with respect to all evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 702, whether the evidence is scientific or nonscientific.” Id. at 6; State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 274, 676 S.E.2d 684, 689 (2009). The testimony from the “expert” at trial was that the PCMD from Appellant’s cell phone allegedly placed Appellant at the scene of the incident. R. 377, l. 23 – 378, l. 5. As this Court held, that testimony was inherently unreliable and should not have been admitted. State v. Rhodes, Opinion No. 2019-UP-361 (2019) p. 6 – 7. However, this Court erred when it found the state’s use of expert testimony for the inherently unreliable PCMD was harmless. Id.

The state's "expert" Fennern testified that the PCMD showed Appellant's exact whereabouts at the time of the incident. R. 44, l. 20 – 45, l. 24. Fennern claimed that Appellant was exactly 1.97 miles from the nearest cell tower at 10:45 pm and then 1.88 – 1.89 miles from the cell tower at 11:02 pm on the night of the incident. Id. Fennern testified that based on these records, the location of Appellant's cell phone was consistent with him being at or near the decedents' home on the night of the murders. R. 410, l. 8 – 415, l. 8. Fennern's testimony was the only evidence the state presented that purported to place Appellant at the scene of the crime.

The remainder of the evidence against Appellant certainly did not amount to overwhelming evidence of guilt. There was DNA of the decedents in a car belonging to Eric Cade that Appellant was allowed to drive. R. 469, l. 2 – 477, l. 21. Therefore, as defense counsel argued, Appellant's DNA "would be on every surface" of the car from his regular use and, consequently, the DNA match to Appellant, "doesn't mean anything." R. 558, ll. 1 – 11.


The jailhouse snitch McLeod was the only direct evidence of guilt in this case. However, McLeod's allegation that he heard Appellant make inculpatory remarks regarding his involvement in the incident while they were cellmates, hardly provided overwhelming evidence of guilt either. R. 507, ll. 4 – 6.

McLeod was a career criminal who had an interest in testifying against Appellant in an effort to procure a more lenient sentence when his charges were adjudicated. R. 497, l. 7 – 498, l. 12; R. 510, l. 6 – 512, l. 7. Moreover, McLeod's testimony at trial differed from what he first told police. McLeod initially told police that a third individual, Amber McDaniel, went with Rogers and Appellant to the Wells' home, but at trial McLeod testified only Rogers and Appellant were involved. App. 515, ll. 13 – 23. Accordingly, McLeod's testimony was unreliable and did not provide overwhelming evidence of Appellant's guilt.

Therefore, the error by the lower court in admitting the inherently unreliable expert testimony on PCMD to place Appellant at the scene of the crime was not harmless; and this Court's ruling to the contrary should be reconsidered.

Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear his case pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, due to the significant legal and factual points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court's affirmation of Appellant's convictions. Appellant respectfully requests (that) this Court hold that the warrantless taking of Appellant's CSLI was an unlawful violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and his right to privacy under Article I, Section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution, and that the lower court's error in admitting the inherently unreliable expert testimony about PCMD could not be harmless.

Respectfully Submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Victor R. Seeger", is written over a horizontal line.

VICTOR R SEEGER
Appellate Defender

This 21st day of November, 2019.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Greenville County

Honorable John C. Hayes, Circuit Court Judge

RECEIVED

NOV 21 2019

SC Court of Appeals

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

v.


JONATHAN DONELL RHODES,

APPELLANT


RECEIVED
JAN 28 2020
S.C. SUPREME COURT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-entitled case has been served upon Susannah R. Cole, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and Jonathan Donell Rhodes, #343817, at Perry Correctional Institution, 430 Oaklawn Road, Pelzer, SC 29669, this 21st day of November, 2019.


Victor R Seeger
Appellate Defender
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE
ME this 21st day of November, 2019.

 (L.S)
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: September 30, 2029

The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,


v.

Jonathan Donell Rhodes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002605

ORDER


After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.



J.



J.



J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Robert Michael Dudek, Esquire
 William Walter Wilkins, III, Esquire
 Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire
 Donald J. Zelenka, Esquire
 Susannah Rawl Cole, Esquire

FILED

December 13, 2019

END

Lara Mary Caudy, Esquire
Victor R Seeger, Esquire
Melody Jane Brown, Esquire