

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF LEXINGTON

FILED
2019 FEB -8 } PH 4:46

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOR THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Joseph Golson, #266765,

LISA H. COMER
CLERK OF COURT
LEXINGTON SC

2018-CP-32-02234

Applicant,

v.

CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

This matter comes before this Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed by Joseph Golson (Applicant) on June 29, 2018. Respondent made its return and motion to dismiss on or about January 30, 2019, requesting the application be summarily dismissed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Lexington County Clerk of Court. During its February 1999 term, the Lexington County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for murder (1999-GS-32-625). J. Stephen Welch, Esquire, represented Applicant on this charge. On May 30, 2000, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Gary E. Clary. Following deliberations, the jury convicted Applicant as indicted. On June 1, 2000, Judge Clary sentenced Applicant to a term of imprisonment of life.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Office of Appellate Defense, perfected an appeal on Applicant's behalf. On appeal, Applicant raised the following issue:

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Whether the trial judge misapplied *State v. Terry*¹ by refusing to allow [Applicant] to cross-examine Officer Johnny Bryant or otherwise place before the jury the fact [Applicant] told Bryant when he was arrested that “we were tussling over the gun and it went off,” where the state presented testimony from two other police officers that [Applicant] made statements, within hours of this earlier statement, admitting he intentionally shot the victim, but accidentally shot her in the chest, since *State v. Terry* did not abrogate, the “rule of completeness,” and fairness demanded context be given to these three statements?

Following briefing and oral argument, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant’s conviction and sentence on March 25, 2002, by published opinion. *State v. Golson*, 349 S.C. 421, 562 S.E.2d 663 (Ct. App. 2002). Applicant filed a timely petition for rehearing, which was denied on May 15, 2002. Subsequently, Applicant filed a petition for writ of certiorari on June 13, 2002. Respondent filed its return to the petition for writ of certiorari on July 12, 2002. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied the petition for writ of certiorari on October 23, 2002 by written order. The remittitur was issued on October 28, 2002.

2002-CP-32-04532

Applicant filed his first application for post-conviction relief on December 30, 2002. In his application, he alleged he was being held in custody unlawfully based on:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; [and]
 - a. Failure to investigate;
 - b. I would contend counsel was inept and ineffective for not preparing my defense for trial;
 - c. Counsel after being told my view of what happened the night of the killing and my allegations of how it happened, never once suggested doing a crime scene re-enactment to see whether the killing may have happened in the manner described in our interview;
 - d. Counsel never researched whether the weapons were purchased by the victim or the applicant or whether it could be prove that the applicant ever had the weapons in his truck, or if they were commonly kept in the trailer;
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

¹ 339 S.C. 352, 529 S.E.2d 274 (2000).

- a. I would assert that the Circuit Court of Lexington County lacked competent jurisdiction to entertain the Applicant's case, and sentence him, because there was no written court order to continue his case beyond 180 days.

Respondent filed its return and motion to dismiss on March 31, 2004, requesting an evidentiary be held solely on the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting the allegation the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction be summarily dismissed. Thereafter, on April 7, 2006, through his counsel, Applicant amended his application for post-conviction relief to include the following allegation:

1. Counsel was ineffective for failing to call expert witnesses at trial to rebut the State's expert testimony and for failing to challenge the accuracy and sufficiency of the evidence through a vigorous cross-examination of the State's witness, particularly regarding the trace evidence and forensic pathology issues surround the victim's shirt and a contact shot determination that was amended following the autopsy, and particulars about the victim's wound itself that would have supported the Applicant's version of the incident as an accident.

Respondent filed its amended return on June 14, 2005. Subsequently, an evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on October 9, 2007, at the Lexington County Courthouse before the Honorable William P. Keesley. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Carol A. McCurry, Esquire. Thereafter, on October 18, 2007, the Honorable William P. Keesley, issued an order denying and dismissing the application for post-conviction relief with prejudice. Judge Keesley's order was filed on October 22, 2007.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal, and M. Celia Robinson, Esquire, perfected an appeal on Applicant's behalf. On appeal, Applicant raised the following issues:

1. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to obtain or present expert testimony in the areas of forensics and trace evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel's failure prejudiced the defense sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial?

2. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to present evidence helpful to the defense was not ineffective assistance of counsel?
3. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to present in evidence the 911 tape of [Applicant's] call for help after the shooting was not ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of his finding that the decision was a tactical decision which was "adequately explained?"
4. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to have a working knowledge of [Applicant's] version of events and his inclusion in his opening statement of statements of fact contrary to [Applicant's] version but confirming the State's theory before the jury did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?
5. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to prepare [Applicant] to testify regarding his taped statements and further ineffective in failing to present [Applicant's] statements in context during his direct examination?
6. The PCR judge erred in finding that counsel's failure to object to the assistant solicitor's misstatement of the evidence on closing did not constitute ineffective assistance; [and]
7. Did the PCR judge err in failing to find that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to argue to the jury that, if not accident, the evidence supported a finding of involuntary manslaughter?

Respondent made its return on September 12, 2008. Thereafter, on November 23, 2009, the South Carolina Court of Appeals denied the petition for writ of certiorari by written order. Applicant then filed a petition for rehearing on December 8, 2009, which was denied on January 20, 2010. Applicant attempted to petition the Supreme Court of South Carolina for a writ of certiorari, but his extension to file the petition for writ of certiorari was denied on March 2, 2010, pursuant to *Ellison v. State*.² The remittitur was issued on March 3, 2010.

2010-CP-32-01899

Applicant subsequently filed his second application for post-conviction relief on May 7, 2010. In that application, he alleged the following grounds for relief:

² 382 S.C. 189, 676 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

1. Is entitled to a belated appeal pursuant to *White v. State*, that a new rule of law that states it is error to charge the jury that it may infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon.

Respondent filed its return and motion to dismiss on July 12, 2010, requesting the application be summarily dismissed as untimely and as successive.

Thereafter, Applicant filed another application for post-conviction relief on July 5, 2012. (Docket No. 2012-CP-32-02781). In this application, Applicant alleged he was being held unlawfully based on the following grounds:

1. Ineffective Assistance Counsel;
 - a. Counsel prejudice Applicant failure [sic] request mental examination deter [sic] was Applicant incompetency [sic] to stand trial or enter a guilty plea (30) yrs manslaughter.
2. Due Process Law; [and]
 - a. State failed to meet it's [sic] burden of proof concerning [sic] the element of malice, in violation of the 14th Amendment guarantee of due process of law.
3. Actual Innocence [and] Miscarriage of Justice.
 - a. Applicant's is actual [sic] innocent of murder and is guilty of manslaughter accidental shooting.

On October 21, 2014, Respondent filed a motion for merger, requesting the 2012 application for post-conviction relief be merged into the 2010 application for post-conviction relief. On October 24, 2014, Judge Keesley issued an order merging the two applications, instructing the Clerk of Court to merge the 2012 application into the 2010 application and further ordering the 2012 application be dismissed upon the merger. Applicant filed a notice of appeal from the order of merger, which was dismissed without prejudice on January 8, 2015. The remittitur was issued on January 26, 2015.

On April 17, 2015, Respondent filed an amended return and motion to dismiss, again requesting the application be summarily dismissed as untimely and as successive. Subsequently, the Honorable Thomas A. Russo, in his capacity as Chief Administrative Judge for the Eleventh

Judicial Circuit, Court of Common Pleas, issued a conditional order of dismissal on June 9, 2015, provisionally denying and dismissing the application for post-conviction relief while giving Applicant twenty days to show why the conditional order should not become final.

Subsequently, Applicant filed another application for post-conviction relief on May 15, 2015. (Docket No. 2015-CP-32-01795). In that application, he alleged the following grounds for relief:

1. Austin Appeal- Abuse of Discretion.
 - a. Trial Court's error in excluding evidence that was relevant to issue of manslaughter. "See Exhibit-A," The jury is entitled to hear all the relevant evidences [sic], "See Exhibit-B and Exhibit-C," Judge the credibility of all the opposing witnesses, and make that decision for itself, rather than being required to accept the State's experts opinions. State vs. Terry, 339 S.C. 352, 529 S.E.2d 274 (2000).

Respondent filed a motion for merger on June 24, 2015, requesting this application be merged with the 2010 application. Judge Russo issued an order of merger on June 26, 2015, merging the 2015 application into the 2010 application. Thereafter, Applicant filed a "Motion to Amend" on January 19, 2016, in which he alleged the following additional ground for relief:

1. Counsel was ineffective when he failed to investigate and present evidence that the deceased had a restraining order against her for violent and threatening conduct by her mother.

Subsequently, the Honorable Eugene C. Griffith, Jr. issued a final order of dismissal on February 13, 2017, denying and dismissing the application for post-conviction relief with prejudice. Applicant did not appeal this decision.

4:11-cv-0350-CMC-TER

Applicant filed a *pro se* petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 8, 2011. In his petition, Applicant set forth the following grounds for relief:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
 - a. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to obtain or present expert testimony in the areas of forensics and trace evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel's failure prejudiced the defense sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial?
 - b. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to present evidence helpful to the defense was not ineffective assistance of counsel?
 - c. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to present in evidence the 911 tape of [Applicant's] call for help after the shooting was not ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of his finding that the decision was a tactical decision which was "adequately explained?"
 - d. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel's failure to have a working knowledge of [Applicant's] version of events and his inclusion in his opening statement of statements of fact contrary to [Applicant's] version but confirming the State's theory before the jury did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?
 - e. Did the PCR judge err in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to prepare [Applicant] to testify regarding his taped statements and further ineffective in failing to present [Applicant's] statements in context during his direct examination?
 - f. The PCR judge erred in finding that counsel's failure to object to the assistant solicitor's misstatement of the evidence on closing did not constitute ineffective assistance; [and]
 - g. Did the PCR judge err in failing to find that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to argue to the jury that, if not accident, the evidence supported a finding of involuntary manslaughter?

Respondent filed its return and motion for summary judgment on August 1, 2011. Thereafter, on February 2, 2012, the Honorable Thomas E. Rogers, III, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a report and recommendation, recommending Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and Applicant's petition be denied. *Golson v. Cartledge*, 4:11-0350-CMC-TER. Applicant filed his objection to the report and recommendation on February 15, 2012. On March 16, 2012, the Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie, United States District Judge, issued an

opinion and order, adopting the Judge Rogers's report and recommendation, granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment, and dismissing Applicant's petition. *Golson v. Cartledge*, 4:11-0350-CMC-TER.

CURRENT APPLICATION

In his *third* and current application for post-conviction relief, Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully on the following grounds:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel;
2. Newly Discovered Evidence;
 - a. Unconstitutional Laws, Great Seal Missing from Laws. Murder – 16-3-10, Missing Act No. and Missing Great Seal to Murder. 1993-94 Act No. 184 1995 Act No. 7.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct; [and]
4. Constitution Violations.

Also before this Court are the records of the Lexington County Clerk of Court regarding the subject conviction, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the records from Applicant's previous post-conviction relief actions and the appeals therefrom, Applicant's appellate records, and the records from this current post-conviction relief action.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the pleadings and all relevant supporting documents. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b), this Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Statute of Limitations

This Court finds this application shall be summarily dismissed for failure to comply with the filing procedures of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 to -160. Specifically, the act requires as follows:

An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within

one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal or the filing of the final decision on appeal, whichever is later.

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A).

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations shall apply to all applications filed after July 1, 1996. *Peloquin v. State*, 321 S.C. 468, 469 S.E.2d 606 (1996). A motion for summary judgment may properly be used to raise the defense of statute of limitations. *McDonnell v. Consolidated School District of Aiken*, 315 S.C. 487, 445 S.E.2d 638 (1994). In addition, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) authorizes the Court to “grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of [an] application when it appears from the pleadings . . . that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Applicant was convicted as indicted on June 1, 2000, and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment, and the remittitur from his direct appeal was issued on October 28, 2002. Therefore, Applicant was required to file this current application on or before October 29, 2003. This application was not filed until June 29, 2018—nearly **fifteen years** beyond the requisite statutory filing period. Accordingly, the application shall be summarily dismissed for failure to file within the time mandated by Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

Successive

This Court further finds the application shall be summarily dismissed because it is successive to Applicant’s previous post-conviction relief applications. Courts disfavor successive applications and place the burden on applicants to establish that any new ground raised in a subsequent application could not have been raised in a previous application. *Foxworth v. State*, 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E.2d 415 (1981); *Arnold v. State*, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992). Section 17-27-90 of the South Carolina Code states:

All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental, or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application.

Under this statute, successive post-conviction relief applications are forbidden unless an applicant can indicate a “sufficient reason” why new grounds for relief were not raised or were not properly raised in previous applications. *Aice v. State*, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991). Any new ground raised in a subsequent application is limited to those grounds that “could not have been raised . . . in the previous application.” *Id.* at 450. If the applicant could have raised these allegations in a previous application, then the applicant may not raise those grounds in successive applications. *Id.* Applicant bears the burden of showing the allegations could not have been previously raised. *Land v. State*, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980).

Applicant’s current allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and constitutional violations were, or could have been, raised in the proceedings based on Applicant’s prior applications for post-conviction relief; thus, the current application is successive and barred under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90. Applicant’s current application is practically identical to his prior applications for post-conviction relief, and he has wholly failed to establish any sufficient reason why he could not have raised his current allegations in his previous applications for post-conviction relief. Therefore, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet the burden imposed upon him, and the application shall be summarily dismissed as successive to Applicant’s previous post-conviction relief applications.

Newly Discovered Evidence

This Court further finds Applicant's assertion he is being held in custody unlawfully as a result of newly-discovered evidence, such that he should be entitled to vacation of his sentence and immunity, is without merit. The Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act states a person may institute a post-conviction relief action if "there exists evidence or material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A)(4). If the applicant contends there is evidence of material fact not previously presented, the post-conviction relief application must be filed within one year after the date of actual discovery of the facts by the applicant or after the date when the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-45(C).

Applicant alleges there is no visible impression of the Great Seal on the following Acts of which he was convicted: 1993 Act No. 184, 1995 Act No. 7. In support of this allegation, Applicant cites Article III, Section 18 of the South Carolina Constitution, "No Bill or Joint Resolution shall have the force of law until it shall have been read three times and on three several days in each house, has had the Great Seal of the State affixed to it. . . ."

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held absolute literal compliance is not essential to valid legislation, but substantial compliance is sufficient. *Smith v. Jennings*, 67 S.C. 324, 45 S.E. 821, 824 (1903). Furthermore, under the enrolled bill rule, an act is deemed to be properly passed when it has been ratified by the presiding officers of the General Assembly, approved by the Governor, and enrolled in the Office of Secretary of State. *Medical Soc. of South Carolina v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina*, 334 S.C. 270, 278, 513 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1999); *Beaufort County v. Jasper County*, 220 S.C. 469, 487, 68 S.E.2d 421, 430 (1951); *State v. Town Council of Chester* 39 S.C. 307, 17 S.E. 752, 755 (1893) ("when the bill . . . is deposited in the department of state,

according to law, its authentication as a bill that has passed congress is complete and unimpeachable).

Other jurisdictions have upheld acts challenged as invalid because there was not strict compliance with a constitutional provision. *See Taylor v. Wilson*, 22 N.W. 119 (Neb. 1885) (citing *Cottrell v. State*, 1 N.W. 1008 (Neb. 1879)) (finding an act was not unconstitutional when the president of the senate did not sign it as required by the state's constitution); *Commr's of Leavenworth Co. v. Higginbotham*, 17 Kan. 62 (Kan. 1876) (“[T]he mere failure of the president of the senate to do his duty cannot have the effect to invalidate the law.”).


Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld the appointment of an officer whose commission lacked the Great Seal as required by law. *State v. Toomer*, 7 Rich. 216, 229, 41 S.C.L. 216, 229 (1854). The Court explained if the State excused the delinquency of the officer and cured the defects, then the title has related back to the time of the election. *Id.* Moreover, section 2-7-45 of the South Carolina 1976 Code states:

The Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, which contains the permanent laws of general application through the 1975 session of the General Assembly and which was presented to the members of the General Assembly during the 1977 session is hereby adopted as the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, and is declared to be the only general statutory law of the State as of January 1, 1976.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held codification of an act will cure a constitutional defect, and is part of the general statutory law of the State. *South Carolina Tax Comm'n v. York Elec. Co-op., Inc.*, 275 S.C. 326, 333, 270 S.E.2d 626, 629-30 (1980). The Acts Applicant currently challenges had substantial compliance with the requirements and were codified into the 1976 Code. Therefore, these laws are enforceable, and Applicant's allegation lacks merit.

Furthermore, Applicant's discovery of the missing Great Seals under Article III, Section 18 does not constitute newly discovered evidence. This evidence was discoverable prior to the conviction at trial. A post-conviction relief application cannot assert any issues that could have been raised at trial or on appeal. *Drayton v. Evatt*, 312 S.C. 4, 8, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993). By failing to raise this evidentiary issue at trial, Applicant waived his right to present any new defenses he may have had, and he certainly cannot raise them now in his current application for post-conviction relief under the guise of "newly discovered evidence."

Before this Court will hold an evidentiary hearing, Applicant must make a *prima facie* showing he is entitled to relief. *Welch v. MacDougall*, 246 S.C. 258, 143 S.E.2d 455 (1965); *Blandshaw v. State*, 245 S.C. 385, 140 S.E.2d 784 (1965). Applicant has failed to make a showing he is entitled to relief based on the information set forth above and, therefore, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the matter. Accordingly, this Court finds this matter should be summarily dismissed with prejudice.



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
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b), this Court intends to dismiss this application with prejudice unless Applicant provides specific reasons, factual or legal, why the application should not be dismissed in its entirety. Applicant is granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of this order upon him to show why this order should not become final. Applicant shall file any reasons he may have with the Lexington County Clerk of Court and shall serve opposing counsel at the following address:

Office of the Attorney General
Attn: Kelly Oppenheimer, Esquire
PCR Division – 11th Circuit
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Applicant is cautioned his response to this order must be actually received by the Lexington County Clerk of Court and opposing counsel within twenty (20) days, and this Court will not consider any issues raised in his response if not so timely filed and served.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of February, 2019.


ALISON R. LEE
Chief Administrative Judge
Eleventh Judicial Circuit

Lexington, South Carolina

FORM 4

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF LEXINGTON
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS**

**JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2018CP3202234**

Joseph Golson 266765		South Carolina State of	
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PLAINTIFF(S)	DEFENDANT(S)
Submitted by:	Attorney for: <input type="checkbox"/> Plaintiff <input type="checkbox"/> Defendant <input type="checkbox"/> Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. See Page 2 for additional information.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit);
 Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other: _____
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j) SCRPC; Bankruptcy;
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other: _____
- STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other:

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order; (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. **Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.**

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

Circuit Court Judge	Judge Code	2/8/2019 Date
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For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on February 8th 2018, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on February 8th 2019, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Joseph Golson #206765
Lieber CI
PO Box 205, Ridgeway SC 29472

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

Kelly Oppenheimer Rembert C. Dennis Building PO Box
11549 Columbia, SC 29211

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

LISA COMER/jp

Court Reporter

Lisa M. Comer - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRC.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.