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S.C. SUPREME COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

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Certiorari to Beaufort County

Honorable Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

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THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

GEORGE HOLMES,

PETITIONER.

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APPENDIX

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**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE  
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING  
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

George Holmes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002010

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Appeal From Beaufort County  
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-133  
Submitted February 1, 2019 – Filed April 10, 2019

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**AFFIRMED**

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Appellate Defender Lara M. Caudy, of Columbia, for  
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**PER CURIAM:** In this criminal matter, George Holmes appeals the circuit court's denial of Holmes's motion for a directed verdict. Holmes argues the circuit court erred in failing to direct a verdict on the offense of indecent exposure when (1) the alleged exposure occurred in a holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center (the Detention Center), which is not a public place as intended under section 16-15-130 of the South Carolina Code (2015); and (2) the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review, and under the correct standard of review, the State failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence that Holmes willfully or maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person. We affirm.

1. We find there is evidence to support the circuit court's finding that the Detention Center jail cell is a public place under section 16-15-130 (A)(1) of the South Carolina Code. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-130 (A)(1) ("It is unlawful for a person to wilfully [sic], maliciously, and indecently expose his person in a public place, on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street or highway."); *State v. Zeigler*, 364 S.C. 94, 103, 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The appellate court may reverse the [circuit court]'s denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if there is no evidence to support the [circuit court]'s ruling."). There is evidence tending to prove the jail cell is a public place because the cell is visible to those who pass by and happen to look through the cell window or the gap in the door. *See State v. Williams*, 280 S.C. 305, 306, 312 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1984) (including a "place so situated that what passes there can be seen by any considerable number of persons, if they happen to look" in the definition of a public place). Witness testimony indicated the booking area is the busiest part of the Detention Center and a considerable number of people pass through the booking area, including corrections officers, attorneys, maintenance workers, nurses, and anyone being booked. Officer Jessica DeSantis testified she could see into the cell from the booking desk and as she walked past the cell. We affirm the circuit court as to this issue.

2. We find Holmes's argument that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review is not preserved for our review. The issue was not raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court. *See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke*, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for appellate review."); *State v. Patterson*, 324 S.C. 5, 16, 482 S.E.2d 760, 765 (1997) (stating a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve issues for direct appellate review). Therefore, we find this issue is not preserved for our review.

**AFFIRMED.<sup>1</sup>**

**WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and HILL, JJ., concur.**

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<sup>1</sup> We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

GEORGE HOLMES,

APPELLANT

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2016-002010

Appeal from Beaufort County

Honorable Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2019-UP-133

PETITION FOR REHEARING

On April 10, 2019, this Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction for indecent exposure in an unpublished opinion. State v. Holmes, 2019-UP-133 (S.C. Ct. App. filed April 10, 2019). Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear the matter based upon the significant points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court in arriving at its conclusions.

On appeal, Appellant argued the trial judge erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the offense of indecent exposure when (1) the alleged exposure occurred in a holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center, which is not a public place as intended by the

legislature or as defined by our Supreme Court, and (2) where the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person.

In a per curiam opinion, this Court held there was evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center is a public place under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-130(A)(1) because witness testimony indicated the booking area is the busiest part of the Detention Center and a considerable number of people pass through this area. The Court also relied on the testimony of Officer Jessica DeSantis who claimed she could see into the cell from the booking desk and as she walked past the cell. State v. Holmes, 2019-UP-133 (S.C. Ct. App. filed April 10, 2019).

However, the Court did not address the merits of Appellant's argument that the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person because it found his separate challenge to the standard used by the trial judge in making its ruling unpreserved.

#### ***Factual Background***

On April 6, 2014, Appellant was incarcerated at the Beaufort County Detention Center. He suffers from severe mental illness, including schizophrenia, and was placed on suicide watch after complaining of hearing voices and stating he was going to harm himself. R. 43, l. 16 – 44, l. 5. An inmate on suicide watch is required to be continually monitored and visually observed by a correctional officer every fifteen minutes. R. 58, l. 13 – 59, l. 14. Consequently, such inmates, like Appellant, are housed in a single person holding cell in the booking area of the detention center. R. 58, ll. 1-12.

In order to reach the booking area from outside the detention center, one must first sign in and pass through a metal detector. After going through the metal detector, the individual must pass through “a secured locked door that is controlled from a central location.” This first secured door leads to “sort of an in-between area” before the individual reaches a second secured locked door. After being granted access through this second secured door, the individual finally reaches the booking area. R. 39, l. 20 – 41, l. 16; R. 31, ll. 15-20. Because it is a jail, the detention center has numerous security protocols in place. R. 41, ll. 17-22; R. 65, ll. 7-11.

Appellant was placed in a holding cell identified as IH-1. R. 79, ll. 8-14. This cell, along with others used to house inmates on suicide watch, has a surveillance camera that captures what occurs inside the cell. R. 53, ll. 12-18. Additionally, each cell has a metal toilet, sink, and bunk. R. 66, ll. 18-22. The door to each cell is made of steel and slides shut from left to right. When closed, there is a small gap between the door and the wall approximately one and a half to two inches wide. R. 54, l. 17 – 55, l. 4. The door itself also has a very small window that officers use to monitor inmates housed inside. R. 58, ll. 13-25.

The state alleged at trial that on the evening of April 6, 2014, Appellant masturbated inside his cell and purposefully positioned himself so that a female correctional officer, Jessica DeSantis, could see him. DeSantis claimed that she could see Appellant’s penis through the small one and a half to two inch gap between the cell door and the wall. R. 87, l. 1 – 90, l. 2; R. 93, ll. 1-3. She also claimed that while Appellant was masturbating, he yelled obscene words at her, such as slut and whore. R. 87, ll. 6-10; R. 92, ll. 8-18.

Nearly three months later, after consulting with the solicitor’s office and waiting for the results of a mental health evaluation Appellant had undergone, law enforcement charged Appellant with indecent exposure pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-130. R. 44, l. 6 – 45, l.

15. This statute reads in relevant part: “(A)(1) It is unlawful for a person to willfully, maliciously, and indecently expose his person in a public place, on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street or highway.”

Appellant moved pretrial to dismiss the indictment arguing that the Beaufort County Detention Center is not a public place under the plain meaning of the statute, and thus Appellant could not be convicted of indecent exposure. R. 2, l. 1 – 3, l. 11. Defense counsel argued that at the time of the alleged offense Appellant was housed in a very “small private place” behind a steel door in a “highly secured government building that the public does not have general access to.” R. 2, ll. 13-20. Because the state must prove Appellant exposed himself in a public place, counsel concluded that the prosecution could not meet all the elements of the offense and that the indictment should be dismissed.

The assistant solicitor admitted “there is no South Carolina law on point when it comes to [what constitutes] a public place.” However, the solicitor asserted that “the Attorney General published a memo back in August of 2007 where they were responding to a question of graffiti inside of a detention center and if it would fit the statute because it [the statute] required that it [the graffiti] be publicly viewable. So the Attorney General put out an opinion and they cited several cases and I want to hand these up to Your Honor.” R. 4, l. 20 – 5, l. 6. Relying on cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Attorney General in its August 2007 opinion, some of which are unpublished and most of which are not directly on point, the solicitor argued that the holding cell in the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant was being housed at the time of the alleged exposure constituted a public place.

Defense counsel stated in response “that our general assembly at the beginning of 2015 attempted to amend our public indecent exposure statute to specifically include a jail as a public

facility for purposes of the statute” but the amendment “was killed by the house without being passed.” Consequently, counsel argued that the “legislative intent is not to include the jail house as a public place in the state of South Carolina.” R. 12, ll. 1-14. She later continued, “And our legislature attempted to change that act and it failed. And that I think is extremely damning to the State’s argument that this is in any way shape or form a public place for the purposes of the statute.” R. 13, ll. 19-23.

Moreover, defense counsel asserted that the statute is “designed to protect the public from instances of indecent exposure . . . [and] as much as Ms. DeSantis [the correctional officer] may not [have] enjoyed having to see that and as much as other C-O’s [correctional officers] probably don’t like it either unfortunately they are not considered the public under the law. This is part of their job.” R. 13, ll. 3-13. Lastly, defense counsel stressed that the holding cell where Appellant was housed at the time of the alleged exposure “is behind two remote control locked doors, a guarded security desk and a metal detector [and] is not a public place at all.” R. 13, ll. 14-19.

The trial court ultimately denied the pretrial motion to dismiss. The court found “the jail is indeed a public place for purposes of this statute [S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-130].” R. 49, ll. 4-6. The court emphasized that because correctional officers were required to visually check on Appellant while he was placed in IH-1 on suicide watch and because other people, including inmates, could walk by and potentially see the alleged exposure, the area was a “public place.” R. 15, ll. 12-17.

At the conclusion of the state’s presentation of evidence, Appellant moved for a directed verdict and renewed and incorporated the arguments he raised during the pretrial motion to dismiss. The following exchange took place between defense counsel and the court:

Ms. Saxon: Again, I stand by my earlier argument that the jail for the purpose of the statute and the cell where all of this occurred as we have now seen

is not a public place. It is not someplace that people freely have access to. The alleged exposure occur[ed] through maybe a one inch, two inch at the most, crack in a cell door.

**As we see from the video you don't see anything. You see Mr. Holmes['] [Appellant's] back the entire time. And you never see him expose himself openly to a camera. He does not run out into the booking area and rip off his suicide gown, which has been testified to be a solid piece. And the entire time based on the evidence you see he is also up against a door, Your Honor. And so when you are talking about exposure there has to be some exposure. There has to be something that we can actually see and show and say look jury, this is how this happened, this is what happened. And there has been no evidence of actual exposure in this case.**

There again as I stated there has been nothing to support the idea that the jail is a public place or somewhere that the people have general access to, which is required in my opinion under the statute. I think for those reasons Your Honor I would ask you to direct a verdict in favor of Mr. Holmes [Appellant].

The Court: What do you think about the fact that this is like a one to two inch crack **it seems to me like you would almost have to go peek into it to see it.**

Ms. Saxon: That's my opinion too, Your Honor. And when you are in the jail and if you look at the videos and the photos that have been presented this is not a wide gap. **This is something that takes a deliberate action upon the other person to go and look through.** It is not something where you can shove his - -

The Court: - - this is a lot different than - - you can see and hear tell of a lot of public defenders who find themselves going into pods and there are people [inmates] out and about and there is full on masturbation and they will drop their britches to the floor and masturbate. This isn't what that is.

Ms. Saxon: No it's not, Your Honor. And that's one of the reasons that I have felt so strongly about this particularly because of where it did occur which is in this very confined cell where Mr. Holmes is allegedly masturbating against a door with the exposure being this two inch maybe, maybe two inch crack and **the State still has to prove that he had an intent to expose himself.**

**There is criminal intent in any criminal crime and they've not offered any evidence to that because it wasn't like he was trying to shove himself through the crack.** He wasn't jumping up on his bed to try to get [a] better view of the window; nothing of that nature. And I think here particularly - -

The Court: - - I think perhaps it's clear that he might have been masturbating based on what he was saying and she [DeSantis] might be right in that regard. But I don't think - - **she said she saw it. I'm not really sure how she did.**

Ms. Saxon: I agree with you, Your Honor. And I would ask that you direct a verdict for Mr. Holmes [Appellant].

The Court: There might be a **scintilla of evidence** because of the fact that she said she saw him. I don't know.

R. 106, l. 3 – 108, l. 25 (emphasis added).

In response to defense counsel's argument, the solicitor asserted that whether DeSantis saw Appellant's penis or whether Appellant intended to expose himself was a question of fact for the jury. R. 109, l. 1 – 114, l. 7.

The trial court ultimately denied the motion for a directed verdict finding "that there is indeed a scintilla of evidence" that Appellant exposed himself based on Officer DeSantis' testimony that she saw Appellant's penis through the crack between the cell door and the wall. The court continued, "**I think that is clearly a legitimate question of fact that needs to be resolved by the jury . . . [w]ith regard to whether it is a public place or not and with regard to whether or not she [DeSantis] saw his penis and *whether or not he intentionally displayed his penis to her.*** So we will proceed forward with the trial." R. 119, l. 23 – 120, l. 5 (emphasis added).

During deliberations, the jury requested to be recharged on the definition of a public place. It also requested to rewatch the video from the surveillance camera inside Appellant's cell at the time of the alleged offense, which was marked as State's Exhibit No. 13 and is on file with this Court. R. 151, l. 18 – 152, l. 23.

#### ***Discussion and Analysis***

"It is a fundamental concept of criminal law that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged against the defendant." State v. Cain,

419 S.C. 24, 30, 795 S.E.2d 846, 849 (2017) (quoting State v. Brown, 360 S.C. 581, 590, 602 S.E.2d 392, 397 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury.” State v. McGowan, 347 S.C. 618, 622, 557 S.E.2d 657, 659 (2001) (citing State v. Rowell, 326 S.C. 313, 315, 487 S.E.2d 185, 196 (1997)).

When the prosecution relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge must direct a verdict in the defendant’s favor unless there is any substantial circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the defendant or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 139, 708 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2011) (citing State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000)).

Likewise, a directed verdict is proper when the evidence produced “merely raises a suspicion the accused is guilty.” State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (citing State v. Martin, 340 S.C. 597, 533 S.E.2d 572 (2000)); State v. Arnold, 361 S.C. 386, 390, 605 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2004); State v. Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 132, 322 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1984). Our courts define suspicion as “a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof.” Lollis, 343 S.C. at 584, 541 S.E.2d at 256 (citing State v. Hyder, 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96 (1963)).

When ruling on Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court erred by applying an incorrect standard. The court found the state presented “at least a scintilla of evidence” and therefore denied Appellant’s motion. R. 114, ll. 8-11; see also R. 119, ll. 23-25; R. 115, ll. 17-18. This was clearly error. The correct standard when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict during a criminal trial where an individual’s liberty is at stake is whether there is “any direct evidence or any

substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused.” McGowan, 347 S.C. at 622, 557 S.E.2d at 659 (emphasis added). The trial court erroneously relied upon the *much lower* standard that is used in civil cases when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Hancock v. Mid-South Management Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 802 (2009) (holding in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, but in cases requiring a heightened burden of proof or in cases applying federal law, the non-moving party must submit more than a mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment).

In its opinion affirming Appellant’s conviction, this Court did not address the merits of Appellant’s argument that the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person because it found this separate challenge to the standard used by the trial judge in making its ruling unpreserved. Significantly, the state has never asserted Appellant’s argument that there was no evidence Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person was not preserved. See Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 333, 730 S.E.2d 282, 287 (2012) (Toal, C.J., concurring) (“When the opposing party does not raise a preservation issue on appeal, courts are not precluded from finding the issue unpreserved if the error is clear. However, *the silence of an adversary should serve as an indicator to the court of the obscurity of the purported procedural flaw.*”) (emphasis added). Instead, in its brief, the state conceded the trial judge used an incorrect standard when ruling on Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict and argued “the trial judge’s mistaken reliance

on a ‘scintilla of evidence’ was a distinction with a difference” and ultimately constituted harmless error.

Appellant’s argument that the trial judge erred by failing to direct a verdict of acquittal because the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person is unquestionably preserved for appeal. Defense counsel made extensive arguments at trial in support of this claim and the trial judge ruled on the merits of the argument. See Queen’s Grant II Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Greenwood Dev. Corp., 368 S.C. 342, 372, 628 S.E.2d 902, 919 (Ct. App. 2006) (“In order for an issue to be properly preserved for appeal, it must have been both raised to and ruled upon by the trial court . . . Issue preservation rules are designed to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on the issues, and thus provide us with a platform for meaningful appellate review.”) (internal citations omitted). At trial, defense counsel argued:

As we see from the video you don’t see anything. You see Mr. Holmes[?] [Appellant’s] back the entire time. And you never see him expose himself openly to a camera. He does not run out into the booking area and rip off his suicide gown, which has been testified to be a solid piece. And the entire time based on the evidence you see he is also up against a door, Your Honor. And so when you are talking about exposure there has to be some exposure. There has to be something that we can actually see and show and say look jury, this is how this happened, this is what happened. And there has been no evidence of actual exposure in this case.

R. 106, l. 21 – 107, l. 7.

Defense counsel later continued:

[T]hat’s one of the reasons that I have felt so strongly about this particularly because of where it did occur which is in this very confined cell where Mr. Holmes is allegedly masturbating against a door with the exposure being this two inch maybe, maybe two inch crack and the State still has to prove that he had an intent to expose himself.

There is criminal intent in any criminal crime and they’ve not offered any evidence to that because it wasn’t like he was trying to shove himself through the

crack. He wasn't jumping up on his bed to try to get [a] better view of the window; nothing of that nature.

R. 108, ll. 4-15.

The trial judge ultimately ruled, **"I think that is clearly a legitimate question of fact that needs to be resolved by the jury . . . [w]ith regard to whether it is a public place or not and with regard to whether or not she [Officer DeSantis] saw his penis and whether or not he intentionally displayed his penis to her.** So we will proceed forward with the trial." R. 119, l. 23 – 120, l. 5 (emphasis added). As shown, the issue was both raised to and ruled upon by the trial court. Further, Appellant was not required to object to the judge's ultimate ruling to preserve the issue for appeal. In fact, defense counsel could not further argue after the judge ruled. See Rule 18(a), SCRCrimP.

Error preservation rules do not require a party to use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve an issue for appellate review. Instead, *a litigant is only required to fairly raise the issue to the trial court, thereby giving it an opportunity to rule on the issue.*" State v. Brannon, 388 S.C. 498, 502, 697 S.E.2d 593, 595-596 (2010) (internal citation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Because Appellant extensively argued below that there was no evidence Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person and the trial judge ruled on the issue, Appellant respectfully requests this Court grant rehearing and address the merits of this argument. See Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 470, 719 S.E.2d 640, 644 (2011) ("We are mindful of the need to approach issue preservation rules with a practical eye and not in a rigid, hyper-technical manner.")

Under the proper standard of review, the trial judge should have directed a verdict of acquittal because the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his

person. Moreover, the state could not prove all the elements of the offense because the holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant was housed when he allegedly exposed himself is not a public place under S.C. Code. Ann. § 16-15-130.

Appellant was indicted for indecent exposure pursuant to § 16-15-130. This statute reads in relevant part: “(A)(1) It is unlawful for a person to willfully, maliciously, and indecently expose his person in a public place, on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street or highway.” The single person holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant allegedly exposed himself while masturbating does not constitute a public place under the statute.

“The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Bryant v. State, 384 S.C. 525, 529, 683 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As such, a court must abide by the plain meaning of the words of a statute.” State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2011) (citing Hodge v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)). Also, penal statutes must be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the defendant. Hair v. State, 305 S.C. 77, 79, 406 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1991) (citing State v. Cutler, 274 S.C. 376, 378, 264 S.E.2d 420, 420-421 (1980)); State v. Muldrow, 348 S.C. 264, 268, 559 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2002).

In State v. Williams, 280 S.C. 305, 312 S.E.2d 555 (1984), our Supreme Court held the following definition of a “public place” was “proper and satisfactory:”

A place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which is in point of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighboring public. Any place so situated that what passes there can be seen by any considerable number of persons, if they happen to look. Also, a place in which the public has an interest as affecting the safety, health, morals, and welfare of the

community. A place exposed to the public, and where the public gather together or pass to and for.”

Id. at 306-307, 312 S.E.2d at 556 (internal citations omitted).

In Williams, the Supreme Court held that the lobby of the Austin Wilkes Society Home was a public place under the public disorderly conduct statute because it was common knowledge that the homes, which received financial assistance from United Way and governmental grants, were not private residences. Id. at 307, 312 S.E.2d at 556. Moreover, the lobby where the conduct occurred was a large waiting area and game room with a television that was commonly used by both tenants and guests. Id.

Here, Appellant was housed in a single person holding cell in the booking area of the detention center. Because it is a jail, the Beaufort County Detention Center has numerous security protocols in place and the general public does not have access to the facility or any right to resort at the facility. See Williams, 280 S.C. at 306-307, 312 S.E.2d at 556. The evidence established that in order to reach the booking area of the detention center one has to first sign in at a guarded desk and pass through a metal detector. The individual then has to be granted access through two separate secured doors that are controlled from a central location. R. 39, l. 20 – 41, l. 16. The only people granted access to the booking area are recently arrested individuals who are accompanied by law enforcement officers, correctional officers, fellow inmates, and nurses who treat inmates. Again, the general public does not have access to the area. Because it is a private, secured facility, the detention center, and even more specifically, the booking area, is not a “public place” under the plain meaning of the statute.

Further, the legislature did not intend for the jail to be considered a public place under the indecent exposure statute. As defense counsel argued below, the general assembly attempted to amend our public indecent exposure statute in early 2015 to specifically include a jail as a public


place for purposes of the statute, but the amendment “was killed by the house without being passed.” R. 12, ll. 1-14. Additionally, the indecent exposure statute was designed to protect members of the public, not correctional officers. Observing masturbating inmates, hearing foul language, and dealing with similar conduct is a part of a correctional officer’s job.

Moreover, the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed himself or intended to expose himself. Appellant was allegedly masturbating behind the closed steel door of the private holding cell where he was housed. Because Appellant was up against the door, it was physically impossible for anyone to observe Appellant masturbating through the small window located at the top of the steel door. When closed, this door supposedly has a less than two inch gap between the door and the wall. Officer DeSantis claimed she could see Appellant’s penis through this very small gap. However, the state presented no evidence that Appellant knew it was physically possible that another individual could see him masturbating through this gap or that he willfully intended DeSantis to see his penis. The trial judge even commented that “it seems to me like you would almost have to go peek into it [the gap] to see it.” R. 107, ll. 14-16. The judge also said, “[S]he [DeSantis] said she saw it [Appellant’s penis]. I’m not really sure how she did.” R. 108, l. 20.

Because there was no direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person, the trial judge erred by failing to grant a directed verdict. Moreover, the judge also erred because the holding cell within the booking area at the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant allegedly exposed himself is not a public place for purposes of the indecent exposure statute. Appellant respectfully requests this Court direct a verdict in his favor.

Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear his case pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, due to the significant legal and factual points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court in affirming Appellant's indecent exposure conviction.

Respectfully Submitted,

  
LARA M. CAUDY  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

This 25th day of April, 2019.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Beaufort County

Honorable Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,


V.

GEORGE HOLMES,

APPELLANT


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above referenced case has been served upon J. Benjamin Aplin, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and George Holmes, #24752 at Beaufort County Detention Center, P.O. Drawer 1228, Beaufort, SC 29901, this 25th day of April, 2019.

  
Lara M. Caudy  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE  
ME this 25th day of April, 2019.

 (L.S)  
Notary Public for South Carolina  
My Commission Expires: May 12, 2027.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

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APPEAL FROM BEAUFORT COUNTY  
Court of General Sessions

Michael G. Nettles, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

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Appellate Case No. 2016-002010

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THE STATE,

Respondent,

v.

GEORGE HOLMES,

Appellant.

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RETURN TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

Opinion No. 2019-UP-133

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On April 10, 2019, this Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction for indecent exposure. Appellant raised one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erroneously refused to grant a directed verdict. Appellant gave two reasons why the motion should have been granted: 1) Appellant’s cell at the Berkeley County Detention Center was not a “public place” within the meaning of the indecent exposure statute; and 2) the State produced no evidence of “willful and malicious” conduct.

Appellant petitions for rehearing on the ground that this Court did not address his “willful and malicious” argument. Although the Court’s opinion indeed did not address this specific

aspect of Appellant's argument, it correctly held that the denial of the directed verdict was proper. Appellant suggests this Court did not reach the "willful and malicious" aspect of his argument because it found Appellant's challenge to the directed verdict standard employed by the trial judge unpreserved. The State does not believe this to be accurate. The Court's finding that Appellant failed to preserve his challenge to the trial court's articulation of the directed verdict standard has no bearing on whether evidence existed to support its ruling denying the motion for directed verdict. See State v. Larmand, 415 S.C. 23, 30, 780 S.E.2d 892, 895 (2015) (explaining an appellate court must affirm the denial of a directed verdict motion if there is any evidence reasonably tending to prove guilt). Indeed, the State did not argue in its brief that the "willful and malicious" argument was unpreserved, but instead addressed (and refuted) the merits of Appellant's argument. See Brief of Respondent at 13–16.

In any case, there is ample evidence in the record of willful and malicious conduct to support the trial court's ruling in this regard. As discussed in the State's brief, Appellant intentionally positioned himself so that a female corrections officer could see his penis through a gap in the cell door as he masturbated. This act was the culmination of Appellant's continuous harassment of the officer, during which he yelled at her, calling her names such as "a cunt, a coke head, a dope fiend, a slut, a whore." He further threatened the officer, telling her he knew where she lived and was going to pay her a visit. See Brief of Respondent at 15–16. Certainly, this conduct meets the threshold for willful and malicious conduct. See Brief of Respondent at 13–15. The trial court found that whether the conduct was intentional was "clearly a legitimate question of fact," and correctly submitted the case to the jury. (R. pp. 19–20). Accordingly, although the Court did not explicitly address this aspect of Appellant's argument, it arrived at a correct result.

The remainder of Appellant's petition rehashes the error preservation and "public place" arguments this Court addressed in its opinion. Appellant has failed to demonstrate any fact or rule of law which was either misapprehended or overlooked by this Court in its determination of these issues. Even though the Court's opinion does not specifically address the "willful and malicious" aspect of Appellant's argument, this ground can be subsumed within Part One of the Court's opinion addressing the denial of the directed verdict motion generally. Even if the Court deems it necessary to address the argument in an amended opinion, no substantive rehearing is necessary. The issue is fully argued in the parties' briefs. Because this Court arrived at the correct result and no further argument is necessary to address the issue, Appellant's petition for rehearing should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN WILSON  
Attorney General

JOSHUA A. EDWARDS  
Assistant Attorney General

BY:



Joshua A. Edwards  
S. C. Bar # 101188

Office of the Attorney General  
Post Office Box 11549  
Columbia, SC 29211  
(803) 734-3727

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

May 6, 2019

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

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APPEAL FROM BEAUFORT COUNTY  
Court of General Sessions

Michael G. Nettles, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

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Appellate Case No. 2016-002010

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THE STATE,

Respondent,

v.

GEORGE HOLMES,

Appellant.

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**PROOF OF SERVICE**

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I, Anne Mueller, certify that I have served the within Return To Petition For Rehearing on Appellant by depositing two copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to attorney of record, Lara M. Caudy, Esquire, S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense, Post Office Box 11589, Columbia, SC 29211.

I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served.  
This 6<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2019.

  
Anne Mueller  
Legal Assistant

Office of the Attorney General  
Post Office Box 11549  
Columbia, SC 29211  
(803) 734-3727

# The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,




v.

George Holmes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002010

\_\_\_\_\_  
ORDER  
\_\_\_\_\_

The petition for rehearing is granted. We dispense with further briefing and argument. The attached opinion is substituted for the previous opinion, which is withdrawn.

	_____	J.
	_____	J.
	_____	J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire  
 John Benjamin Aplin, Esquire  
 Lara Mary Caudy, Esquire  
 Jennifer Ellis Roberts, Esquire  
 Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, Esquire  
 Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., Esquire

**FILED**  
*August 28, 2019*  
**RECEIVED**  
 AUG 28 2019  
 APPELLATE DEFENSE

Joshua Abraham Edwards, Esquire  
The Honorable Carmen T. Mullen

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE  
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING  
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

George Holmes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002010

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Appeal From Beaufort County  
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-133  
Submitted February 1, 2019 – Filed April 10, 2019  
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled August 28, 2019

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**AFFIRMED**

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Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for  
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Senior Assistant  
Deputy Attorney General William M. Blich, Jr., both of  
Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of  
Bluffton, for Respondent.

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**PER CURIAM:** In this criminal matter, George Holmes appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict. Holmes argues the circuit court erred in failing to direct a verdict on the offense of indecent exposure when (1) the alleged exposure occurred in a holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center (the Detention Center), which is not a public place as intended under section 16-15-130 of the South Carolina Code (2015) and (2) the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review, and under the correct standard of review, the State failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence that Holmes willfully or maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person. We affirm.

1. We find there is evidence to support the circuit court's refusal to direct a verdict because whether the Detention Center jail cell is a public place under section 16-15-130(A)(1) is a question of fact that should be resolved by a jury. *See State v. Zeigler*, 364 S.C. 94, 103, 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The appellate court may reverse the [circuit court]'s denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if there is no evidence to support the [circuit court]'s ruling."); *State v. Weston*, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); *Hopper v. Terry Hunt Constr.*, 373 S.C. 475, 479–80, 646 S.E.2d 162, 165 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Certain situations involve mixed question of law and fact. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. But whether the facts of a case were correctly applied to a statute is a question of fact . . ."); *see, e.g., Bursey v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control*, 369 S.C. 176, 185, 631 S.E.2d 899, 904 (2006), *overruled on other grounds by Allison v. W.L. Gore & Assocs.*, 394 S.C. 185, 188, 714 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2011) (finding the meaning of the term 'excavation' in a statute was a question of law and whether certain activities exceeded the scope of the definition of 'excavation' was a question of fact); § 16-15-130(A)(1) ("It is unlawful for a person to wilfully [sic], maliciously, and indecently expose his person in a public place, on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street or highway."); *State v. Williams*, 280 S.C. 305, 306, 312 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1984) (defining "public place" as "[a] place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which is in point of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighboring public . . . [a]ny place so situated that what passes there can be seen by any considerable number of persons, if they happen to look . . . [a]lso, a place in which the public has an interest as affecting the safety, health, morals, and welfare of the community . . . [a] place exposed to the public, and where the public gather together or pass to and fro" (quoting *Public Place*, *Black's Law Dictionary* (4th ed. rev. 1968))); *see also Collins v. State*, 381 S.E.2d 430, 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)

("Whether the act was performed in a 'public place' within the meaning of the [public indecency] statute was a question of fact which the trial court properly left for the jury's resolution."); *Douglas v. State*, 768 S.E.2d 526, 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) ("Under this general definition, what constitutes a public place is a question of fact for the jury and must be proved or disproved by the evidence in each case . . . ."); *People v. Williams*, 613 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. 2000) ("However, to the extent that the prosecution may have to establish that the act occurred in public as an element of the crime, it remains a question for trial whether the element is established."); *Wisneski v. State*, 905 A.2d 385, 393 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) ("What constitutes a public place within the meaning of [indecent exposure] depends on the circumstances of the case." (quoting *Messina v. State*, 130 A.2d 578, 579 (Md. 1957)) (emphasis omitted)); *State v. Narcisse*, 833 So.2d 1186, 1192 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (stating the question of whether a jail infirmary is a public place open to the public view is a question for the jury to determine).

Further, we find there is evidence reasonably tending to prove the jail cell is a public place because the cell is visible to those who pass by and happen to look through the cell window or the gap in the door. *See Williams*, 280 S.C. at 306, 312 S.E.2d at 556 (including a "place so situated that what passes there can be seen by any considerable number of persons, if they happen to look" in the definition of a public place (quoting *Public Place*, *Black's Law Dictionary* (4th ed. rev. 1968))). Officer Jessica DeSantis testified she could see into the cell from the booking desk and as she walked past the cell. Witness testimony indicated the booking area is the busiest part of the Detention Center and a considerable number of people pass through the booking area, including corrections officers, attorneys, maintenance workers, nurses, and anyone being booked.

2. We find Holmes's argument that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review is not preserved for appellate review. This issue was not raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court. *See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke*, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for appellate review."); *State v. Patterson*, 324 S.C. 5, 16, 482 S.E.2d 760, 765 (1997) (stating a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve issues for direct appellate review).

Even if this issue was preserved for review, we find there is evidence to support the circuit court's finding that sufficient evidence existed showing Holmes willfully or maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person. *See* § 16-15-130(A)(1) ("It is unlawful for a person to wilfully [sic], maliciously, and

indecently expose his person in a public place, on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street or highway."); *State v. Smith*, 359 S.C. 481, 490, 597 S.E.2d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2004) ("In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and if there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury."). There is evidence tending to prove Holmes willfully took actions to ensure Officer DeSantis observed him exposing himself because there is evidence Holmes did not have undergarments on, he put one foot up on the bunk, positioned himself before the gap in the door, held his penis, moved his hand in an up-and-down-motion, banged on his cell door, and "did anything to direct attention to himself." See *Willful*, *Black's Law Dictionary* (10th ed. 2004) (defining a willful act as one which is done voluntarily and intentionally); *id.* (noting "[a] voluntary act becomes willful in law, only when it involves conscious wrong or evil purpose on the part of the actor, or at least inexcusable carelessness, whether the act is right or wrong"). We also find there is evidence tending to prove Holmes's actions were deliberate and spiteful and, therefore, malicious because Officer DeSantis testified he yelled expletives at her, called her by her first name, and threatened that he knew where she lived. See *Eaves v. Broad River Elec. Coop., Inc.*, 277 S.C. 475, 479, 289 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1982) (defining malice as "the deliberate intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse"); *Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.*, 368 S.C. 424, 437, 629 S.E.2d 642, 649 (2006) (providing "[m]alice does not necessarily mean a defendant acted out of spite, revenge, or with a malignant disposition, although such an attitude certainly may indicate malice"); *id.* (stating "malice may be implied where the evidence reveals a disregard of the consequences of an injurious act, without reference to any special injury that may be inflicted on another person").

Accordingly, Holmes's conviction is

**AFFIRMED.**<sup>1</sup>

**WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and HILL, JJ., concur.**

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<sup>1</sup> We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

GEORGE HOLMES,

APPELLANT

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2016-002010

Appeal from Beaufort County

Honorable Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2019-UP-133

PETITION FOR REHEARING

On August 28, 2019, this Court affirmed Appellant's conviction for indecent exposure in an unpublished opinion. State v. Holmes, 2019-UP-133 (S.C. Ct. App. filed August 28, 2019). Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear the matter based upon the significant points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court in reaching its decision.

On appeal, Appellant argued the trial judge erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the offense of indecent exposure when (1) the alleged exposure occurred in a holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center, which is not a public place as intended by the legislature or as defined by our Supreme Court, and (2) where the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously

exposed his person or intended to expose his person. Appellant also challenged the standard of review used by the trial judge in denying the motion.

In a per curiam opinion, this Court held there was evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center is a public place under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-130(A)(1) because witness testimony indicated the booking area is the busiest part of the Detention Center and the cell is visible to those who pass by and happen to look through the cell window or the gap in the door. The Court also relied on the testimony of Officer Jessica DeSantis who claimed she could see into the cell from the booking desk and as she walked past the cell. State v. Holmes, 2019-UP-133 (S.C. Ct. App. filed August 28, 2019).

This Court further held Appellant's argument that the trial judge applied the wrong standard of review was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge. If the issue was preserved for review, this Court held there was evidence to support the trial judge's finding that sufficient evidence existed showing Appellant willfully or maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person. The Court concluded there was evidence Appellant willfully took actions to ensure Officer DeSantis observed him exposing himself because "Holmes did not have undergarments on, he put one foot up on the bunk, positioned himself before the gap in the door, held his penis, moved his hand in an up-and-down motion, banged on the cell door, and 'did anything to direct attention to himself.'" Lastly, the Court determined there was evidence Appellant's actions were malicious because "Officer DeSantis testified he yelled expletives at her, called her by her first name, and threatened that he knew where she lived.

#### ***Factual Background***

On April 6, 2014, Appellant was incarcerated at the Beaufort County Detention Center. He suffers from severe mental illness, including schizophrenia, and was placed on suicide watch

after complaining of hearing voices and stating he was going to harm himself. R. 43, l. 16 – 44, l. 5. An inmate on suicide watch is required to be continually monitored and visually observed by a correctional officer every fifteen minutes. R. 58, l. 13 – 59, l. 14. Consequently, such inmates, like Appellant, are housed in a single person holding cell in the booking area of the detention center. R. 58, ll. 1-12.

In order to reach the booking area from outside the detention center, one must first sign in and pass through a metal detector. After going through the metal detector, the individual must pass through “a secured locked door that is controlled from a central location.” This first secured door leads to “sort of an in-between area” before the individual reaches a second secured locked door. After being granted access through this second secured door, the individual finally reaches the booking area. R. 39, l. 20 – 41, l. 16; R. 31, ll. 15-20. Because it is a jail, the detention center has numerous security protocols in place. R. 41, ll. 17-22; R. 65, ll. 7-11.

Appellant was placed in a holding cell identified as IH-1. R. 79, ll. 8-14. This cell, along with others used to house inmates on suicide watch, has a surveillance camera that captures what occurs inside the cell. R. 53, ll. 12-18. Additionally, each cell has a metal toilet, sink, and bunk. R. 66, ll. 18-22. The door to each cell is made of steel and slides shut from left to right. When closed, there is a small gap between the door and the wall approximately one and a half to two inches wide. R. 54, l. 17 – 55, l. 4. The door itself also has a very small window that officers use to monitor inmates housed inside. R. 58, ll. 13-25.

The state alleged at trial that on the evening of April 6, 2014, Appellant masturbated inside his cell and purposefully positioned himself so that a female correctional officer, Jessica DeSantis, could see him. DeSantis claimed that she could see Appellant’s penis through the small one and a half to two inch gap between the cell door and the wall. R. 87, l. 1 – 90, l. 2; R.

93, ll. 1-3. She also claimed that while Appellant was masturbating, he yelled obscene words at her, such as slut and whore. R. 87, ll. 6-10; R. 92, ll. 8-18.

Nearly three months later, after consulting with the solicitor's office and waiting for the results of a mental health evaluation Appellant had undergone, law enforcement charged Appellant with indecent exposure pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-130. R. 44, l. 6 – 45, l. 15. This statute reads in relevant part: “(A)(1) It is unlawful for a person to willfully, maliciously, and indecently expose his person in a public place, on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street or highway.”

Appellant moved pretrial to dismiss the indictment arguing that the Beaufort County Detention Center is not a public place under the plain meaning of the statute, and thus Appellant could not be convicted of indecent exposure. R. 2, l. 1 – 3, l. 11. Defense counsel argued that at the time of the alleged offense Appellant was housed in a very “small private place” behind a steel door in a “highly secured government building that the public does not have general access to.” R. 2, ll. 13-20. Because the state must prove Appellant exposed himself in a public place, counsel concluded that the prosecution could not meet all the elements of the offense and that the indictment should be dismissed.

The assistant solicitor admitted “there is no South Carolina law on point when it comes to [what constitutes] a public place.” However, the solicitor asserted that “the Attorney General published a memo back in August of 2007 where they were responding to a question of graffiti inside of a detention center and if it would fit the statute because it [the statute] required that it [the graffiti] be publicly viewable. So the Attorney General put out an opinion and they cited several cases and I want to hand these up to Your Honor.” R. 4, l. 20 – 5, l. 6. Relying on cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Attorney General in its August 2007 opinion, some of which are unpublished and most of which are not directly on point, the solicitor argued that the holding

cell in the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant was being housed at the time of the alleged exposure constituted a public place.

Defense counsel stated in response “that our general assembly at the beginning of 2015 attempted to amend our public indecent exposure statute to specifically include a jail as a public facility for purposes of the statute” but the amendment “was killed by the house without being passed.” Consequently, counsel argued that the “legislative intent is not to include the jail house as a public place in the state of South Carolina.” R. 12, ll. 1-14. She later continued, “And our legislature attempted to change that act and it failed. And that I think is extremely damning to the State’s argument that this is in any way shape or form a public place for the purposes of the statute.” R. 13, ll. 19-23.

Moreover, defense counsel asserted that the statute is “designed to protect the public from instances of indecent exposure . . . [and] as much as Ms. DeSantis [the correctional officer] may not [have] enjoyed having to see that and as much as other C-O’s [correctional officers] probably don’t like it either unfortunately they are not considered the public under the law. This is part of their job.” R. 13, ll. 3-13. Lastly, defense counsel stressed that the holding cell where Appellant was housed at the time of the alleged exposure “is behind two remote control locked doors, a guarded security desk and a metal detector [and] is not a public place at all.” R. 13, ll. 14-19.

The trial court ultimately denied the pretrial motion to dismiss. The court found “the jail is indeed a public place for purposes of this statute [S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-130].” R. 49, ll. 4-6. The court emphasized that because correctional officers were required to visually check on Appellant while he was placed in IH-1 on suicide watch and because other people, including inmates, could walk by and potentially see the alleged exposure, the area was a “public place.” R. 15, ll. 12-17.

At the conclusion of the state's presentation of evidence, Appellant moved for a directed verdict and renewed and incorporated the arguments he raised during the pretrial motion to dismiss. The following exchange took place between defense counsel and the court:

Ms. Saxon: Again, I stand by my earlier argument that the jail for the purpose of the statute and the cell where all of this occurred as we have now seen is not a public place. It is not someplace that people freely have access to. The alleged exposure occur[ed] through maybe a one inch, two inch at the most, crack in a cell door.

**As we see from the video you don't see anything. You see Mr. Holmes['] [Appellant's] back the entire time. And you never see him expose himself openly to a camera. He does not run out into the booking area and rip off his suicide gown, which has been testified to be a solid piece. And the entire time based on the evidence you see he is also up against a door, Your Honor. And so when you are talking about exposure there has to be some exposure. There has to be something that we can actually see and show and say look jury, this is how this happened, this is what happened. And there has been no evidence of actual exposure in this case.**

There again as I stated there has been nothing to support the idea that the jail is a public place or somewhere that the people have general access to, which is required in my opinion under the statute. I think for those reasons Your Honor I would ask you to direct a verdict in favor of Mr. Holmes [Appellant].

The Court: What do you think about the fact that this is like a one to two inch crack **it seems to me like you would almost have to go peek into it to see it.**

Ms. Saxon: That's my opinion too, Your Honor. And when you are in the jail and if you look at the videos and the photos that have been presented this is not a wide gap. **This is something that takes a deliberate action upon the other person to go and look through.** It is not something where you can shove his - -

The Court: - - this is a lot different than - - you can see and hear tell of a lot of public defenders who find themselves going into pods and there are people [inmates] out and about and there is full on masturbation and they will drop their britches to the floor and masturbate. This isn't what that is.

Ms. Saxon: No it's not, Your Honor. And that's one of the reasons that I have felt so strongly about this particularly because of where it did occur which is in this very confined cell where Mr. Holmes is allegedly masturbating against a door with the exposure being this two inch maybe, maybe two inch crack and **the State still has to prove that he had an intent to expose himself.**

**There is criminal intent in any criminal crime and they've not offered any evidence to that because it wasn't like he was trying to shove himself through the crack.** He wasn't jumping up on his bed to try to get [a] better view of the window; nothing of that nature. And I think here particularly - -

The Court: - - I think perhaps it's clear that he might have been masturbating based on what he was saying and she [DeSantis] might be right in that regard. But I don't think - - **she said she saw it. I'm not really sure how she did.**

Ms. Saxon: I agree with you, Your Honor. And I would ask that you direct a verdict for Mr. Holmes [Appellant].

The Court: There might be a **scintilla of evidence** because of the fact that she said she saw him. I don't know.

R. 106, l. 3 – 108, l. 25 (emphasis added).

In response to defense counsel's argument, the solicitor asserted that whether DeSantis saw Appellant's penis or whether Appellant intended to expose himself was a question of fact for the jury. R. 109, l. 1 – 114, l. 7.

The trial court ultimately denied the motion for a directed verdict finding "that there is indeed a scintilla of evidence" that Appellant exposed himself based on Officer DeSantis' testimony that she saw Appellant's penis through the crack between the cell door and the wall. The court continued, "**I think that is clearly a legitimate question of fact that needs to be resolved by the jury . . . [w]ith regard to whether it is a public place or not and with regard to whether or not she [DeSantis] saw his penis and *whether or not he intentionally displayed his penis to her.*** So we will proceed forward with the trial." R. 119, l. 23 – 120, l. 5 (emphasis added).

#### ***Discussion and Analysis***

"It is a fundamental concept of criminal law that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense charged against the defendant." State v. Cain, 419 S.C. 24, 30, 795 S.E.2d 846, 849 (2017) (quoting State v. Brown, 360 S.C. 581, 590, 602 S.E.2d 392, 397 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If there is any direct evidence or

any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury.” State v. McGowan, 347 S.C. 618, 622, 557 S.E.2d 657, 659 (2001) (citing State v. Rowell, 326 S.C. 313, 315, 487 S.E.2d 185, 196 (1997)).

When the prosecution relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge must direct a verdict in the defendant’s favor unless there is any substantial circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the defendant or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 139, 708 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2011) (citing State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000)).

Likewise, a directed verdict is proper when the evidence produced “merely raises a suspicion the accused is guilty.” State v. Lollis, 343 S.C. 580, 584, 541 S.E.2d 254, 256 (2001) (citing State v. Martin, 340 S.C. 597, 533 S.E.2d 572 (2000)); State v. Arnold, 361 S.C. 386, 390, 605 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2004); State v. Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 132, 322 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1984). Our courts define suspicion as “a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof.” Lollis, 343 S.C. at 584, 541 S.E.2d at 256 (citing State v. Hyder, 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96 (1963)).

When ruling on Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge erred by applying an incorrect standard. The judge found the state presented “at least a scintilla of evidence” and therefore denied Appellant’s motion. R. 114, ll. 8-11; see also R. 119, ll. 23-25; R. 115, ll. 17-18. This was clearly error. The correct standard when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict during a criminal trial where an individual’s liberty is at stake is whether there is “any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused.” McGowan, 347 S.C. at 622, 557 S.E.2d at 659. The trial judge erroneously relied upon the *much lower* standard that is used in civil cases when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See

Hancock v. Mid-South Management Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 802 (2009) (holding in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, but in cases requiring a heightened burden of proof or in cases applying federal law, the non-moving party must submit more than a mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment).

In its opinion affirming Appellant's conviction, this Court held Appellant's argument that the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person was unpreserved based solely on his separate challenge to the standard used by the trial judge in making his ruling. Significantly, the state has never asserted Appellant's argument that there was no evidence Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person was not preserved. See Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 333, 730 S.E.2d 282, 287 (2012) (Toal, C.J., concurring) ("When the opposing party does not raise a preservation issue on appeal, courts are not precluded from finding the issue unpreserved if the error is clear. However, *the silence of an adversary should serve as an indicator to the court of the obscurity of the purported procedural flaw.*") (emphasis added). Instead, in its brief, the state conceded the trial judge used an incorrect standard when ruling on Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, but argued "the trial judge's mistaken reliance on a 'scintilla of evidence' was a distinction without a difference" and ultimately constituted harmless error.

Appellant's argument that the trial judge erred by failing to direct a verdict of acquittal because the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person is

unquestionably preserved for appeal. Defense counsel made extensive arguments at trial in support of this claim and the trial judge ruled on the merits of the argument. See Queen's Grant II Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Greenwood Dev. Corp., 368 S.C. 342, 372, 628 S.E.2d 902, 919 (Ct. App. 2006) (“In order for an issue to be properly preserved for appeal, it must have been both raised to and ruled upon by the trial court . . . Issue preservation rules are designed to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on the issues, and thus provide us with a platform for meaningful appellate review.”) (internal citations omitted). At trial, defense counsel argued:

As we see from the video you don't see anything. You see Mr. Holmes['] [Appellant's] back the entire time. And you never see him expose himself openly to a camera. He does not run out into the booking area and rip off his suicide gown, which has been testified to be a solid piece. And the entire time based on the evidence you see he is also up against a door, Your Honor. And so when you are talking about exposure there has to be some exposure. There has to be something that we can actually see and show and say look jury, this is how this happened, this is what happened. And **there has been no evidence of actual exposure in this case.**

R. 106, l. 21 – 107, l. 7 (emphasis added).

Defense counsel later continued:

[T]hat's one of the reasons that I have felt so strongly about this particularly because of where it did occur which is in this very confined cell where Mr. Holmes is allegedly masturbating against a door with the exposure being this two inch maybe, maybe two inch crack and **the State still has to prove that he had an intent to expose himself.**

**There is criminal intent in any criminal crime and they've not offered any evidence to that because it wasn't like he was trying to shove himself through the crack.** He wasn't jumping up on his bed to try to get [a] better view of the window; nothing of that nature.

R. 108, ll. 4-15 (emphasis added).

The trial judge ultimately ruled, “I think **that is clearly a legitimate question of fact that needs to be resolved by the jury . . . [w]ith regard to whether it is a public place or not and with regard to whether or not she [Officer DeSantis] saw his penis and *whether or not he***

*intentionally displayed his penis to her.* So we will proceed forward with the trial.” R. 119, l. 23 – 120, l. 5 (emphasis added).

Error preservation rules do not require a party to use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve an issue for appellate review. Instead, *a litigant is only required to fairly raise the issue to the trial court, thereby giving it an opportunity to rule on the issue.*” State v. Brannon, 388 S.C. 498, 502, 697 S.E.2d 593, 595-596 (2010) (internal citation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Because Appellant extensively argued below that there was no evidence Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person and the trial judge ruled on the issue, Appellant respectfully requests this Court grant rehearing and hold this issue is preserved for appellate review. See Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 470, 719 S.E.2d 640, 644 (2011) (“We are mindful of the need to approach issue preservation rules with a practical eye and not in a rigid, hyper-technical manner.”)

Moreover, Appellant’s challenge to the standard of review used by the trial judge is also preserved since Appellant was not required to object to the judge’s ultimate ruling to preserve the issue for appeal. In fact, defense counsel could not further argue after the judge ruled. See Rule 18(a), SCRCrimP.

Under the proper standard of review, the trial judge should have directed a verdict of acquittal because the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person or intended to expose his person. Moreover, the state could not prove all the elements of the offense because the holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant was housed when he allegedly exposed himself is not a public place under S.C. Code. Ann. § 16-15-130.

Appellant was indicted for indecent exposure pursuant to § 16-15-130. This statute reads in relevant part: “(A)(1) It is unlawful for a person to willfully, maliciously, and indecently

expose his person in a public place, on property of others, or to the view of any person on a street or highway.” The single person holding cell at the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant allegedly exposed himself while masturbating does not constitute a public place under the statute.

“The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Bryant v. State, 384 S.C. 525, 529, 683 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As such, a court must abide by the plain meaning of the words of a statute.” State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2011) (citing Hodge v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)). Also, penal statutes must be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the defendant. Hair v. State, 305 S.C. 77, 79, 406 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1991) (citing State v. Cutler, 274 S.C. 376, 378, 264 S.E.2d 420, 420-421 (1980)); State v. Muldrow, 348 S.C. 264, 268, 559 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2002).

In State v. Williams, 280 S.C. 305, 312 S.E.2d 555 (1984), our Supreme Court held the following definition of a “public place” was “proper and satisfactory:”

A place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which is in point of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighboring public. Any place so situated that what passes there can be seen by any considerable number of persons, if they happen to look. Also, a place in which the public has an interest as affecting the safety, health, morals, and welfare of the community. A place exposed to the public, and where the public gather together or pass to and for.”

Id. at 306-307, 312 S.E.2d at 556 (internal citations omitted).

In Williams, the Supreme Court held that the lobby of the Austin Wilkes Society Home was a public place under the public disorderly conduct statute because it was common knowledge that the homes, which received financial assistance from United Way and governmental grants, were not private residences. Id. at 307, 312 S.E.2d at 556. Moreover, the lobby where the conduct occurred

was a large waiting area and game room with a television that was commonly used by both tenants and guests. Id.

Here, Appellant was housed in a single person holding cell in the booking area of the detention center. Because it is a jail, the Beaufort County Detention Center has numerous security protocols in place and the general public does not have access to the facility or any right to resort at the facility. See Williams, 280 S.C. at 306-307, 312 S.E.2d at 556. The evidence established that in order to reach the booking area of the detention center one has to first sign in at a guarded desk and pass through a metal detector. The individual then has to be granted access through two separate secured doors that are controlled from a central location. R. 39, l. 20 – 41, l. 16. The only people granted access to the booking area are recently arrested individuals who are accompanied by law enforcement officers, correctional officers, fellow inmates, and nurses who treat inmates. Again, the general public does not have access to the area. Because it is a private, secured facility, the detention center, and even more specifically, the booking area, is not a “public place” under the plain meaning of the statute.

Further, the legislature did not intend for the jail to be considered a public place under the indecent exposure statute. As defense counsel argued below, the general assembly attempted to amend our public indecent exposure statute in early 2015 to specifically include a jail as a public place for purposes of the statute, but the amendment “was killed by the house without being passed.” R. 12, ll. 1-14. Additionally, the indecent exposure statute was designed to protect members of the public, not correctional officers. Observing masturbating inmates, hearing foul language, and dealing with similar conduct is a part of a correctional officer’s job.

Moreover, the state failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed himself or intended to expose himself. Appellant was allegedly masturbating behind the closed steel door of the private holding cell where

he was housed. Because Appellant was up against the door, it was physically impossible for anyone to observe Appellant masturbating through the small window located at the top of the steel door. When closed, this door supposedly has a less than two inch gap between the door and the wall. Officer DeSantis claimed she could see Appellant's penis through this very small gap. However, the state presented no evidence that Appellant knew it was physically possible that another individual could see him masturbating through this gap or that he willfully intended DeSantis to see his penis. The trial judge even commented that "it seems to me like you would almost have to go peek into it [the gap] to see it." R. 107, ll. 14-16. The judge also said, "[S]he [DeSantis] said she saw it [Appellant's penis]. I'm not really sure how she did." R. 108, l. 20.

Because there was no direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Appellant willfully and maliciously exposed his person, the trial judge erred by failing to grant a directed verdict. Moreover, the judge also erred because the holding cell within the booking area at the Beaufort County Detention Center where Appellant allegedly exposed himself is not a public place for purposes of the indecent exposure statute. Appellant respectfully requests this Court direct a verdict in his favor.

Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court rehear his case pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, due to the significant legal and factual points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court in affirming Appellant's indecent exposure conviction.

Respectfully Submitted,



LARA M. CAUDY  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

This 12th day of September, 2019.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

\_\_\_\_\_  
Appeal from Beaufort County

Honorable Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge  
\_\_\_\_\_

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,


V.

GEORGE HOLMES,

APPELLANT


\_\_\_\_\_  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
\_\_\_\_\_

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above referenced case has been served upon Joshua A. Edwards, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and George Holmes, #24752 at Beaufort County Detention Center, P.O. Drawer 1228, Beaufort, SC 29901, this 12th day of September, 2019.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Lara M. Caudy  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE  
ME this 12th day of September, 2019.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(L.S)  
Notary Public for South Carolina  
My Commission Expires: September 27, 2028.



ALAN WILSON  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

September 20, 2019

**VIA HAND DELIVERY**

The Honorable Jenny A. Kitchings  
Clerk, South Carolina Court of Appeals  
Post Office Box 11629  
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Re: The State v. George Holmes  
Appellate Case No: 2016-002010

Dear Ms. Kitchings:

After this Court withdrew and substituted its opinion in *State v. George Holmes*, 2019-UP-133 (Refiled August 28, 2019), Appellant filed a second Petition for Rehearing. Counsel of Record for the State is currently out of the country, so please accept this letter in lieu of a formal Return. Please do not hesitate to contact me if the Court desires a formal Return.

The State submits Appellant has failed to indicate any fact or law misapprehended or overlooked by this Court in its substituted opinion. This Court properly addressed all issues, including those originally complained of by Appellant as having been omitted. The State incorporates all arguments from its Brief and prior Return to Petition for Rehearing on the merits of the issues addressed by Appellant's second Petition for Rehearing.

Sincerely,

William M. Blich, Jr.  
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General  
S.C. Bar No: 15608

cc: Lara M. Caudy, Esquire  
Victim Advocacy Division

# The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

George Holmes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002010

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## ORDER

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After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.

H. B. Wilson J.  
John O. Patterson J.  
D. Hanlin J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire  
John Benjamin Aplin, Esquire  
Lara Mary Caudy, Esquire  
Jennifer Ellis Roberts, Esquire  
Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, Esquire

**FILED**

October 1, 2019

Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., Esquire  
Joshua Abraham Edwards, Esquire  
William M. Blicht, Jr., Esquire  
The Honorable Carmen T. Mullen

RECEIVED  
OCT 01 2019  
APPELLATE DEFENSE