

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

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Certiorari to Greenville County

Honorable Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge  
—————

Opinion No. 2020-UP-246 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed August 19, 2020)  
—————

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

BRIAN WILLIE BENSON LEWIS,

APPELLANT

APPELLATE CASE NO 2017-000482  
—————

APPENDIX  
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**Oct 16 2020**

S.C. SUPREME COURT

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**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE  
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING  
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

Brian Willie Lewis, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000482

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Appeal From Greenville County  
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-246  
Heard September 11, 2019 – Filed August 19, 2020

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**AFFIRMED**

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Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek,  
Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, and Appellate  
Defender Adam Sinclair Ruffin, all of Columbia, for  
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior  
Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of  
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of  
Greenville, for Respondent.

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**PER CURIAM:** Brian Willie Lewis appeals from his convictions for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime,

conspiracy, and resisting arrest asserting the trial court erred in (1) including "searching for the truth" language in its reasonable doubt charge, (2) declining to charge his requested jury instructions on identification and credibility, and (3) admitting his out-of-court statements because they were not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in including "searching for the truth" language in its reasonable doubt charge: *State v. Aleksey*, 343 S.C. 20, 27, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251 (2000) ("[J]ury instructions should be considered as a whole, and if as a whole they are free from error, any isolated portions which may be misleading do not constitute reversible error."); *id.* ("The standard for review of an ambiguous [or defective] jury instruction is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution."); *State v. Pradubsri*, 420 S.C. 629, 640-41, 803 S.E.2d 724, 730 (Ct. App. 2017) (finding—upon review of the entire charge—no reversible error despite the trial court's truth-seeking jury instruction, observing the trial court's instructions referenced the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard at least twenty times); *Todd v. State*, 355 S.C. 396, 402-03, 585 S.E.2d 305, 308-09 (2003) (holding, despite the use of truth-seeking language, there was no reasonable likelihood jurors applied the trial court's instructions in an unconstitutional way because the trial court "used alternative methods of describing the [reasonable doubt] standard," and "the trial [court's] careful and exhaustive articulation of the reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence standard, when examined in its entirety, effectively communicated the high burden of proof that the state was required to establish by the Constitution").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in declining to charge appellant's requested jury instructions on identification: *Barber v. State*, 393 S.C. 232, 236, 712 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2011) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the [trial] court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial." (quoting *State v. Mattison*, 388 S.C. 469, 478, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010))); *State v. Brandt*, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011) ("A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law." (quoting *State v. Adkins*, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Ct. App. 2003))); *State v. Burkhart*, 350 S.C. 252, 261, 565 S.E.2d 298, 303 (2002) ("The substance of the law must be charged to the jury, not particular verbiage.") *id.* ("[T]o warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial."); *State v. Green*, 412 S.C. 65, 76-77, 770 S.E.2d 424, 430 (Ct. App. 2015) (finding no error in the trial

court's refusal to issue an almost identical identification charge); *id.* at 78, 770 S.E.2d at 431 ("South Carolina appears to fall in the class of jurisdictions that view instructions regarding 'a witness's level of certainty in his or her identification in assessing the reliability of the identification' as 'superfluous when general instructions on witness credibility and burden of proof are given' or 'an impermissible judicial comment on the evidence.'" (quoting *Brodes v. State*, 614 S.E.2d 766, 767, 768 n. 6 (Ga. 2005))).

3. As to whether the trial court erred in declining to charge appellant's requested jury instructions on credibility: *Barber*, 393 S.C. at 236, 712 S.E.2d at 438 ("The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial." (quoting *State v. Knoten*, 347 S.C. 296, 302, 555 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2001))); *id.* ("In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the [trial] court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial." (quoting *Mattison*, 388 S.C. at 478, 697 S.E.2d at 583)); *Brandt*, 393 S.C. at 549, 713 S.E.2d at 603 ("A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law." (quoting *Adkins*, 353 S.C. at 318, 577 S.E.2d at 464)); *id.* ("It is error for the trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction [that] states a sound principle of law when that principle applies to the case at hand, *and the principle is not otherwise included in the charge.*" (emphasis added) (quoting *State v. Williams*, 367 S.C. 192, 195, 624 S.E.2d 443, 445 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added))); *Burkhart*, 350 S.C. at 261, 565 S.E.2d at 303 ("The substance of the law must be charged to the jury, not particular verbiage."); *id.* ("[T]o warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial."); *State v. Marin*, 415 S.C. 475, 483, 783 S.E.2d 808, 813 (2016) (holding, though a particular charge may have been appropriate, its absence did not mandate reversal when the essence of the charge was encompassed in the jury instructions).

4. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting appellant's out-of-court statements: *State v. Miller*, 375 S.C. 370, 378, 652 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The trial [court] determines the admissibility of a statement upon proof of its voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence."); *State v. Saltz*, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001) ("When reviewing a trial court's ruling concerning voluntariness [of a statement], [the appellate court] does not reevaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence."); *State v. Moses*, 390 S.C. 502, 513, 702 S.E.2d 395, 401 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In South Carolina, the test for determining whether a defendant's confession was given

freely, knowingly, and voluntarily focuses upon whether the defendant's will was overborne by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.").

**AFFIRMED.**

**HUFF, WILLIAMS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

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THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

BRIAN WILLIE BENSON LEWIS,

APPELLANT.

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2017-000482

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Appeal from Greenville County

Honorable Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-246

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PETITION FOR REHEARING

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On August 19, 2020, this Court affirmed the trial judge’s decision to instruct the jury that “a reasonable doubt is that doubt which would make an honest, conscientious juror searching for the truth in a case to hesitate to act.” State v. Lewis, Op. No. 2020-UP-246 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed August 19, 2020). Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court rehear the matter considering the significant points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court discussed below.

This Court relied on State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 27, 538 S.E.2d 248, 251 (2000) for the proposition that “jury instructions should be considered as a whole, and if as a whole they are free

from error, any isolated portions which may be misleading do not constitute reversible error.” However, Aleksey dealt with a jury instruction regarding the *credibility of witnesses* in which the judge concluded his remarks by stating: “Ladies and gentlemen, throughout this entire process, you have but one single objective, and that is to seek the truth, to seek the truth regardless of from what source that truth may be derived.” Aleksey, 343 S.C. at 26, 538 S.E.2d at 251. The Aleksey Court noted that, prior to its instruction on the credibility of witnesses, the “trial court gave a lengthy, complete, and proper instruction on reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the State’s burden of proof.” Id.

Unlike in Aleksey, the trial judge in this case did not give a “proper instruction on reasonable doubt.” Instead, the trial judge incorrectly defined reasonable doubt as “doubt which would make an honest, conscientious juror searching for the truth in a case to hesitate to act.” R. 456, ll. 20 – 25. That was not the definition of reasonable doubt and it was error for the trial judge to charge it.

This Court ignored the Aleksey Court’s acknowledgement that “[j]ury instructions on reasonable doubt which charge the jury to ‘seek the truth’ are disfavored because they ‘run the risk of unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proof to a defendant.’” Aleksey, 343 S.C. at 26-27, 538 S.E.2d at 251 quoting State v. Needs, 333 S.C. 134, 155, 508 S.E.2d 857, 867-68. This Court also ignored the fact that, unlike in this case, in Aleksey the “seek the truth” language did not appear in the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction. As the Aleksey Court stated:

As an abstract concept, “seeking the truth” suggests determining whose version of events is more likely true, the government’s or the defendant’s, and thereby intimates a preponderance of evidence standard. *Such an instruction would be error if used in the explanation of the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.*

Id. at 28, 538 S.E.2d at 252 (emphasis added). This was exactly the manner in which the trial judge in this case used the “seeking the truth” language. By defining reasonable doubt in this manner, not only did the judge give a legally incorrect definition of reasonable doubt, he also all but ensured the jury would use this language in an unconstitutional manner – shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.

This Court also cited State v. Pradubsri, 420 S.C. 629, 640-41, 803 S.E.2d 724, 730 (Ct. App. 2017) where this Court found no reversible error because the trial judge’s instructions “referenced the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard at least twenty times.” Like in Pradubsri, the trial judge in this case made numerous “references” to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. However, what this Court overlooked was that the trial judge only *defined* reasonable doubt once, and incorrectly.

Whether the trial judge said the words “reasonable doubt” one time or one hundred times is immaterial if the judge only defines those words on a single occasion, as the trial judge did here. In fact, the trial judge’s full reasonable doubt instruction acknowledged this:

*So what is reasonable doubt? I’ve said that word seventeen times. What does that mean? A reasonable doubt is that doubt which would make an honest, conscientious juror searching for the truth in a case to hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must therefore be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.*

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt can also be described as proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the Defendant’s guilt.

R. 456, l. 20 – 457, l. 7 (emphasis added). By putting the “searching for the truth” language in this context, the trial court was telling the jury that every time he “referenced” the reasonable doubt standard, he meant “searching for the truth.” When viewed in this context, it can more properly be said that on every occasion in which the trial judge made a reference to the term “reasonable

doubt,” he was referencing his legally incorrect definition of reasonable doubt and reminding the jury that “reasonable doubt” meant to “search for the truth.”

Finally, this Court’s opinion ignored both State v. Needs, 333 S.C. 134, 508 S.E.2d 857 (1998) and State v. Beaty, 423 S.C. 26, 813 S.E.2d 502 (2018). The Needs Court “strongly urge[d]” trial courts to avoid using any “seek” language in their jury instructions on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence because “[s]uch language is unnecessary and runs the risk of unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proof to a defendant.” Needs, 333 S.C. at 155, 508 S.E.2d at 867-68.

Twenty years later in Beaty, the Supreme Court *again* instructed trial judges not to include terms such as “search for the truth,” “find the true facts,” or any other terms “that may divert the jury from its obligation in a criminal case to determine whether the State has proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Beaty, 423 S.C. at 34, 813 S.E.2d at 506. In Beaty, the trial judge’s improper comments came in his opening remarks to the jury, not in his charge on the law at the close of the trial. In addition, the Beaty Court noted that the judge’s improper comments “were not linked to either the reasonable doubt or the circumstantial evidence charges.” Id. Because of this, the Beaty Court found the error harmless. However, the Court clearly reiterated that it is error for trial judges to include “searching for the truth” language in their comments to the jury: “These phrases could be understood to place an obligation on the jury, independent of the burden of proof, to determine the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime and from those facts alone render the verdict the jury believes best serves its perception of justice.” Id.

This Court’s opinion ignored the specific facts and circumstances of this case, including the context in which the trial judge used the “search for the truth” language. The trial judge erred

when he defined reasonable doubt incorrectly and improperly by couching it in terms of “searching for the truth.” Our Supreme Court has repeatedly found this to be improper and has repeatedly instructed trial judges not to do this. The trial judge in this case even acknowledged that the language was improper, stated that he would not use it in his jury charge because of the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Beaty, 423 S.C. 26, 813 S.E.2d 502 (2018), and then still proceeded to disregard Supreme Court precedent by giving an incorrect and improper definition of reasonable doubt. R. 415, ll. 1 – 7. None of these facts were addressed by this Court in its opinion.

Based upon the specific points overlooked and/or misapprehended by this Court in its opinion discussed above, Appellant requests this Court to rehear the matter.

s/Adam Ruffin  
Adam Sinclair Ruffin  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

This 2nd day of September, 2020.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

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Appeal from Greenville County

Honorable Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

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THE STATE,

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BRIAN WILLIE BENSON LEWIS,

APPELLANT.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Order “RE: Operation of the Appellate Courts During the Coronavirus Emergency,” dated March 20, 2020, the undersigned hereby certifies a true copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-referenced case has been served upon David Spencer, Esquire, at the primary e-mail address listed in the Attorney Information System (AIS); and Brian Willie Benson Lewis, #355387, at Perry Correctional Institution, 430 Oaklawn Road, Pelzer, SC 29669, this 2nd day of September, 2020.

s/Adam Ruffin  
Adam Sinclair Ruffin  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

# The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Brian Willie Lewis, Appellant.


Appellate Case No. 2017-000482

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## ORDER

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
After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.



J.



J.



J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire

Laura Ruth Baer, Esquire

David A. Spencer, Esquire

William Walter Wilkins, III, Esquire

Robert Michael Dudek, Esquire

**FILED**  
**Sep 16 2020**

Adam Sinclair Ruffin, Esquire  
The Honorable Brian M. Gibbons