

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

RECEIVED

Dec 03 2020

SC Court of Appeals

Appeal from Berkeley County
Honorable Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Case No. 2017-002130

THE STATE,

Respondent,

vs.

RANDY WRIGHT,

Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING

Polling of the jury is sometimes—but not always—conducted after a verdict is announced at the conclusion of a trial, and its purpose is simply to help ensure the jury’s verdict is a unanimous one. Green v. State, 351 S.C. 184, 196, 569 S.E.2d 318, 324 (2002). Significantly, jury polling achieves that purpose by giving each of the members of the jury an opportunity to individually assent to the verdict, which typically—up to that point—has only been announced by someone like a foreperson or clerk on the jurors’ collective behalf. See Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1958) (explaining the purpose of jury polling “is to give each juror an opportunity, before the verdict is recorded, to declare in open court his assent to the verdict which the foreman has returned,” which enables the trial judge and the parties to ascertain with certainty a unanimous verdict free of inducement or coercion has been reached).

In South Carolina, no statute or criminal procedure rule exists that expressly addresses if, when, and how post-verdict jury polling must be conducted in a criminal case tried in one of our

state courts. Cf. State v. Beaty, 423 S.C. 26, 39, 813 S.E.2d 502, 509 (2018) (“[T]here is no codified or otherwise duly adopted court rule governing the content and order of closing arguments in criminal cases in which a defendant introduces evidence.”). Accordingly, based on the mandates of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure, the proper procedures for jury polling in our state must necessarily be derived from the “practice as it has heretofore existed” in our courts unless and until a specific rule of procedure is adopted through the appropriate constitutionally-delineated process. Rule 37, SCRCrimP; see S.C. Const. art. V, § 4A (“All rules and amendments to rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of this State promulgated by the Supreme Court must be submitted by the Supreme Court to the Judiciary Committee of each House of the General Assembly during a regular session, but not later than the first day of February during each session. Such rules or amendments shall become effective ninety calendar days after submission unless disapproved by concurrent resolution of the General Assembly, with the concurrence of three-fifths of the members of each House present and voting.”).

Regarding the jury polling practices that have heretofore existed in our courts, South Carolina trial judges historically were vested with complete discretion as to both whether and how jury polling was conducted following the return of a verdict in a criminal trial, which left trial judges free to conduct *no* polling at all if satisfied it was not necessary under the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Simon, 126 S.C. 437, 120 S.E. 230, 232 (1923) (instructing “the well-settled rule” in South Carolina is “neither party has an absolute right to have the jury polled”); State v. Dodson, 14 S.C. 628, 628 (1881) (“The matter of polling the jury is within the discretion of the presiding judge.”). However, the practice of unfettered polling discretion was modified with our Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 309, 278 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1981), which announced and established the following new—and succinct—

procedural rule: “If [a] request [for jury polling] is made, a poll must be taken.”¹ (emphasis added). Importantly though, when articulating that new rule, the Supreme Court elected *not* to mandate a specific method by which a jury poll must be taken. Id. Instead of doing so, our Supreme Court chose to leave the particular manner by which polling of the jury is accomplished to the trial judge’s discretion, which has been expressly recognized in our post-Linder jurisprudence and is consistent with what has been described as the “prevailing view” in our nation. See United States v. Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining “the prevailing view is that the method chosen [for jury polling] is within the discretion of the trial judge”); State v. Singleton, 319 S.C. 312, 316, 460 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1995) (recognizing the manner of jury polling falls within the trial judge’s discretion). Moreover, even after the decision in Linder, jury polling still is not a necessary or critical component of the criminal trial process in our state, and there is no affirmative duty on defense counsel to request jury polling even though the right to do so exists. See Green, 351 S.C. at 196, 569 S.E.2d at 324 (explaining a trial judge “is not required to conduct a jury poll if the court is satisfied the verdict is unanimous” and defense counsel has “no affirmative duty to request the trial judge poll the jury”); see also Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194 (1899) (“[Jury polling] is *not a matter which is vital*, is frequently not required by litigants; and, while it is an undoubted right of either, it is not that which must be found in the proceedings in order to make a valid verdict.” (emphasis added)).

¹ Notably, at the time Linder was decided, our Supreme Court was constitutionally vested with authority to promulgate procedural rules for state courts to follow. See Beaty, 423 S.C. at 41, 813 S.E.2d at 510 (“Before 1973, the South Carolina Constitution did not address in any manner the power of [the Supreme] Court to implement rules of practice and procedure in the courts of this State. On April 4, 1973, article V, section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution was amended to grant power to this Court, subject to statutory law, to make rules governing the practice and procedure in all such courts in the unified judicial system.” (internal quotations and brackets omitted)).

In Appellant Randy Wright’s case, the trial judge—through her jury instructions—made abundantly clear to the jurors their verdict had to be a unanimous one. (R. p. 26; p. 483). And, to ensure absolute clarity on that point of law, the trial judge expressly emphasized to the jurors: “[A]ll 12 of you must agree on the verdict.” (R. p. 483). Following that unambiguous and easily-understood directive, the jury began deliberations and, within just under an hour and a half, reached a verdict. (R. p. 485; p. 487). Once they had done so, the jurors returned to the open courtroom, and, with all of them present, the verdict was announced as follows: “As to the charge of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, we, the jury, unanimously find [Wright] guilty.” (R. p. 488). Immediately after that, the jurors were asked to individually raise their right hands if the verdict announced was their verdict, and each member of the jury individually raised his or her hand in response. (R. pp. 488-489). Thus, the jury was unquestionably polled during Wright’s trial, and the manner of polling employed resulted in twelve *individual* hands being raised towards the courtroom ceiling to signify all twelve jurors were in full agreement with the guilty verdict that had been announced. (R. pp. 488-489).

Even though the jurors were, in fact, polled in Wright’s case and confirmed both collectively *and* individually the verdict returned was a unanimous one, this Court vacated the jury’s verdict, reversed Wright’s conviction, and remanded the matter for a new trial based solely on the manner in which that polling was conducted. State v. Wright, Op. No. 27562 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 18, 2020) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 45 at 22). In doing so, this Court determined the manner by which the jurors were polled to ascertain their individual responses was insufficient and “not the best method for accomplishing the purpose of a jury poll.” Then, despite recognizing no South Carolina authority has ever previously mandated jury polling must specifically be conducted in a person-by-person manner, this Court held the trial judge reversibly

erred by failing to conduct polling in precisely such a manner and, by so holding, adopted an entirely new rule of criminal procedure for jury polling in South Carolina consistent with rules that have been promulgated in jurisdictions *other than* our own. Finally, this Court concluded the trial judge's failure to conduct polling in the "best method" was reversible per se without any need for a showing of specific prejudice to Wright. Respectfully, pursuant to Rule 221(a) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, Respondent ("the State") petitions for rehearing because this Court overlooked and misconstrued several critical points in deciding Wright's case.

Initially, this Court appears to have overlooked the fact the polling conducted in Wright's case fully satisfied the purpose of jury polling and was entirely consistent with the "practice as it has heretofore existed" in our state. That is true because—through the jurors being asked to raise their hands individually to confirm the announced verdict was their own—a poll was unquestionably taken, which was all our Supreme Court in Linder said must occur when polling is sought. Linder, 276 S.C. at 309, 278 S.E.2d at 338; see Singleton, 319 S.C. at 316, 460 S.E.2d at 576 (indicating—in a case decided after Linder—the manner in which jury polling is conducted rests within the trial judge's discretion); cf. Miller, 59 F.3d at 421 ("[W]e are bound by our precedent to review the procedure followed in the case before us as one that is within the discretion of the district court."). Likewise, based on the process employed, the jurors were unmistakably given an opportunity to *individually* express agreement or disagreement with the verdict, and they all did just that, which enabled a determination of each individual juror's assent to the verdict. See Miranda, 255 F.2d at 17 (instructing the purpose of jury polling "is to give each juror an opportunity, before the verdict is recorded, to declare in open court his assent to the verdict which the foreman has returned"); see also Linder, 276 S.C. at 308, 278 S.E.2d at 337 ("Polling is a practice whereby the court determines from the jurors individually whether they

assented and still assent to the verdict.”). Similarly, since all twelve jurors were required to individually respond based on the manner in which the polling was conducted, the trial judge—along with everyone else in the courtroom—was able to confirm the jury’s verdict was a unanimous one simply by counting the twelve separate and individual raised hands. See Singleton, 319 S.C. at 316, 460 S.E.2d at 576 (“[T]he trial judge must be satisfied that the verdict is unanimous.”). Under such circumstances, there cannot be any legitimate grounds upon which to find the trial judge abused her broad discretion or otherwise erred merely because she refused to conduct *further* polling of jurors who had already been polled and had all individually expressed agreement with the verdict. Cf. United States v. Carter, 772 F.2d 66, 67-68 (4th Cir. 1985) (indicating it could *not* “conclude the trial judge abused his discretion in polling the jurors by asking for a show of hands” when nothing expressly prescribed the manner by which a jury poll must be conducted at that time and the applicable rule merely indicated “the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the court’s own motion”).

Beyond that, this Court appears to have overlooked the constitutional limits that prevent new rules of procedure in our state from being created and articulated solely by the issuance of published appellate decisions. Regarding those limits, our Supreme Court has explained appellate courts in South Carolina do “not have the power to adopt new rules of procedure for future trials by writing opinions to decide cases” in light of the fact such courts are limited to reviewing for errors of law only in criminal cases. Beaty, 423 S.C. at 41, 813 S.E.2d at 510; see S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 (“The Supreme Court shall constitute a court for the correction of errors at law under such regulations as the General Assembly may prescribe.”). Likewise, the citizens of our state have exclusively delegated authority to promulgate rules—and amendments to rules—governing the practices and procedures to be followed in our state’s courts to our Supreme Court,

and our citizenry further elected to place limits on that authority in the form of legislative oversight. S.C. Const. art. V, § 4A. As a result, this Court was constitutionally restricted from altering, amending, or expanding the practices and procedures for jury polling that have heretofore existed in South Carolina regardless of how prudent this Court believes the practices and procedures that have been formally adopted in other jurisdictions may be. See, e.g., Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1998 Amendments to Fed. R. Crim. P. 31 (“[T]he rule requires that the jurors be polled individually when a polling is requested, or when polling is directed sua sponte by the court.”); Conn. Practice Book § 42-31 (“The [jury] poll shall be conducted by the clerk of the court by asking each juror individually whether the verdict announced is such juror’s verdict.”); Ky. RCr 9.88 (“When the verdict is announced, either party may require the jury to be polled, which is done by the clerk’s or court’s asking each juror if it is his or her verdict.”). Despite those limitations, this Court nonetheless did alter and amend our state’s existing procedures through its decision in *Wright*’s case by holding—for the first time in the history of our state’s jurisprudence—jury polling *must* be specifically conducted in a person-by-person method when it is requested, and, by doing so, this Court acted in a manner directly contrary to the carefully-crafted process set out in our state constitution. See *Beatty*, 423 S.C. at 46, 813 S.E.2d at 512 (“Article V, section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution limits this Court’s authority to correcting errors of law and does not empower us to promulgate a procedural rule for future cases by simply issuing an opinion. Article V, section 4A, of the South Carolina Constitution prohibits this Court from adopting *any* rules of practice and procedure . . . without first going through the prescribed legislative process.” (emphasis added)).

Furthermore, even if a new procedural rule could somehow properly be adopted solely via appellate decision in South Carolina, this Court appears to have overlooked the fact it would

not be appropriate to apply such a new rule retroactively in Wright's case. That is true because new procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively, and, for obvious reasons, a trial judge cannot be faulted for failing to comply with a trial procedure that did not yet exist. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) ("New rules of procedure . . . generally do not apply retroactively. They do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise."). Even though new procedural rules typically do not apply retroactively, this Court applied the new rule it articulated regarding the specific method by which requested jury polling must be conducted to Wright's case despite also correctly recognizing "Linder provided no guidance on the mechanics of proper individual polling." See Hutto v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 259 S.C. 170, 173, 191 S.E.2d 7, 8-9 (1972) ("It is, of course, settled law that a case cannot be considered as a binding precedent on a legal point that was not argued in the case and not mentioned in the opinion." (citation and internal quotations omitted)). Critically, in light of the lack of any specified requirements in Linder regarding the manner in which requested jury polling must be conducted, nothing required the trial judge to specifically conduct person-by-person polling *at the time of Wright's trial*. See Linder, 276 S.C. at 309, 278 S.E.2d at 338 (holding only "[i]f the request is made, a poll must be taken"). Therefore, the trial judge could not have erred by failing to comply with this Court's not-yet-articulated procedural rule, which likewise could not logically or fairly be applied to Wright's case since it was not yet in existence in South Carolina at the time the jury was polled. Cf. Miller, 59 F.3d at 421 (declining to reverse in a case in which only collective polling of the jury was conducted but adopting a supervisory rule that would make individualized polling mandatory when requested "[i]n the future"); Carter, 772 F.2d at 67-68 (finding the district court

judge did not commit reversible error in polling the jury by asking for a show of hands in light of the fact nothing—at that time—“prescribe[d] the manner in which the poll is to be conducted” but suggesting “each juror be asked to respond individually” in *future* cases).

Finally, in concluding no showing of prejudice was necessary in order for a failure to conduct jury polling via a the person-by-person method to constitute reversible error, this Court appears to have overlooked several key points, including our Supreme Court’s post-Linder jurisprudence indicating a prejudice analysis should be conducted when evaluating an appellate challenge to the manner of jury polling. Specifically, since Linder was decided, our Supreme Court has directly conducted a prejudice analysis when addressing an issue involving the method by which a jury was polled, which strongly demonstrates such an analysis remains necessary when conducting appellate review of such an issue. See Singleton, 351 S.C. at 316, 460 S.E.2d at 576 (finding reversal was not warranted based on an issue with the method by which jury polling was conducted because Singleton was *not prejudiced* by it); see also Green, 351 S.C. at 196, 569 S.E.2d at 324 (affirming the denial of post-conviction relief based—in part—on the fact prejudice had not been established even though defense counsel’s actions resulted in the jury not being polled *at all* in a case in which one of the jurors may have been crying when the verdict was announced and the jury foreman expressly stated the verdict was reached “reluctantly”). Additionally, requiring prejudice to be established based on a complaint regarding the manner in which jury polling was conducted would also be fully consistent with the fact appellants in South Carolina are ordinarily required to establish both error *and* prejudice in order to be entitled to reversal on appeal. See Thomasko v. Poole, 349 S.C. 7, 17, 561 S.E.2d 597, 602 (2002) (“It is well established that an appellant seeking reversal of a decision by the trial court must show both error and prejudice.”); State v. King, 367 S.C. 131, 136, 623 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Ct. App. 2005)

(“Error without prejudice does not warrant reversal.”). Furthermore, Wright’s case did *not* involve a situation in which the trial judge failed to comply with an express rule of criminal procedure like occurred in many of the cases in which reversal was found to be appropriate. See, e.g., Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Hercules, 875 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Where reversal may be a harsh result, nothing short of reversal sufficient to remedy *this Rule 31 violation*.” (emphasis added)); Miles v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.3d 46, 46-47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (finding the trial judge’s failure to comply with the jury polling method expressly delineating in a Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure constituted reversible error). Therefore, just like with other issues involving the jury, prejudice necessarily must be established in order for an appellant in South Carolina to obtain reversal based on the manner in which jury polling was conducted, and a conviction cannot be vacated merely because the trial judge perhaps did not conduct polling in the most perfect or efficient manner conceivable. See United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 508-509 (1983) (“[T]here can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and . . . the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial. . . . [W]hen courts fashion rules whose violations mandate automatic reversals, they retreat from their responsibilities, becoming instead impregnable citadels of technicality.” (citations, internal quotations, and brackets in original omitted)); cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (“[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable.”); State v. Aldret, 333 S.C. 307, 313-314, 509 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1999) (“Given that we have not found automatic reversal warranted even in cases of external influences on a jury’s verdict, we decline to do so in the cases of internal misconduct consisting of premature deliberations. Our decision is consistent with the majority of

jurisdictions which hold a defendant must demonstrate prejudice from jury misconduct in order to be entitled to a new trial.” (citations omitted)).

Critically, when a prejudice analysis is actually conducted as required in Wright’s case, such an analysis shows Wright was not prejudiced by the method of jury polling that was employed during his trial, which is true for several different reasons. First, the jury in Wright’s case was unquestionably properly instructed its verdict must be a unanimous one in a clear and direct manner, and the jurors must be presumed to have followed the trial judge’s clear directive on that point. See United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 497 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The assumption has become axiomatic because it is so essential to the efficient functioning of the criminal justice system.”); State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 353, 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1999) (“[J]urors are presumed to follow the law as instructed to them.”). Second, the jurors in Wright’s case were actually polled and provided individual responses regarding the unanimous nature of the verdict by a show of hands, which both distinguished the situation involved significantly from cases in which *no* individual responses of any kind were obtained from all the members of the jury and provided objective evidence there were no issues with the unanimity of the verdict announced. Compare Carter, 772 F.2d at 68 (holding the jury polling procedure employed of “asking for a show of hands” was not reversible error even though the jurors were not individually questioned in a person-by-person manner as requested by defense counsel), with Miranda, 255 F.2d at 17 (concluding the trial judge reversibly erred by solely questioning the jury foreman as to whether the verdict was unanimous even though a request for jury polling was timely made); and Linder, 276 S.C. at 308, 278 S.E.2d at 337 (finding the trial judge erred by concluding confirmation of the verdict solely by the jury foreman was sufficient to serve in place of an actual poll). Third, the jury only needed a little more than an hour to reach a verdict in Wright’s straightforward

case, and nothing that occurred before or after the verdict was announced suggesting anything other than complete unanimity amongst the jurors.² Cf. Miller, 59 F.3d at 418 (“When that [collective jury polling] proceeding is considered against the backdrop of a relatively simple case, a short period of deliberation by the jury, and no indication in the record that any of the jurors displayed reluctance or disagreement with the verdict, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.”); People v. Masajo, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (instructing “the trial court’s failure to ask each juror if the verdict was his or hers requires reversal *only* if appellant were prejudiced by that error” and concluding no prejudice resulted to Masajo from the trial judge’s erroneous refusal to individually poll the jurors as statutorily required in California since nothing in the record indicated the verdict was not unanimous or uncoerced, the swift seventy-two-minute period of deliberations was “indicative of unanimity of opinion,” and each juror was given an opportunity in open court to indicate dissent from the verdict by not raising his or her hand when asked to do so). Fourth and lastly, jury polling—which has been described by the highest of legal authorities as a “minor matter”—still does *not* even have to be conducted at all if not requested in our state, which strongly demonstrates such polling is not a fundamental or necessary component of a criminal trial such that the integrity and legitimacy of the proceedings is jeopardized without it. See Humphries, 174 U.S. at 195 (characterizing a trial judge’s failure to conduct polling of the jury as a “minor matter”); Linder, 276 S.C. at 309, 278 S.E.2d at 338 (“Whether a poll of the jury will be conducted is discretionary with the trial judge *unless* polling is requested.” (emphasis added)); see also Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1950) (instructing “experience of the years has shown that

² Notably, defense counsel did not make his request for additional polling based on anything he had observed or detected regarding the jury and, instead, explained he did so solely pursuant to his “standard procedure.” (R. pp. 488-489).

[the] benefit [of jury polling] to a defendant in effecting a change or modification of the jury’s verdict is substantially nonexistent”); People v. Anzalone, 298 P.3d 849, 857 (Cal. 2013) (“The technical error here [in failing to poll the jury] did not affect the essential framework within which [Anzalone]’s trial was conducted. . . . To call what transpired here structural error would be to expand that notion beyond any example articulated by the United States Supreme Court, and elevate form over substance.”); People v. McGhee, 964 N.E.2d 715, 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“[P]olling the jury is merely a procedural device that helps to ensure that the jury’s verdict is unanimous, but it is not an indispensable prerequisite to a fair trial. . . . [W]e must conclude that polling the jury on request, while mandatory, is not so fundamental that the failure to do so affects the fairness of a defendant’s trial and challenges the integrity of the judicial process.”). Thus, since the jurors must be presumed to follow the instructions given to them, the jurors collectively and individually confirmed they all agreed in the verdict, and nothing occurred suggesting anything other than complete unanimity on the part of the jurors, there are no proper grounds upon which to conclude the jury’s verdict was anything other than unanimous even if the jury polling conducted could have possibly been carried out in a better manner. Carter, 772 F.2d at 68; see United States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 189 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Without any evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the jury followed the instructions given to it by the court.”).

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons coupled with the reasons previously advanced, the State respectfully urges this Court to reconsider this matter pursuant to Rule 221(a) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, vacate its prior opinion, and issue a new opinion correctly affirming Wright’s conviction after finding the trial judge did not abuse her discretion or otherwise reversibly err based purely on the manner in which the jury polling—which unquestionably occurred and resulted in a show of twelve individual hands in support of the

verdict announced—was conducted. By doing so, this Court will afford due respect to a verdict returned by an impartial—and properly-instructed—group of jurors who collectively and individually affirmed it was a unanimous one, comply with the limits our state’s citizenry has chosen to put into place concerning the procedural rule-making process, and avoid unnecessarily imposing the significant social costs that flow from the reversal of a conviction. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986) (“The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendant to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relieved their disturbing experiences.”); Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 484 (1913) (“It would be absurd to upset a verdict upon a speculation that the jury did not do their duty and follow the instructions of the court.”); Beaty, 423 S.C. at 46, 813 S.E.2d at 512 (instructing our appellate courts are prohibited from adopting “even a much-needed” criminal procedure rule without going through the process delineated by the South Carolina Constitution).

Respectfully submitted,

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December 3, 2020

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Shana Montgomery, certify I have served the within Respondent's Petition for Rehearing on Appellant by sending an electronic copy via email to the address listed in AIS for the following individual:

Joanna K. Delany, Esq.
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I further certify all parties required by Rule to be served have been served.
This 3rd day of December, 2020.



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Subject: State V. Randy Wright ; Petition for Rehearing ; Appellate Case No. 2017-002130
Date: Thursday, December 3, 2020 4:17:17 PM
Attachments: [Wright.Pet for Rehearing \(02440813xD2C78\).pdf](#)

Good Afternoon,

Attached please find a copy of the State's Petition For Rehearing with the proof of service for State v. Randy Wright (2017-002130). Please confirm receipt. This Petition will be submitted to the South Carolina Court of Appeals today via the AIS One Drive System. Please don't hesitate to contact our office should you have any questions.

Thank You.

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