

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In the Supreme Court

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**Dec 17 2020**

**SC Court of Appeals**

APPEAL FROM FLORENCE COUNTY  
Court of Common Pleas

Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge

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Appellate Case No. 2017-002290  
Opinion No. 2020-UP-103 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Apr. 8, 2020)  
(Withdraw, Substituted, and Refiled Oct. 7, 2020)  
(Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled Nov. 18, 2020)

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Deborah B. Harwell, ..... Plaintiff,

v.

Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and as the  
Personal Representative of the Estate of David  
W. Harwell; and the South Carolina Department  
of Health and Environmental Control, Division of Vital Records, ..... Defendants,

Of whom Robert Bryan Harwell, individually  
and as the Personal Representative of the Estate  
of David W. Harwell is the..... **PETITIONER,**

v.

Law Office of Deidre W. Edmonds, P.A. and  
Deidre W. Edmonds, Individually, Third-Party Defendants, are the..... **RESPONDENTS.**

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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Marian D. Nettles  
Nettles, Turbeville & Reddeck  
P.O. Box 699  
Lake City, SC 29560  
(843) 374-8511  
missy@ntrlaw.com

(continued)  
Kevin M. Barth  
Barth, Ballenger & Lewis, LLP  
P.O. Box 107  
Florence, SC 29503  
kbarth@bblawsc.com

Gena Phillips Ervin  
Orr & Ervin, LLC  
P.O. Box 2527  
Florence, SC 29503

**Attorneys for Petitioner**

Other Counsel of Record:

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr.  
Barbara J. Wagner  
Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC  
288 Meeting Street, Suite 200 (29401)  
P.O. Drawer H  
Charleston, SC 29402  
(843) 577-7700  
mdc@barnwell-whaley.com  
bwagner@barnwell-whaley.com  
**Attorneys for Respondents**

Deborah B. Harwell, *Pro Se*  
1459 River Highway  
 Mooresville, NC 28117  
*Pro se* Plaintiff

John Harleston  
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control  
2600 Bull Street  
Columbia, SC 29201  
Attorney for Defendant

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1. **Despite its original opinion correctly affirming as to Attorney Edmonds's/Respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals subsequently ignored the appellate standard of review (abuse of discretion) and erred in finding the record is devoid of evidence showing Attorney Edmonds/Respondents filed Widow's claim for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review, and ignored Attorney Edmonds's/Respondents' continued pursuit of the frivolous claim, thereby disregarding existing law as to Rule 11 and the South Carolina Frivolous Proceedings Sanctions Act in its second and third opinions.....4**

2. **The original opinion by the Court of Appeals and the circuit court's factual findings confirm that there was indeed a factual basis for the award of attorney sanctions and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion; however, the Court of Appeals erroneously reversed course in two subsequent opinions.....6**

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## CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for Petitioner certifies that Petitioner made a Petition for Rehearing on October 21, 2020, which was finally ruled on by the Court of Appeals on November 18, 2020.

### QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- 1. Did the Court of Appeals---despite its original opinion correctly affirming as to Attorney Edmonds's/Respondents' appeal---subsequently ignore the appellate standard of review (abuse of discretion) and err in finding the record is devoid of evidence showing Attorney Edmonds/Respondents filed Widow's claim for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review, and ignore Attorney Edmonds's/Respondents' continued pursuit of the frivolous claim, and thereby disregard existing law as to Rule 11 and the South Carolina Frivolous Proceedings Sanctions Act in its second and third opinions?**
- 2. Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing course in two subsequent opinions, when its original opinion and the circuit court's factual findings confirmed that there was indeed a factual basis for the award of attorney sanctions and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion?**
- 3. Did the Court of Appeals, without *any* request or petition for rehearing by *any* party, err in *sua sponte* modifying its original opinion filed April 8, 2020, as to "B. Harwell's Appeal"?**

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

David W. Harwell (Decedent) and Deborah B. Harwell (Widow) entered into a prenuptial agreement on November 19, 2001, before marrying each other on November 21, 2001. Record on Appeal (R.) 91-107, 142. In March 2015, Decedent filed a family court action seeking a decree of separate support and maintenance to enforce the parties' prenuptial agreement. R. 86-107. The parties successfully mediated the matter and entered into an agreement (the Mediation Agreement) that the family court adopted and incorporated into its final order (the Separation Decree) issued on July 21, 2015. R. 167-78. Decedent passed away on September 30, 2015. R. 229.

On January 14, 2016, Widow filed a *pro se* action in the probate court alleging two creditor's claims against Decedent's estate, seeking (1) an elective share in the amount of \$3.1 million pursuant to the prenuptial agreement (the Prenuptial Claim) and (2) reimbursement in the amount of \$1,457.25 for obituary publication costs (the Obituary Claim) associated with two obituaries she had published for Decedent. R. 109-78. Robert Bryan Harwell (Petitioner or

Harwell), individually and as the personal representative for Decedent's estate, served a notice disallowing Widow's claims against the estate and subsequently initiated contempt proceedings in the family court based upon Widow's numerous violations of the Mediation Agreement that the family court had incorporated into its final order. R. 153-78.<sup>1</sup>

On March 1, 2016, attorney Deirdre Edmonds of the Law Office of Deirdre Edmonds, P.A. (Respondents or Edmonds) assumed representation of Widow for the pending matters in the probate court. R. 147-57. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, seeking to list Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse. *Id.* Edmonds additionally filed petitions for allowance of Widow's previous creditor's claims against the estate. *Id.* On April 1, 2016, Harwell filed answers and counterclaims, seeking dismissal of Widow's petitions and sanctions against Widow and Edmonds pursuant to Rule 11, SCRPC, and the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (the Act). R. 153-207. On May 26, 2016, Widow filed another *pro se* probate petition seeking to collect her elective share from Decedent's estate. R. 542.

By order dated June 10, 2016, the probate court removed the pending probate petitions to the circuit court. R. 7-9. On August 31, 2016, an order was filed substituting attorney Desa Ballard as counsel for Widow. R. 65. Also on August 31, 2016, Widow filed a partial stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing all her petitions against the estate except for her petition for adjudication as the surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate. R. 353-63. By order dated October 21, 2016, the circuit court adopted Widow's stipulations and dismissed said petitions. R. 359-63. Edmonds had no part in the dismissal of these claims. Additionally, the court dismissed Widow's remaining petition against the estate as moot, stating "DHEC has now already amended the death certificate to reflect [Widow] as the surviving spouse for vital records purposes with Bryan Harwell's consent." R. 360.

On February 2, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on Harwell's remaining action for sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. R. 865. On April 12, 2017, the circuit court issued an order (the Final Order) imposing sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. R. 58-74. Specifically,

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<sup>1</sup> The family court found Widow in contempt for violating various provisions of the final family court order. R. 10-30. The family court's decision has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which has issued the remittitur. *See Harwell v. Harwell*, Op. No. 2020-UP-306 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 12, 2020).

the circuit court found the *pro se* creditor's claims filed by Widow against the estate were frivolous and without merit and consequently imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of \$40,000. R. 70. The circuit court further provided Widow's sanctions would be reduced by "any sums which she may have already paid pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of \$25,000.00 in attorney's fees as provided in the [c]ontempt [o]rder." *Id.* As to Edmonds, the circuit court imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of \$5,000. Specifically, the court found Respondents' filing of the Obituary Claim was in fact frivolous and without merit. R. 78; *see* R. 72-73 (finding Edmonds "was not justified in filing or pursuing the claim for reimbursement of the obituary Publication"). Regarding Widow's petition for declaration as the surviving spouse and amendment of the death certificate, the circuit court found the relief sought was justified and the actions taken by Respondents were necessary to obtain such relief. R. 70-71. The court further found Respondents' filing of the Prenuptial Claim, based upon the information provided to her by Widow, was reasonable and therefore not frivolous. R. 72.

All parties filed motions to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, and the circuit court held a hearing on the motions on July 19, 2017. R. 533-69, 941. By order dated September 27, 2017, the circuit court denied the parties' motions to reconsider. R. 75-81. Respondents, Petitioner, and Widow all filed appeals.

On April 8, 2020, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion (the First Opinion) affirming as to the appeals of all three parties. *See Harwell v. Harwell*, Op. No. 2020-UP-103, 2020 WL 1722496 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Apr. 8, 2020) (attached as Exhibit A). Edmonds filed a petition for rehearing, and on October 7, 2020, the Court of Appeals granted Edmonds's petition, withdrew the First Opinion, and issued another opinion (the Second Opinion) reversing as to Respondents' appeal.<sup>2</sup> *See Harwell v. Harwell*, Op. No. 2020-UP-103, 2020 WL 6037016 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 7, 2020) (attached as Exhibit B). Harwell filed a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing *en banc*, and on November 18, 2020, the Court of Appeals granted the petition in part, denied *en banc* rehearing, withdrew the Second Opinion, and issued another opinion (the Third Opinion) still reversing as to Edmonds's appeal. *See Harwell v. Harwell*, Op. No. 2020-UP-103, 2020 WL 6037016 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 7, 2020) (attached as Exhibit C).

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<sup>2</sup> Widow also filed a petition for rehearing, which the Court of Appeals denied.

## ARGUMENT

**1. DESPITE ITS ORIGINAL OPINION CORRECTLY AFFIRMING AS TO ATTORNEY EDMONDS'S/RESPONDENTS' APPEAL, THE COURT OF APPEALS SUBSEQUENTLY IGNORED THE APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW (ABUSE OF DISCRETION) AND ERRED IN FINDING THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE SHOWING ATTORNEY EDMONDS/RESPONDENTS FILED WIDOW'S CLAIM FOR ANY OTHER REASON THAN TO PRESERVE WIDOW'S CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND IGNORED ATTORNEY EDMONDS'S/RESPONDENTS' CONTINUED PURSUIT OF THE FRIVOLOUS CLAIM, THEREBY DISREGARDING EXISTING LAW AS TO RULE 11 AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA FRIVOLOUS PROCEEDINGS SANCTIONS ACT IN ITS SECOND AND THIRD OPINIONS.**

This Court has explained "the standard for sanctions under Rule 11 is essentially the same as that of the" the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanction Act (the Act).<sup>3, 4</sup> *Father v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 353 S.C. 254, 262, 578 S.E.2d 11, 15 (2003) (recognizing a Rule 11 sanction is "for [a] frivolous filing or argument, or for [a] bad faith filing," while a sanction under the Act is for "frivolity"); see *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. 430, 436, 663 S.E.2d 46, 50 (2008) (recognizing sanctions imposed under Rule 11 and the Act are "an equity matter"). "When reviewing [a] judge's order of sanctions, the appellate court takes its own view of the facts," but when "the appellate court agrees with the trial court's findings of fact, it reviews the decision to award sanctions, as well as the terms of those sanctions, under an abuse of discretion standard." *Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc.*, 393 S.C. 590, 597, 713 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2011). "An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50.

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<sup>3</sup> S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-10 to -100.

<sup>4</sup> Rule 11 permits a circuit court to "impose sanctions on a party, a party's attorney, or both for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper to cause delay or when no good grounds exist to support the filing." *Ex parte Bon Secours*, 393 S.C. at 597, 713 S.E.2d at 628; see Rule 11(a), SCRCP ("The written or electronic signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."). "The party and/or attorney may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith whether or not there is good ground to support it." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50 (explaining Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate for frivolous pleadings and arguments). "While Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety." *Ex parte Bon Secours*, 393 S.C. at 598, 713 S.E.2d at 628 (internal footnote omitted). Similarly, the Act "provides for liability for attorney fees and costs of frivolous suits." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. The Act provides that an attorney or *pro se* litigant in a civil action may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document or for making frivolous arguments. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-10(A)(4).

In all three opinions, the Court of Appeals stated, "[W]e agree with the circuit court's findings of fact. Thus, we review the court's imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion . . . ." See Exhibits A, B, & C. Importantly, *no* party has challenged this conclusion by the Court of Appeals, and therefore that conclusion is the law of the case. See *Eldridge v. Eldridge*, 398 S.C. 113, 121, 728 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2012) (recognizing "an unchallenged ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case"); *Mazloom v. Mazloom*, 392 S.C. 403, 404, 709 S.E.2d 661 (2011) (recognizing an "issue not raised in [a] petition for rehearing is the law of the case").

In the First Opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the award of sanctions against Edmonds for filing a petition of allowance for Widow's Obituary Claim. See Exhibit A. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized: (1) in the Mediation Agreement, Widow waived any claims she had against Decedent's estate; (2) at the time Widow filed the Obituary Claim, Widow had not filed any motions to set aside the Separation Decree, which incorporated the parties' Mediation Agreement; (3) Widow published the two supplemental obituaries upon her own initiative and without authorization from the estate; (4) Widow's filing of a creditor's claim against the estate for reimbursement was unreasonable and frivolous; and therefore (5) Respondents' filing of the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim was equally frivolous as Widow had no reasonable expectation that the estate would reimburse her for the additional, unauthorized obituaries. See *id.* These facts provided ample support for the circuit court to exercise its discretion and sanction Respondents.

However, in its Second and Third Opinions, the Court of Appeals ignored these facts and simply concluded "the record is devoid of evidence showing [Respondents] filed the petition for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review." See Exhibits B & C. In fact, in the Second Opinion the Court of Appeals erroneously stated, "Moreover, after further involvement in the case, Edmonds filed a stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing the Obituary Claim." See Exhibit B. The Court of Appeals deleted this statement in its Third Opinion after Harwell explained in his Petition for Rehearing that not only did Edmonds not dismiss the claim, but she had continued to pursue the frivolous claim, and that it was Widow's new counsel (attorney Ballard) who dismissed the claim.

Also, in its Second and Third Opinions, the Court of Appeals stated, "Accordingly, we find Edmonds's intent in filing the petition was not malicious or for any improper purpose." See

Exhibits B & C. The Court of Appeals appears to have now judicially engrafted an additional condition, requirement, or savings clause that a matter is not sanctionable under Rule 11 or the Act unless the matter is filed maliciously or for an improper purpose. This could have a profound impact on the law of sanctions in this State.

Harwell respectfully submits the Court of Appeals ignored the appropriate standard of review (i.e., abuse of discretion given its agreement with the circuit court's findings of fact) and erred in finding the record is devoid of evidence showing Edmonds filed Widow's claim for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review and ignored Edmonds's continued pursuit of a frivolous claim, thus disregarding existing law as to Rule 11 and the Act.

**2. THE ORIGINAL OPINION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE CIRCUIT COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS INDEED A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY SANCTIONS AND THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION; HOWEVER, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REVERSED COURSE IN TWO SUBSEQUENT OPINIONS.**

As explained above, the Court of Appeals in its First Opinion upheld the award of sanctions against Respondents for filing a petition of allowance for Widow's Obituary Claim. However, the Court of Appeals erroneously and inexplicably made a 180-degree turn and reversed course in its Second and Third Opinions. A side-by-side-by-side comparison of the section "Edmonds's Appeal" in the three opinions issued by the Court of Appeals best illustrates this argument:

- **First Opinion:**

We further find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against Edmonds for filing a petition of allowance for Widow's Obituary Claim. In the Mediation Agreement, Widow waived any claims she had against Decedent's estate, and at the time Widow filed the Obituary Claim, Widow had not filed any motions to set aside the Separation Decree, which incorporated the parties' Mediation Agreement. Further, Widow published the two supplemental obituaries upon her own initiative and without authorization from the estate. Therefore, we find Widow's filing of a creditor's claim against the estate for reimbursement was unreasonable and frivolous. Accordingly, we hold Edmonds's filing of the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim was equally frivolous as Widow had no reasonable expectation that the estate would reimburse her for the additional,

unauthorized obituaries. Thus, we hold the circuit court properly sanctioned Edmonds for this claim.<sup>[5]</sup>

*See Exhibit A (internal citations omitted).*

- **Second Opinion:**

[W]e agree the circuit court abused its discretion in sanctioning Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim as the record is devoid of evidence showing Edmonds filed the petition for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review. Moreover, after further involvement in the case, Edmonds filed a stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing the Obituary Claim. Accordingly, we find Edmonds's intent in filing the petition was not malicious or for any improper purpose. Thus, we reverse the circuit court's sanction of Edmonds regarding the Obituary Claim.

*See Exhibit B (internal citations omitted).*

- **Third Opinion:**

[W]e agree the circuit court abused its discretion in sanctioning Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim as the record is devoid of evidence showing Edmonds filed the petition for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review. Accordingly, we find Edmonds's intent in filing the petition was not malicious or for any improper purpose. Thus, we reverse the circuit court's sanction of Edmonds regarding the Obituary Claim.

*See Exhibit C (internal citations omitted).*

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<sup>5</sup> The circuit court stated in its January 4, 2018 order:

Next I will consider the issues raised by Third Party Defendant Deidre W. Edmonds in her Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration.

1. She raises the issue that the claim for reimbursement for the obituary was not a frivolous claim. This court made that finding based on the fact that Ms. Harwell had waived any and all claims, including future claims that she might have had against David Harwell or his estate. Her decision to run an[] alternate obituary was made by her with full knowledge of this waiver of past, current and future claims. When she ran the Obituary she was in no position to bind the estate or to contract on it's behalf. I see no reason to amend my ruling that the claim should not have been made and was without legal basis. I am not aware of any case or statute that allows a family member or an in-law to take independent actions that create a legally binding obligation on the part of an estate unless that person has been given the legal authority to do so. I know of no such authority in this case.

Under the reasonable attorney standard, it cannot be argued that such an attorney would have a good faith basis to pursue the Obituary Claim in this case. There is abundant evidence in the record to support the circuit court's imposition of sanctions on Edmonds. Edmonds advanced the Obituary Claim by filing a petition to allow the claim. R. 148. A reasonable attorney would not have advanced this claim in view of the direct prohibition in the Separation Decree. Attorney Edmonds admitted she filed the petition for allowance of the claim after reviewing the Notice of Disallowance of Claim, which had the Separation Decree and Mediation Agreement both attached. R. 397-401. Although Attorney Edmonds does not practice law in Family Court, she testified she was called upon in both her private practice of nearly twenty-eight years and as a probate judge, for twelve of those years, to read family court orders. She agreed she was "comfortable" reading such orders and understanding them. R. 396-397. Attorney Edmonds filed the petition to allow the claims after having read the relevant order barring such claims. She affixed her signature thereto. R. 401. The circuit court held Attorney Edmonds "was not justified in filing or pursuing the claim for reimbursement of the obituary Publication." R. 72-73. As the Court of Appeals originally ruled, the record *does* in fact contain the factual basis supporting the sanctions imposed on Respondents.

Harwell respectfully submits the Court of Appeals' First Opinion and the circuit court's factual findings confirm that there was indeed a factual basis for the award of attorney sanctions and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore the Court of Appeals erroneously reversed course in its two subsequent opinions (including the operative Third Opinion).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Attorney Edmonds never filed for a dismissal of any of the monetary claims or petitions. R. 353-63. Attorney Edmonds filed her petitions to allow creditor claims---including the Obituary Claim at issue---on March 9, 2016. R. 150-51, 550. She also filed a claim for \$3.1 million dollars against the estate on behalf of Widow on March 1, 2016, and a Petition for adjudication as surviving spouse. R. 147-49. The circuit court held a hearing on Petitioner's request for sanctions against Wife and Edmonds under Rule 11 and the Act on July 21, 2016. R. 65. The day before that hearing, Widow hired attorney Desa Ballard to represent her. R. 65. At that hearing, Ms. Ballard requested additional time to familiarize herself with the case and to attempt to resolve some of the matters. An order substituting her as counsel was filed on August 31, 2016. R. 65. That same day, Ms. Ballard filed a partial stipulation of dismissal. R. 355. Furthermore, on October 19, 2016, the parties filed stipulations detailing the conclusion of these petitions and claims. R. 357-63. Significantly, in a matter of weeks after Ms. Ballard assumed representation of Widow, these claims were dismissed. Again, Edmonds had no part in the dismissal of these claims and in fact was represented by her own counsel at this point. To the extent the Court of Appeals gave Attorney Edmonds credit in the Second Opinion filed October 7, 2020, for seeing the error of her ways and taking corrective action, this simply did not happen. To the contrary, Respondents have continued throughout this appeal to assert the propriety of the Obituary Claim. In her corrected Final Brief, Respondents argue "it is not uncommon for estates to bear the expense of publishing an Obituary." Brief p. 11. The difference in this case is that Widow waived that right in the Mediation Agreement that

**3. WITHOUT ANY REQUEST OR PETITION FOR REHEARING BY ANY PARTY, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY *SUA SPONTE* MODIFIED ITS ORIGINAL OPINION FILED APRIL 8, 2020, AS TO "B. HARWELL'S APPEAL."**

In the First Opinion, as to the section entitled "B. Harwell's Appeal," the Court of Appeals affirmed as to Harwell's appeal but "acknowledge[d] Edmonds made tactless assertions in the filing that were unnecessary to obtain the relief sought." *See* Exhibit A (emphasis added). However, in both the Second and Third Opinions, the Court of Appeals deleted the word "tactless" *without any request by any party*, thereby making a substantive change *sua sponte*.

Edmonds's and Widow's petitions for rehearing both indicated they were not seeking rehearing of the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the denial of certain sanctions regarding Harwell's appeal and made no request for modification or revision of the opinion regarding "B. Harwell's Appeal" at any time. Harwell himself did not originally file a petition for rehearing as to the First Opinion, and he stated in his return to Respondents' petition that "although the [Petitioner] believes [Respondents] should have been sanctioned more harshly, he respects the Court's ruling, and submits that there were no points overlooked." *See* Return filed May 14, 2020. Petitioner was satisfied with the apt description of Respondents' conduct in accusing him of committing a felony in the application for the death certificate as "tactless," as the circuit court found these allegations to be false and unjustified. *See* R. 71, 136-137.

No monetary sanctions were associated with Respondents' false allegations that Petitioner committed a felony. Harwell accepted this result in large part because of the "tactless" description in the First Opinion, a description that was subsequently deleted without request by any party. In his Petition for Rehearing, Petitioner respectfully requested that the word "tactless" be reinserted into the opinion to recognize the imprudent nature of Edmonds's conduct. However, the Court of Appeals neither reinserted the word "tactless" nor explained its reason for not doing so. Procedurally, neither Petitioner nor Respondents nor Widow petitioned for rehearing as to Petitioner's appeal, yet the Court of Appeals modified this section of the opinion without request by any party. Petitioner respectfully submits the Court of Appeals erred in making an unwarranted, unrequested, unauthorized by any statute or rule, *sua sponte* change to the portion of its opinion addressing Harwell's appeal.

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
was incorporated in the Separation Decree in the family court litigation. R. p. 177. Edmonds's actions constitute sanctionable conduct.

## CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals erroneously sanitized an attorney's sanctionable conduct under Rule 11 and the Act by issuing multiple opinions, ignoring the standard of review, ignoring facts supporting sanctions, and even revising/modifying an opinion when no party requested it. Either Rule 11 or the Act have some teeth as to attorneys; or Rule 11 and the Act are toothless and can be ignored by the Bar, according to the final opinion by the Court of Appeals. For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner asks the Court to grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

December 17, 2020

Respectfully submitted,




Marian D. Nettles  
Nettles, Turbeville & Reddeck  
P.O. Box 699  
Lake City, SC 29560  
(843) 374-8511  
missy@ntrlaw.com

Kevin M. Barth  
Barth, Ballenger & Lewis, LLP  
P.O. Box 107  
Florence, SC 29503  
kbarth@bblawsc.com

Gena Phillips Ervin  
Orr & Ervin, LLC  
P.O. Box 2527  
Florence, SC 29503

**Attorneys for Petitioner**

 KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment  
Opinion Withdrawn and Superseded by Harwell v. Harwell, S.C. App.,  
October 7, 2020

2020 WL 1722496

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK  
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL  
VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED  
OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT  
IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS  
PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**  
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Deborah B. HARWELL, Respondent/Appellant,  
v.

Robert Bryan HARWELL, individually and  
as the Personal Representative of the Estate  
of David W. Harwell; and the South Carolina  
Department of Health and Environmental  
Control, Division of Vital Records, Defendants,  
Of whom Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and  
as the Personal Representative of the Estate of  
David W. Harwell is the Respondent/Appellant,  
Of whom the South Carolina Department  
of Health and Environmental Control,  
Division of Vital Records is the Respondent,

v.

Law Office of Deidre W. Edmunds,  
P.A. and Deidre W. Edmunds,  
Individually, Appellants/Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002290

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-103

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Submitted December 2, 2019

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Filed April 8, 2020

Appeal From Florence County, Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court  
Judge

**Attorneys and Law Firms**

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr. and Barbara J. Wagner, both of Barnwell  
Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of Charleston, for Deidre  
W. Edmonds, Individually, and the Law Office of Deidre W.  
Edmonds, P.A.

Kevin Mitchell Barth, of Barth, Ballenger & Lewis, LLP,  
and Gena Phillips Ervin, of Orr & Ervin LLC, both of  
Florence, for Robert Bryan Harwell, Individually and as  
Personal Representative of the Estate of David W. Harwell.

Deborah B. Harwell, pro se, of Mooresville, North Carolina.

John Harleston, of Columbia, for South Carolina Department  
of Health and Environmental Control, Division of Vital  
Records.

**Opinion**

**PER CURIAM:**

\*1 In this cross-appeal from the circuit court, the Law  
Office of Deidre Edmonds, P.A. and Deidre Edmonds  
individually (collectively, Edmonds) appeal the circuit court's  
orders issuing sanctions against her amounting to \$5,000.  
Robert B. Harwell (Harwell), individually and as the personal  
representative for the estate of David W. Harwell (Decedent),  
also appeals the circuit court's orders, seeking additional  
sanctions against Edmonds for her representation of Deborah  
B. Harwell (Widow), the estranged wife of Decedent.  
Widow additionally appeals the aforementioned circuit court  
orders.<sup>1</sup> We affirm.

**FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Decedent and Widow were married on November 21, 2001,  
having previously entered into a prenuptial agreement on  
November 19, 2001. In March 2015, Decedent filed a  
family court action seeking a decree of separate support and  
maintenance that enforced the parties' prenuptial agreement.  
After successful mediation efforts, the parties entered into  
a mediation agreement (the Mediation Agreement), which  
the family court adopted and incorporated into its final order  
(the Separation Decree) issued on July 21, 2015. Shortly  
thereafter, Decedent passed away on September 30, 2015.

On January 14, 2016, Widow filed a pro se action in the  
probate court in which she brought two creditor's claims  
against Decedent's estate, seeking (1) an elective share in the

amount of \$3.1 million pursuant to the prenuptial agreement (the Prenuptial Claim) and (2) reimbursement in the amount of \$1,457.25 for obituary publication costs (the Obituary Claim) associated with two obituaries she filed for Decedent. Harwell, as personal representative of the estate, served a notice disallowing Widow's claims against the estate and subsequently initiated contempt proceedings in the family court, alleging Widow violated the Mediation Agreement.<sup>2</sup>

On March 1, 2016, Edmonds assumed representation of Widow for the pending matters in the probate court. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse.<sup>3</sup> Edmonds additionally filed petitions for allowance of Widow's previous creditor's claims against the estate. On April 1, 2016, Harwell filed answers and counterclaims, seeking dismissal of Widow's petitions and sanctions against Widow and Edmonds pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (the Act).<sup>4</sup> On May 26, 2016, Widow filed another pro se probate petition seeking to collect her elective share from Decedent's estate.<sup>5</sup>

\*2 By order dated June 10, 2016, the probate court removed the pending probate petitions to the circuit court. On August 31, 2016, Widow filed a partial stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing all of her petitions against the estate except for her petition for adjudication as the surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate. By order dated October 21, 2016, the circuit court adopted Widow's stipulations and dismissed the aforementioned petitions. Additionally, the court dismissed Widow's remaining petition against the estate as moot, stating "DHEC has now already amended the death certificate to reflect [Widow] as the surviving spouse for vital records purposes with Bryan Harwell's consent."

On February 2, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on Harwell's remaining action for sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. On April 12, 2017, the circuit court issued an order (Final Order) imposing sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. Specifically, the circuit court found the pro se creditor's claims filed by Widow against the estate were frivolous and without merit and consequently imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of \$40,000. The circuit court further provided Widow's sanctions

would be reduced by "any sums which she may have already paid pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of \$25,000.00 in attorney's fees as provided in the [c]ontempt [o]rder." As to Edmonds, the circuit court imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of \$5,000. Specifically, the court found Edmonds's filing of the Obituary Claim was frivolous and without merit. Regarding Widow's petition for declaration as the surviving spouse and amendment of the death certificate, the circuit court found the relief sought was justified and the actions taken by Edmonds were necessary to obtain such relief. The court further found Edmonds's filing of the Prenuptial Claim, based upon the information provided to her by Widow, was reasonable and therefore not frivolous.

All parties filed motions to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, and the circuit court held a hearing on the motions on July 19, 2017. By order dated September 27, 2017, the circuit court denied the parties' motions to reconsider. This appeal followed.

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

The determination of whether a court should impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, or the Act is a matter of equity. *Se. Site Prep, LLC v. Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC*, 394 S.C. 97, 104, 713 S.E.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 2011). "In an action in equity tried by the judge alone, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence." *Id.* However, when the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's findings of fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. *Id.*; *see also Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. 430, 437, 663 S.E.2d 46, 50 (2008). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions." *Se. Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654.

## LAW/ANALYSIS

### I. Sanctions

Rule 11(a), SCRCP, provides:

The written or electronic signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to

the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

Pursuant to Rule 11, a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party's attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper. *Id.*; see also *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "The party and/or attorney may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith whether or not there is good ground to support it." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith ...." *Id.* at 437-38, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "Further, if appropriate under the facts of the case, the court may order a party and/or the party's attorney to pay a reasonable monetary penalty to the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith." *Id.* at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "While Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety." *Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc.*, 393 S.C. 590, 598, 713 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2011) (footnote omitted).

\*3 Additionally, "[t]he South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanction[s] Act provides for liability for attorney fees and costs of frivolous suits." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(a) of the South Carolina Code provides:

An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or administrative action or defense may be sanctioned for: ... filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if: ... a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances would believe that under the facts, his claim or defense was clearly not warranted under existing law ... a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to

harass or injure the other party; or ... a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe the pleading, motion, or document is frivolous, interposed for merely delay, or merely brought for any purpose other than securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim or defense upon which the proceedings are based ....

Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(b) further provides an attorney or pro se litigant may be sanctioned for "making frivolous arguments a reasonable attorney would believe were not reasonably supported by the facts." Pursuant to subsection 15-36-10(B)(2), if "an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances."

Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the circuit court's findings of fact. Thus, we review the court's imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion and address the parties' various contentions in turn. *See Se. Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 (providing that when the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's findings of fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard).

#### A. Edmonds's Appeal

Edmonds argues the circuit court erred in issuing sanctions against her pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act for filing the petition for allowance of Widow's Obituary Claim against the estate. Specifically, Edmonds contends the court improvidently issued the sanctions because (1) a determination on the merits of the Obituary Claim was never made as required under the Act and (2) Harwell failed to present evidence establishing the Obituary Claim was frivolously asserted. Edmonds further asserts the sanction imposed was excessive. We disagree.

The Mediation Agreement entered into between the parties and incorporated into the Separation Decree contained the following provision: "Both parties *waive any and all rights* they may have in the estate of the other or *to make any claim*

*upon or against the estate of the other. Each party shall be bound by the terms of this agreement.*" (emphases added).

Following Decedent's death, the estate published an obituary. Displeased with this obituary because it failed to name her as Decedent's surviving spouse, Widow, without authorization from the estate, published two more obituaries, which named her as Decedent's widow.<sup>6</sup> Widow thereafter filed a pro se creditor's claim against the estate seeking reimbursement in the amount of \$1,457.25 for the publication costs of the obituaries. Harwell, as personal representative of the estate, served a notice of disallowance of the claim pursuant to section 62-3-806(a).<sup>7</sup> After receiving Harwell's notice of disallowance, Widow retained Edmonds as counsel. Edmonds subsequently filed a petition for allowance of Widow's Obituary Claim in the probate court.

\*4 We find Edmonds's initial contention that the circuit court erred in imposing sanctions against her because a merits determination was never made on the Obituary Claim as allegedly required under the Act unpersuasive. Although subsection 15-36-10(C)(1) delineates at what procedural stage a court will determine if a claim or defense is considered frivolous upon a motion of the prevailing party, we find this subsection does not prescribe a court's sole method for imposing sanctions for filing or advancing frivolous claims. Subsection (B)(2) provides a court may "upon its own motion or motion of a party" impose sanctions upon an attorney or pro se litigant for violations of subsection (A)(4). Furthermore, the circuit court additionally found sanctions were warranted pursuant to Rule 11, which contains no such procedural prerequisites. *See* Rule 11(a), SCRCP ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....").

We further find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against Edmonds for filing a petition of allowance for Widow's Obituary Claim. In the Mediation Agreement, Widow waived any claims she had against Decedent's estate, and at the time Widow filed the Obituary Claim, Widow had not filed any motions to set aside the Separation Decree, which incorporated the parties' Mediation Agreement. Further, Widow published the two supplemental obituaries upon her own initiative and without authorization from the estate. Therefore, we find Widow's filing of a creditor's claim against the estate for reimbursement was unreasonable and frivolous. Accordingly, we hold Edmonds's

filing of the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim was equally frivolous as Widow had no reasonable expectation that the estate would reimburse her for the additional, unauthorized obituaries. *See* § 15-36-10(B)(2) (providing a court may upon its own motion or motion of a party impose sanctions against an attorney for violations of subsection (A)(4)); § 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if "a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party" (emphasis added)); Rule 11(a), SCRCP (providing that a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party's attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper); *Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp.*, 393 S.C. at 598, 713 S.E.2d at 628 ("While Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety." (footnote omitted)). Thus, we hold the circuit court properly sanctioned Edmonds for this claim.

Moreover, we find the circuit court's sanction of \$5,000 against Edmonds was not excessive. Pursuant to subsection 15-36-10(B)(2), if "an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation *any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances.*" § 15-36-10(B)(2) (emphasis added). Likewise, under Rule 11(a), a court has wide discretion to impose "an appropriate sanction" for violations of the rule. Although Edmonds contends the sanction is disproportionate to the amount of the claim and is therefore excessive, we find nothing in Rule 11 or the Act confines the court to such a measure; rather, the court has wide discretion to fashion a sanction it deems appropriate given the underlying circumstances. In its order denying the parties' motions for reconsideration, the circuit court explained it arrived at \$5,000 by calculating twenty hours of legal work at a rate of \$250 per hour. Considering the length of the litigation and number of motions filed, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of the sanction.

\*5 Based on the foregoing, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sanction against Edmonds for filing the Obituary Claim. *See Se. Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on

appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions.”).

### B. Harwell's Appeal

Harwell argues the circuit court erred in failing to sanction Edmonds for (1) asserting he committed a felony in her filing of the claim seeking a declaration of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate and (2) filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, which the Mediation Agreement barred. Harwell additionally contends the circuit court erred in offsetting the sanctions issued against Widow with prior contempt sanctions issued against her by the family court. We disagree.

Prior to Widow's claim seeking adjudication as Decedent's surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate, Decedent's death certificate indicated his marital status as “married but separated” and stated “NA” in the surviving spouse designation, which prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits from the General Assembly as provided in the Mediation Agreement as well as prevented her from receiving other death benefits. When Widow attempted to amend the death certificate with DHEC, it informed her that only Harwell could request a correction to the certificate as he was the prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a court order would be required. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse. In her filing, Edmonds asserted Harwell willfully and knowingly supplied false information to DHEC in violation of section 44-63-161(A)(2), which was a felony under section 44-63-161(B).<sup>8</sup>

In its Final Order, the circuit court found sanctions were not warranted regarding Widow's claim, stating:

I find that the relief sought in that action was justified and that the action was necessary. While it is clear that some of the allegations contained in that petition concerning the alleged actions of the personal representati[ve] were false and ultimately found to be without justification, it is my finding

that these allegations were the result of what appears to be an almost paranoid belief on the part of the parties to these actions concerning the evaluation of the motives of the other side. ... This is an equitable matter and I must consider th[e] possibility that [ ] Harwell could have taken steps to resolve the problem early in the life of this [d]eath [c]ertificate issue to resolve the matter, ... but instead used this issue as a bargaining chip to seek withdrawal of the other unrelated claims. At any rate, the claim was necessary since the [d]eath [c]ertificate was incorrect in the manner in which it did not reflect the existence of a surviving spouse. It is my finding that Ms. Edm[on]ds[s] preparation of this pleading was based on information provided to her by DHEC and [Widow]. While some of her allegation[s] were not later proven to be true and perhaps overzealous when made, it did result in obtaining the relief her client needed in that situation.

\*6 We agree with the circuit court's assessment of the situation at hand. Although we acknowledge Edmonds made tactless assertions in the filing that were unnecessary to obtain the relief sought, we find the circuit court properly found *the overall purpose* of the claim was not frivolous, and therefore, sanctions were not warranted pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act for “continuing” the claim. *See* § 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if “a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, *continuation*, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party” (emphasis added)); *See. Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 (“Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions.”).

As to Harwell's contention that the circuit court erred in failing to sanction Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, we agree with the

court's assessment that sanctions were not warranted. Prior to assuming representation of Widow, Edmonds met with Widow to discuss the notice of disallowance she received from the estate and other potential claims she might have. During this meeting, Widow informed Edmonds that she believed Decedent withheld information regarding the extent of his assets when they entered the Mediation Agreement and she intended to challenge the Separation Decree. Edmonds advised Widow she would need to file a motion to set aside the order in family court; Edmonds further advised Widow to obtain other counsel for that action because she was not a family court practitioner and would only represent her regarding her probate claims. Based upon her experience and knowledge as a long term probate practitioner and former probate judge, Edmonds determined Widow would need to file a petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim so that if Widow succeeded in the family court, she would not be foreclosed from making resulting claims against the estate in probate court. *See* § 62-3-806(a) ("Every claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative is barred so far as not allowed unless the claimant commences a proceeding for allowance of the claim in accordance with Section 62-3-804(2) not later than thirty days after the mailing or other service of the notice of disallowance or partial disallowance by the personal representative." (emphases added)). Having determined the petition for allowance could be filed no later than March 12, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition on March 9, 2016. In support of her motions in opposition of sanctions, Edmonds submitted expert affidavits from Burnele Powell and Mitchell Payne, who both opined Edmonds's filing of the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim was reasonable and not a violation of the provisions of Rule 11 or the Act.

Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose sanctions against Edmonds for filing the Prenuptial Claim. *See* § 15-36-10(B) (2) (providing a court may upon its own motion or motion of a party impose sanctions against an attorney for violations of subsection (A)(4)); § 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if "a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party"); Rule 11(a), SCRCP (providing that a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party's attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper). We agree with the circuit court and the submitted affidavits that based upon

the information provided to her by Widow and the timeframe at hand, Edmonds's actions were reasonable and in the best interest of her client. Although Harwell contends Edmonds was required to investigate the merits of the claim prior to filing the petition for allowance, we find no such duty existed and Edmonds was entitled to rely on the information provided to her by Widow. *See Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 439 n.3, 663 S.E.2d at 51 n.3 ("Our conclusion that an attorney must conduct a reasonable investigation *beyond what is related to the attorney by his client is limited* to the situation whe[n] a client is alleging conversion against his or her former attorney for misappropriation of client funds or legal malpractice." (emphases added)). Furthermore, we note the merit of the Prenuptial Claim was contingent upon the success of Widow's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP,<sup>9</sup> in the family court, which was unknowable during the timeframe Edmonds had for filing a petition for allowance. Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly found Edmonds's filing of the petition for allowance was not frivolous.

\*7 Finally, Harwell contends the circuit court erred in offsetting the sanctions issued against Widow with prior sanctions issued against her by the family court for contemptuous conduct. In the Final Order, the circuit court imposed sanctions against Widow in the amount of \$40,000, but the court specified Widow's sanctions would be reduced by "any sums which she may have already paid pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of \$25,000.00 in attorney's fees as provided in the [c]ontempt [o]rder." In its order denying the parties' motions for reconsideration, the court explained it ordered this particular remedy as an equitable protection for Widow in an effort to prevent punishing her twice for her actions surrounding the pro se creditor's claims against the estate, since these claims had previously been the subject of Harwell's contempt action against her. Although a unique stipulation, we find the sanction fashioned by the circuit court was within the scope of its authority. *See* § 15-36-10(B) (2) (providing that if "an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation *any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances*" (emphasis added)); Rule 11(a), SCRCP ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, *an appropriate sanction ...*" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did not err in offsetting Widow's sanctions issued pursuant to

Rule 11 and the Act with the prior sanctions issued against her in the family court.

Based on the foregoing, we find the sanctions issued by the circuit court against Edmonds and Widow were proper. *See Se. Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 (“Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions.”).

## II. Expert Testimony

Widow asserts the circuit court erred in failing to admit the expert testimony of Burnele Powell.<sup>10</sup> We find this issue is without merit as Edmonds submitted Powell’s affidavit as an exhibit to her motion opposing sanctions, and nothing in the record indicates the court did not consider the affidavit. Moreover, we find this issue is unpreserved for appellate review as Widow neither objected during the

sanctions hearing nor raised the issue in her motion for reconsideration.<sup>11</sup> *See Wilder Corp.*, 330 S.C. at 76, 497 S.E.2d at 733 (“It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for appellate review.”). Accordingly, this court is foreclosed from considering this issue.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court’s orders are

**AFFIRMED.**<sup>12</sup>

WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

## All Citations

Not Reported in S.E. Rptr., 2020 WL 1722496

## Footnotes

- 1 On November 1, 2017, Edmonds filed a notice of appeal with this court, appealing the circuit court’s order issuing sanctions against Edmonds and Widow and the circuit court’s order following the parties’ Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motions. On November 2, 2017, Harwell filed a notice of appeal with this court, appealing the aforementioned circuit court orders, which was assigned a different appellate case number from Edmonds’s appeal. On November 8, 2017, Widow filed a notice of appeal with this court, cross-appealing the aforementioned circuit court orders appealed by Harwell. Desa Ballard filed Widow’s notice of appeal but simultaneously filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, which this court granted by order dated November 27, 2017. On February 7, 2018, this court granted a motion to consolidate the three appeals.
- 2 By order dated July 20, 2016, the family court found Widow in contempt and sentenced her to forty-five days’ imprisonment. The family court additionally ordered Widow to pay \$25,000 in attorney’s fees. This contempt action is not the subject of this appeal.
- 3 At that time, Decedent’s death certificate indicated his marital status as “married but separated” and stated “NA” in the surviving spouse designation, which prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits from the General Assembly as provided in the Mediation Agreement. When Widow attempted to amend the death certificate with the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), DHEC informed her that only Harwell could request a correction to the certificate as he was the prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a court order would be required.
- 4 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-10 to -100 (Supp. 2019).
- 5 Widow additionally filed a pro se motion in the family court to set aside the Separation Decree, which incorporated the Mediation Agreement, pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP, on May 26, 2016.
- 6 Widow published obituaries in *The Sun News* and *The State* newspapers.
- 7 S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-806(a) (Supp. 2019) (“[W]ithin sixty days after the presentment of the claim, or within fourteen months after the death of the decedent, whichever is later, the personal representative must serve upon the claimant a notice stating the claim has been allowed or disallowed in whole or in part.”).

- 8 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(A)(2) (2018) ("It is unlawful for a person: ... to wilfully make a false statement in a certificate, record, or report required to be filed by this chapter or a regulation, or in an application for an amendment to or for a certified copy of the certificate, record, or report, or to wilfully supply false information intending that the information be used in the preparation or amendment of the certificate, record, or report."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(B) (2018) ("A person who violates a provision of item (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (A) is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
- 9 Rule 60(b)(3), SCRCP ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party ....").
- 10 In her appellant's brief, Widow raised five issues on appeal; however, the first four issues solely pertain to criminal contempt sanctions Widow received following a contempt proceeding in the family court. Widow did not appeal the family court contempt order in this appeal. Accordingly, this court is confined to considering only the fifth issue.
- 11 Widow's motion for reconsideration is not included in the record on appeal. However, the circuit court did not list this issue in its recitation of the issues asserted by Widow in her motion for reconsideration.
- 12 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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Opinion Withdrawn and Superseded by Harwell v. Harwell, S.C App.,  
November 18, 2020

2020 WL 6037016

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK  
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL  
VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED  
OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT  
IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS  
PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**  
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Deborah B. HARWELL, Respondent/Appellant,  
v.

Robert Bryan HARWELL, individually and  
as the Personal Representative of the Estate  
of David W. Harwell; and the South Carolina  
Department of Health and Environmental  
Control, Division of Vital Records, Defendants,  
Of whom Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and  
as the Personal Representative of the Estate of  
David W. Harwell is the Respondent/Appellant,

v.  
Law Office of Deidre W. Edmonds,  
P.A. and Deidre W. Edmonds,  
Individually, Appellants/Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002290

|  
Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-103

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Submitted December 2, 2019

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Filed April 8, 2020

|  
Withdrawn, Substituted,  
and Refiled October 7, 2020

Appeal From Florence County, Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court  
Judge

**Attorneys and Law Firms**

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr. and Barbara J. Wagner, both of Barnwell  
Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of Charleston, for Deidre  
W. Edmonds, Individually, and the Law Office of Deidre W.  
Edmonds, P.A.

Kevin Mitchell Barth, of Barth, Ballenger & Lewis, LLP,  
and Gena Phillips Ervin, of Orr & Ervin LLC, both of  
Florence, for Robert Bryan Harwell, Individually and as  
Personal Representative of the Estate of David W. Harwell.

Deborah B. Harwell, pro se, of Mooresville, North Carolina.

John Harleston, of Columbia, for South Carolina Department  
of Health and Environmental Control, Division of Vital  
Records.

**Opinion**

PER CURIAM:

\*1 In this cross-appeal from the circuit court, the Law  
Office of Deidre Edmonds, P.A. and Deidre Edmonds  
individually (collectively, Edmonds) appeal the circuit court's  
orders issuing sanctions against her amounting to \$5,000.  
Robert B. Harwell (Harwell), individually and as the personal  
representative for the estate of David W. Harwell (Decedent),  
also appeals the circuit court's orders, seeking additional  
sanctions against Edmonds for her representation of Deborah  
B. Harwell (Widow), the estranged wife of Decedent.  
Widow additionally appeals the aforementioned circuit court  
orders.<sup>1</sup> We affirm in part and reverse in part.

**FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Decedent and Widow were married on November 21, 2001,  
having previously entered into a prenuptial agreement on  
November 19, 2001. In March 2015, Decedent filed a  
family court action seeking a decree of separate support and  
maintenance that enforced the parties' prenuptial agreement.  
After successful mediation efforts, the parties entered into  
a mediation agreement (the Mediation Agreement), which  
the family court adopted and incorporated into its final order  
(the Separation Decree) issued on July 21, 2015. Shortly  
thereafter, Decedent passed away on September 30, 2015.

On January 14, 2016, Widow filed a pro se action in the  
probate court in which she brought two creditor's claims  
against Decedent's estate, seeking (1) an elective share

in the amount of \$3.1 million pursuant to the prenuptial agreement (the Prenuptial Claim) and (2) reimbursement in the amount of \$1,457.25 for obituary publication costs (the Obituary Claim) associated with two obituaries she filed for Decedent. Harwell, as personal representative of the estate, served a notice disallowing Widow's claims against the estate and subsequently initiated contempt proceedings in the family court, alleging Widow violated the Mediation Agreement.<sup>2, 3</sup>

\*2 On March 1, 2016, Edmonds assumed representation of Widow for the pending matters in the probate court. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse.<sup>4</sup> Edmonds additionally filed petitions for allowance of Widow's previous creditor's claims against the estate. On April 1, 2016, Harwell filed answers and counterclaims, seeking dismissal of Widow's petitions and sanctions against Widow and Edmonds pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (the Act).<sup>5</sup> On May 26, 2016, Widow filed another pro se probate petition seeking to collect her elective share from Decedent's estate.<sup>6</sup>

By order dated June 10, 2016, the probate court removed the pending probate petitions to the circuit court. On August 31, 2016, Widow filed a partial stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing all of her petitions against the estate except for her petition for adjudication as the surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate. By order dated October 21, 2016, the circuit court adopted Widow's stipulations and dismissed the aforementioned petitions. Additionally, the court dismissed Widow's remaining petition against the estate as moot, stating "DHEC has now already amended the death certificate to reflect [Widow] as the surviving spouse for vital records purposes with Bryan Harwell's consent."

On February 2, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on Harwell's remaining action for sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. On April 12, 2017, the circuit court issued an order (the Final Order) imposing sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. Specifically, the circuit court found the pro se creditor's claims filed by Widow against the estate were frivolous and without merit and consequently imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of

\$40,000. The circuit court further provided Widow's sanctions would be reduced by "any sums which she may have already paid pursuant to the [family] court award of \$25,000.00 in attorney's fees as provided in the [contempt] order." As to Edmonds, the circuit court imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of \$5,000. Specifically, the court found Edmonds's filing of the Obituary Claim was frivolous and without merit. Regarding Widow's petition for declaration as the surviving spouse and amendment of the death certificate, the circuit court found the relief sought was justified and the actions taken by Edmonds were necessary to obtain such relief. The court further found Edmonds's filing of the Prenuptial Claim, based upon the information provided to her by Widow, was reasonable and therefore not frivolous.

All parties filed motions to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, and the circuit court held a hearing on the motions on July 19, 2017. By order dated September 27, 2017, the circuit court denied the parties' motions to reconsider. This appeal followed.

#### STANDARD OF REVIEW

\*3 The determination of whether a court should impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, or the Act is a matter of equity. *See Site Prep, LLC v. Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC*, 394 S.C. 97, 104, 713 S.E.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 2011). "In an action in equity tried by the judge alone, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence." *Id.* However, when the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's findings of fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. *Id.*; *see also Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. 430, 437, 663 S.E.2d 46, 50 (2008). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions." *See Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654.

#### LAW/ANALYSIS

##### I. Sanctions

Rule 11(a), SCRCP, provides:

The written or electronic signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the

pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

Pursuant to Rule 11, a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party's attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper. *Id.*; see also *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "The party and/or attorney may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith whether or not there is good ground to support it." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith ...." *Id.* at 437-38, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "Further, if appropriate under the facts of the case, the court may order a party and/or the party's attorney to pay a reasonable monetary penalty to the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith." *Id.* at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "While Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety." *Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc.*, 393 S.C. 590, 598, 713 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2011) (footnote omitted).

Additionally, "[t]he South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanction[s] Act provides for liability for attorney fees and costs of frivolous suits." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(a) of the South Carolina Code provides:

An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or administrative action or defense may be sanctioned for: ... filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if: ... a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances would believe that under the facts, his claim or defense was clearly not warranted under existing law ... a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of

a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party; or ... a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe the pleading, motion, or document is frivolous, interposed for merely delay, or merely brought for any purpose other than securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim or defense upon which the proceedings are based ....

Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(b) further provides an attorney or pro se litigant may be sanctioned for "making frivolous arguments a reasonable attorney would believe were not reasonably supported by the facts." Pursuant to subsection 15-36-10(B)(2), if "an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances."

\*4 Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the circuit court's findings of fact. Thus, we review the court's imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion and address the parties' various contentions in turn. See *Se. Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 (providing that when the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's findings of fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard).

#### A. Harwell's Appeal

Harwell argues the circuit court erred in failing to sanction Edmonds for (1) asserting he committed a felony in her filing of the claim seeking a declaration of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate and (2) filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, which the Mediation Agreement barred. Harwell additionally contends the circuit court erred in offsetting the sanctions issued against Widow with prior contempt sanctions issued against her by the family court. We disagree.

Prior to Widow's claim seeking adjudication as Decedent's surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate, Decedent's death certificate indicated his marital status as "married but separated" and stated "NA" in

the surviving spouse designation, which prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits from the General Assembly, as provided in the Mediation Agreement, as well as death benefits. When Widow attempted to amend the death certificate with DHEC, it informed her that only Harwell could request a correction to the certificate as he was the prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a court order would be required. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse. In her filing, Edmonds asserted Harwell willfully and knowingly supplied false information to DHEC in violation of section 44-63-161(A)(2), which was a felony under section 44-63-161(B).<sup>7</sup>

In its Final Order, the circuit court found sanctions were not warranted regarding Widow's claim, stating:

I find that the relief sought in that action was justified and that the action was necessary. While it is clear that some of the allegations contained in that petition concerning the alleged actions of the personal representati[ve] were false and ultimately found to be without justification, it is my finding that these allegations were the result of what appears to be an almost paranoid belief on the part of the parties to these actions concerning the evaluation of the motives of the other side. ... This is an equitable matter and I must consider th[e] possibility that [ ] Harwell could have taken steps to resolve the problem early in the life of this [d]eath [c]ertificate issue to resolve the matter. ... but instead used this issue as a bargaining chip to seek withdrawal of the other unrelated claims. At any rate, the claim was necessary since the [d]eath [c]ertificate was incorrect in the manner in which it did not reflect the existence of a surviving spouse. It is my finding that Ms. Edm[on]ds[s] preparation of this pleading was based on information provided to her by DHEC and [Widow]. While some of

her allegation[s] were not later proven to be true and perhaps overzealous when made, it did result in obtaining the relief her client needed in that situation.

\*5 We agree with the circuit court's assessment of the situation at hand. Although we acknowledge Edmonds made assertions in the filing that were unnecessary to obtain the relief sought, we find the circuit court properly found *the overall purpose* of the claim was not frivolous, and therefore, sanctions were not warranted pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act for "continuing" the claim. *See* § 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if "a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, *continuation*, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party" (emphasis added)); *See Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions.").

As to Harwell's contention that the circuit court erred in failing to sanction Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, we agree with the court's assessment that sanctions were not warranted.

The Mediation Agreement entered into between the parties and incorporated into the Separation Decree contained the following provision: "Both parties *waive any and all rights* they may have in the estate of the other or *to make any claim upon or against the estate of the other*. Each party shall be bound by the terms of this agreement." (emphases added).

Prior to assuming representation of Widow, Edmonds met with Widow to discuss the notice of disallowance she received from the estate and other potential claims she might have. During this meeting, Widow informed Edmonds that she believed Decedent withheld information regarding the extent of his assets when they entered the Mediation Agreement and she intended to challenge the Separation Decree. Edmonds advised Widow she would need to file a motion to set aside the order in family court; Edmonds further advised Widow to obtain other counsel for that action because she was not a family court practitioner and would only represent her regarding her probate claims. Based upon her experience and

knowledge as a long term probate practitioner and former probate judge, Edmonds determined Widow would need to file a petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim so that if Widow succeeded in the family court, she would not be foreclosed from making resulting claims against the estate in probate court. *See* § 62-3-806(a) (“Every claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative *is barred* so far as not allowed *unless the claimant commences a proceeding for allowance of the claim* in accordance with Section 62-3-804(2) *not later than thirty days after the mailing or other service* of the notice of disallowance or partial disallowance by the personal representative.” (emphases added)). Having determined the petition for allowance could be filed no later than March 12, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition on March 9, 2016. In support of her motions in opposition of sanctions, Edmonds submitted expert affidavits from Burnele Powell and Mitchell Payne, who both opined Edmonds’s filing of the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim was reasonable and not a violation of the provisions of Rule 11 or the Act.

Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose sanctions against Edmonds for filing the Prenuptial Claim. *See* § 15-36-10(B) (2) (providing a court may upon its own motion or motion of a party impose sanctions against an attorney for violations of subsection (A)(4)); § 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if “a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party”); Rule 11(a), SCRCP (providing that a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party’s attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper). We agree with the circuit court and the expert affidavits that based upon the information provided to her by Widow and the timeframe at hand, Edmonds’s actions were reasonable and in the best interest of her client. Although Harwell contends Edmonds was required to investigate the merits of the claim prior to filing the petition for allowance, we find Edmonds was entitled to rely on the information provided to her by Widow. *See Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 439 n.3, 663 S.E.2d at 51 n.3 (“Our conclusion that an attorney must conduct a reasonable investigation *beyond what is related to the attorney by his client is limited to the situation whe[n] a client is alleging conversion against his or her former attorney for misappropriation of client funds or legal malpractice.*” (emphases added)). Furthermore, we note the merit of the Prenuptial Claim was contingent

upon the success of Widow’s motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP,<sup>8</sup> in the family court, which Edmonds could not have known during the timeframe she had for filing a petition for allowance. Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly found Edmonds’s filing of the petition for allowance was not frivolous.

\*6 Finally, Harwell contends the circuit court erred in offsetting the sanctions issued against Widow with prior sanctions issued against her by the family court for contemptuous conduct. In the Final Order, the circuit court imposed sanctions against Widow in the amount of \$40,000, but the court specified Widow’s sanctions would be reduced by “any sums which she may have already paid pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of \$25,000.00 in attorney’s fees as provided in the [c]ontempt [o]rder.” In its order denying the parties’ motions for reconsideration, the court explained it ordered this particular remedy as an equitable protection for Widow in an effort to prevent punishing her twice for her actions surrounding the pro se creditor’s claims against the estate, since these claims had previously been the subject of Harwell’s contempt action against her. Although a unique stipulation, we find the sanction fashioned by the circuit court was within the scope of its authority. *See* § 15-36-10(B) (2) (providing that if “an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation *any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances*” (emphasis added)); Rule 11(a), SCRCP (“If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, *an appropriate sanction ...*” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did not err in offsetting Widow’s sanctions issued pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act with the prior sanctions imposed by the family court.

#### B. Edmonds’s Appeal

Edmonds argues the circuit court erred in sanctioning her under Rule 11 and the Act for filing the petition for allowance of Widow’s Obituary Claim against the estate. Specifically, Edmonds contends the court improvidently issued the sanctions because (1) a determination on the merits of the Obituary Claim was never made as required under the Act and (2) Harwell failed to present evidence establishing the Obituary Claim was frivolously asserted. We agree in part.

Following Decedent's death, the estate published an obituary. Displeased with this obituary because it failed to name her as Decedent's surviving spouse, Widow, without authorization from the estate, published two more obituaries, which named her as Decedent's widow.<sup>9</sup> Widow thereafter filed a pro se creditor's claim against the estate seeking reimbursement in the amount of \$1,457.25 for the publication costs of the obituaries. After Widow received Harwell's notice of disallowance on behalf of the estate, Edmonds filed a petition for allowance of the claim on Widow's behalf.

We find unpersuasive Edmonds's initial contention that the circuit court erred in imposing sanctions against her because a merits determination was never made on the Obituary Claim. Although subsection 15-36-10(C)(1) delineates at what procedural stage a court will determine if a claim or defense is considered frivolous upon a motion of the prevailing party, we find this subsection does not prescribe a court's sole method for imposing sanctions for filing or advancing frivolous claims. Subsection (B)(2) provides a court may "upon its own motion or motion of a party" impose sanctions upon an attorney or pro se litigant for violations of subsection (A)(4). Furthermore, the circuit court additionally found sanctions were warranted pursuant to Rule 11, which contains no such procedural prerequisite. *See* Rule 11(a), SCRCP ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....").

However, we agree the circuit court abused its discretion in sanctioning Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim as the record is devoid of evidence showing Edmonds filed the petition for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review. *See* § 62-3-806(a) ("Every claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative *is barred* so far as not allowed *unless the claimant commences a proceeding for allowance of the claim* in accordance with Section

62-3-804(2) not later than thirty days after the mailing or other service of the notice of disallowance or partial disallowance by the personal representative." (emphases added)). Moreover, after further involvement in the case, Edmonds filed a stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing the Obituary Claim. Accordingly, we find Edmonds's intent in filing the petition was not malicious or for any improper purpose. *See Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc.*, 393 S.C. at 598, 713 S.E.2d at 628 (providing that Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard). Thus, we reverse the circuit court's sanction of Edmonds regarding the Obituary Claim.<sup>10</sup> *See Se. Site Prep.* 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions.").

## II. Expert Testimony

\*7 Widow asserts the circuit court erred in failing to admit the expert testimony of Burnele Powell.<sup>11</sup> We find this issue is without merit as Edmonds submitted Powell's affidavit as an exhibit to her motion opposing sanctions, and the circuit court indicated on the record that it received and reviewed the affidavit. Further, the court referenced its consideration of the submitted affidavits in its order denying the parties' motions to reconsider.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's orders are

## AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.<sup>12</sup>

WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

## All Citations

Not Reported in S.E. Rptr., 2020 WL 6037016

## Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup> On November 1, 2017, Edmonds filed a notice of appeal with this court, appealing the circuit court's order issuing sanctions against Edmonds and Widow and the circuit court's order following the parties' Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motions. On November 2, 2017, Harwell filed a notice of appeal with this court, appealing the aforementioned circuit court orders, which was assigned a different appellate case number

from Edmonds's appeal. On November 8, 2017, Widow filed a notice of appeal with this court, cross-appealing the aforementioned circuit court orders appealed by Harwell. Desa Ballard filed Widow's notice of appeal but simultaneously filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, which this court granted by order dated November 27, 2017. On February 7, 2018, this court granted a motion to consolidate the three appeals.

2 S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-806(a) (Supp. 2019) (“[W]ithin sixty days after the presentment of the claim, or within fourteen months after the death of the decedent, whichever is later, the personal representative must serve upon the claimant a notice stating the claim has been allowed or disallowed in whole or in part.”).

3 By order dated July 20, 2016, the family court found Widow in contempt and sentenced her to forty-five days' imprisonment. The family court additionally ordered Widow to pay \$25,000 in attorney's fees. This contempt action is not the subject of this appeal.

4 At that time, Decedent's death certificate indicated his marital status as “married but separated” and stated “NA” in the surviving spouse designation, which prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits from the General Assembly as provided in the Mediation Agreement. When Widow attempted to amend the death certificate with the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), DHEC informed her that only Harwell could request a correction to the certificate as he was the prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a court order would be required.

5 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-10 to -100 (Supp. 2019).

6 Widow additionally filed a pro se motion in the family court to set aside the Separation Decree, which incorporated the Mediation Agreement, pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRPC, on May 26, 2016.

7 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(A)(2) (2018) (“It is unlawful for a person: ... to wilfully make a false statement in a certificate, record, or report required to be filed by this chapter or a regulation, or in an application for an amendment to or for a certified copy of the certificate, record, or report, or to wilfully supply false information intending that the information be used in the preparation or amendment of the certificate, record, or report.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(B) (2018) (“A person who violates a provision of item (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (A) is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”).

8 Rule 60(b)(3), SCRPC (“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party ....”).

9 Widow published obituaries in The Sun News and The State newspapers.

10 Edmonds additionally argues the sanction imposed by the circuit court was excessive. Because we reverse the circuit court's imposition of the sanction, we need not address this issue. See *Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.*, 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

11 In her appellant's brief, Widow raised five issues on appeal; however, the first four issues solely pertain to criminal contempt sanctions Widow received following a contempt proceeding in the family court. Widow did not appeal the family court contempt order in this appeal. Accordingly, this court is confined to considering only the fifth issue.

12 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

2020 WL 6788280

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**  
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Deborah B. HARWELL, Respondent/Appellant,  
v.

Robert Bryan HARWELL, individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of David W. Harwell; and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Division of Vital Records, Defendants,  
Of whom Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of David W. Harwell is the Respondent/Appellant,

v.

Law Office of Deidre W. Edmonds,  
P.A. and Deidre W. Edmonds,  
Individually, Appellants/Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002290

|  
Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-103

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Submitted December 2, 2019

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Filed April 8, 2020

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Withdrawn, Substituted and  
Refiled November 18, 2020

Appeal From Florence County, Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge

**Attorneys and Law Firms**

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr. and Barbara J. Wagner, both of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of Charleston, for Deidre W. Edmonds, Individually, and the Law Office of Deidre W. Edmonds, P.A.

Kevin Mitchell Barth, of Barth, Ballenger & Lewis, LLP, and Gena Phillips Ervin, of Orr & Ervin LLC, both of Florence, for Robert Bryan Harwell, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of David W. Harwell.

Deborah B. Harwell, pro se, of Mooresville, North Carolina.

John Harleston, of Columbia, for South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Division of Vital Records.

**Opinion**

**PER CURIAM:**

\*1 In this cross-appeal from the circuit court, the Law Office of Deidre Edmonds, P.A. and Deidre Edmonds individually (collectively, Edmonds) appeal the circuit court's orders issuing sanctions against her amounting to \$5,000. Robert B. Harwell (Harwell), individually and as the personal representative for the estate of David W. Harwell (Decedent), also appeals the circuit court's orders, seeking additional sanctions against Edmonds for her representation of Deborah B. Harwell (Widow), the estranged wife of Decedent. Widow additionally appeals the aforementioned circuit court orders.<sup>1</sup> We affirm in part and reverse in part.

**FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Decedent and Widow were married on November 21, 2001, having previously entered into a prenuptial agreement on November 19, 2001. In March 2015, Decedent filed a family court action seeking a decree of separate support and maintenance that enforced the parties' prenuptial agreement. After successful mediation efforts, the parties entered into a mediation agreement (the Mediation Agreement), which the family court adopted and incorporated into its final order (the Separation Decree) issued on July 21, 2015. Shortly thereafter, Decedent passed away on September 30, 2015.

On January 14, 2016, Widow filed a pro se action in the probate court in which she brought two creditor's claims against Decedent's estate, seeking (1) an elective share in the amount of \$3.1 million pursuant to the prenuptial agreement (the Prenuptial Claim) and (2) reimbursement in the amount of \$1,457.25 for obituary publication costs (the Obituary Claim) associated with two obituaries she filed for Decedent. Harwell, as personal representative of the estate, served a notice disallowing Widow's claims against the estate and subsequently initiated contempt proceedings

in the family court, alleging Widow violated the Mediation Agreement.<sup>2, 3</sup>

\*2 On March 1, 2016, Edmonds assumed representation of Widow for the pending matters in the probate court. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse.<sup>4</sup> Edmonds additionally filed petitions for allowance of Widow's previous creditor's claims against the estate. On April 1, 2016, Harwell filed answers and counterclaims, seeking dismissal of Widow's petitions and sanctions against Widow and Edmonds pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (the Act).<sup>5</sup> On May 26, 2016, Widow filed another pro se probate petition seeking to collect her elective share from Decedent's estate.<sup>6</sup>

By order dated June 10, 2016, the probate court removed the pending probate petitions to the circuit court. On August 31, 2016, Widow filed a partial stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing all of her petitions against the estate except for her petition for adjudication as the surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate. By order dated October 21, 2016, the circuit court adopted Widow's stipulations and dismissed the aforementioned petitions. Additionally, the court dismissed Widow's remaining petition against the estate as moot, stating "DHEC has now already amended the death certificate to reflect [Widow] as the surviving spouse for vital records purposes with Bryan Harwell's consent."

On February 2, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on Harwell's remaining action for sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. On April 12, 2017, the circuit court issued an order (the Final Order) imposing sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. Specifically, the circuit court found the pro se creditor's claims filed by Widow against the estate were frivolous and without merit and consequently imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of \$40,000. The circuit court further provided Widow's sanctions would be reduced by "any sums which she may have already paid pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of \$25,000.00 in attorney's fees as provided in the [c]ontempt [o]rder." As to Edmonds, the circuit court imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of \$5,000. Specifically, the court found Edmonds's filing of the Obituary Claim was

frivolous and without merit. Regarding Widow's petition for declaration as the surviving spouse and amendment of the death certificate, the circuit court found the relief sought was justified and the actions taken by Edmonds were necessary to obtain such relief. The court further found Edmonds's filing of the Prenuptial Claim, based upon the information provided to her by Widow, was reasonable and therefore not frivolous.

All parties filed motions to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, and the circuit court held a hearing on the motions on July 19, 2017. By order dated September 27, 2017, the circuit court denied the parties' motions to reconsider. This appeal followed.

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

\*3 The determination of whether a court should impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, or the Act is a matter of equity. *See Site Prep, LLC v. Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC*, 394 S.C. 97, 104, 713 S.E.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 2011). "In an action in equity tried by the judge alone, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence." *Id.* However, when the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's findings of fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. *Id.*; *see also Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. 430, 437, 663 S.E.2d 46, 50 (2008). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions." *See Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654.

## LAW/ANALYSIS

### I. Sanctions

Rule 11(a), SCRCP, provides:

The written or electronic signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

Pursuant to Rule 11, a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party's attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper. *Id.*; see also *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "The party and/or attorney may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith whether or not there is good ground to support it." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith ...." *Id.* at 437-38, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "Further, if appropriate under the facts of the case, the court may order a party and/or the party's attorney to pay a reasonable monetary penalty to the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith." *Id.* at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "While Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety." *Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc.*, 393 S.C. 590, 598, 713 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2011) (footnote omitted).

Additionally, "[t]he South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanction[s] Act provides for liability for attorney fees and costs of frivolous suits." *Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(a) of the South Carolina Code provides:

An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or administrative action or defense may be sanctioned for: ... filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if: ... a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances would believe that under the facts, his claim or defense was clearly not warranted under existing law ... a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party; or ... a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe the pleading, motion, or document is frivolous, interposed for merely delay,

or merely brought for any purpose other than securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim or defense upon which the proceedings are based ....

Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(b) further provides an attorney or pro se litigant may be sanctioned for "making frivolous arguments a reasonable attorney would believe were not reasonably supported by the facts." Pursuant to subsection 15-36-10(B)(2), if "an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances."

\*4 Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the circuit court's findings of fact. Thus, we review the court's imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion and address the parties' various contentions in turn. See *Se. Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 (providing that when the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's findings of fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard).

#### A. Harwell's Appeal

Harwell argues the circuit court erred in failing to sanction Edmonds for (1) asserting he committed a felony in her filing of the claim seeking a declaration of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate and (2) filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, which the Mediation Agreement barred. Harwell additionally contends the circuit court erred in offsetting the sanctions issued against Widow with prior contempt sanctions issued against her by the family court. We disagree.

Prior to Widow's claim seeking adjudication as Decedent's surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death certificate, Decedent's death certificate indicated his marital status as "married but separated" and stated "NA" in the surviving spouse designation, which prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits from the General Assembly, as provided in the Mediation Agreement, as well as death benefits. When Widow attempted to amend the death certificate with DHEC, it informed her that only Harwell could request a correction to the certificate as he was the

prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a court order would be required. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse. In her filing, Edmonds asserted Harwell willfully and knowingly supplied false information to DHEC in violation of section 44-63-161(A)(2), which was a felony under section 44-63-161(B).<sup>7</sup>

In its Final Order, the circuit court found sanctions were not warranted regarding Widow's claim, stating:

I find that the relief sought in that action was justified and that the action was necessary. While it is clear that some of the allegations contained in that petition concerning the alleged actions of the personal representati[ve] were false and ultimately found to be without justification, it is my finding that these allegations were the result of what appears to be an almost paranoid belief on the part of the parties to these actions concerning the evaluation of the motives of the other side.... This is an equitable matter and I must consider th[e] possibility that [ ] Harwell could have taken steps to resolve the problem early in the life of this [d]eath [c]ertificate issue to resolve the matter, ... but instead used this issue as a bargaining chip to seek withdrawal of the other unrelated claims. At any rate, the claim was necessary since the [d]eath [c]ertificate was incorrect in the manner in which it did not reflect the existence of a surviving spouse. It is my finding that Ms. Edm[on]ds[']s preparation of this pleading was based on information provided to her by DHEC and [Widow]. While some of her allegation[s] were not later proven to be true and perhaps overzealous when made, it did result in obtaining

the relief her client needed in that situation.

\*5 We agree with the circuit court's assessment of the situation at hand. Although we acknowledge Edmonds made assertions in the filing that were unnecessary to obtain the relief sought, we find the circuit court properly found *the overall purpose* of the claim was not frivolous, and therefore, sanctions were not warranted pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act for "continuing" the claim. *See* § 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if "a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, *continuation*, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party" (emphasis added)); *See Site Prep*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions.").

As to Harwell's contention that the circuit court erred in failing to sanction Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, we agree with the court's assessment that sanctions were not warranted.

The Mediation Agreement entered into between the parties and incorporated into the Separation Decree contained the following provision: "Both parties *waive any and all rights* they may have in the estate of the other or *to make any claim upon or against the estate of the other*. Each party shall be bound by the terms of this agreement." (emphases added).

Prior to assuming representation of Widow, Edmonds met with Widow to discuss the notice of disallowance she received from the estate and other potential claims she might have. During this meeting, Widow informed Edmonds that she believed Decedent withheld information regarding the extent of his assets when they entered the Mediation Agreement and she intended to challenge the Separation Decree. Edmonds advised Widow she would need to file a motion to set aside the order in family court; Edmonds further advised Widow to obtain other counsel for that action because she was not a family court practitioner and would only represent her regarding her probate claims. Based upon her experience and knowledge as a long term probate practitioner and former probate judge, Edmonds determined Widow would need to file a petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim so

that if Widow succeeded in the family court, she would not be foreclosed from making resulting claims against the estate in probate court. *See* § 62-3-806(a) (“Every claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative is barred so far as not allowed unless the claimant commences a proceeding for allowance of the claim in accordance with Section 62-3-804(2) not later than thirty days after the mailing or other service of the notice of disallowance or partial disallowance by the personal representative.” (emphases added)). Having determined the petition for allowance could be filed no later than March 12, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition on March 9, 2016. In support of her motions in opposition of sanctions, Edmonds submitted expert affidavits from Burnele Powell and Mitchell Payne, who both opined Edmonds’s filing of the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim was reasonable and not a violation of the provisions of Rule 11 or the Act.

Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose sanctions against Edmonds for filing the Prenuptial Claim. *See* § 15-36-10(B) (2) (providing a court may upon its own motion or motion of a party impose sanctions against an attorney for violations of subsection (A)(4)); § 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document if “a reasonable attorney presented with the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the other party”); Rule 11(a), SCRCP (providing that a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party’s attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper). We agree with the circuit court and the expert affidavits that based upon the information provided to her by Widow and the timeframe at hand, Edmonds’s actions were reasonable and in the best interest of her client. Although Harwell contends Edmonds was required to investigate the merits of the claim prior to filing the petition for allowance, we find Edmonds was entitled to rely on the information provided to her by Widow. *See Ex parte Gregory*, 378 S.C. at 439 n.3, 663 S.E.2d at 51 n.3 (“Our conclusion that an attorney must conduct a reasonable investigation *beyond what is related to the attorney by his client is limited to the situation whe[n] a client is alleging conversion against his or her former attorney for misappropriation of client funds or legal malpractice.*” (emphases added)). Furthermore, we note the merit of the Prenuptial Claim was contingent upon the success of Widow’s motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP,<sup>8</sup> in the family court, which Edmonds could not have known during the timeframe she had for filing a petition for

allowance. Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly found Edmonds’s filing of the petition for allowance was not frivolous.

\*6 Finally, Harwell contends the circuit court erred in offsetting the sanctions issued against Widow with prior sanctions issued against her by the family court for contemptuous conduct. In the Final Order, the circuit court imposed sanctions against Widow in the amount of \$40,000, but the court specified Widow’s sanctions would be reduced by “any sums which she may have already paid pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of \$25,000.00 in attorney’s fees as provided in the [c]ontempt [o]rder.” In its order denying the parties’ motions for reconsideration, the court explained it ordered this particular remedy as an equitable protection for Widow in an effort to prevent punishing her twice for her actions surrounding the pro se creditor’s claims against the estate, since these claims had previously been the subject of Harwell’s contempt action against her. Although a unique stipulation, we find the sanction fashioned by the circuit court was within the scope of its authority. *See* § 15-36-10(B) (2) (providing that if “an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation *any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances*” (emphasis added)); Rule 11(a), SCRCP (“If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, *an appropriate sanction ...*” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did not err in offsetting Widow’s sanctions issued pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act with the prior sanctions imposed by the family court.

#### B. Edmonds’s Appeal

Edmonds argues the circuit court erred in sanctioning her under Rule 11 and the Act for filing the petition for allowance of Widow’s Obituary Claim against the estate. Specifically, Edmonds contends the court improvidently issued the sanctions because (1) a determination on the merits of the Obituary Claim was never made as required under the Act and (2) Harwell failed to present evidence establishing the Obituary Claim was frivolously asserted. We agree in part.

Following Decedent’s death, the estate published an obituary. Displeased with this obituary because it failed to name her as Decedent’s surviving spouse, Widow, without authorization from the estate, published two more obituaries, which named

her as Decedent's widow.<sup>9</sup> Widow thereafter filed a pro se creditor's claim against the estate seeking reimbursement in the amount of \$1,457.25 for the publication costs of the obituaries. After Widow received Harwell's notice of disallowance on behalf of the estate, Edmonds filed a petition for allowance of the claim on Widow's behalf.

We find unpersuasive Edmonds's initial contention that the circuit court erred in imposing sanctions against her because a merits determination was never made on the Obituary Claim. Although subsection 15-36-10(C)(1) delineates at what procedural stage a court will determine if a claim or defense is considered frivolous upon a motion of the prevailing party, we find this subsection does not prescribe a court's sole method for imposing sanctions for filing or advancing frivolous claims. Subsection (B)(2) provides a court may "upon its own motion or motion of a party" impose sanctions upon an attorney or pro se litigant for violations of subsection (A)(4). Furthermore, the circuit court additionally found sanctions were warranted pursuant to Rule 11, which contains no such procedural prerequisite. *See* Rule 11(a), SCRPC ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....").

However, we agree the circuit court abused its discretion in sanctioning Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim as the record is devoid of evidence showing Edmonds filed the petition for any other reason than to preserve Widow's claim for judicial review. *See* § 62-3-806(a) ("Every claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative *is barred* so far as not allowed *unless the claimant commences a proceeding for allowance of the claim* in accordance with Section 62-3-804(2) not later than thirty days after the mailing

or other service of the notice of disallowance or partial disallowance by the personal representative." (emphases added)). Accordingly, we find Edmonds's intent in filing the petition was not malicious or for any improper purpose. *See Ex parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc.*, 393 S.C. at 598, 713 S.E.2d at 628 (providing that Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard). Thus, we reverse the circuit court's sanction of Edmonds regarding the Obituary Claim.<sup>10</sup> *See Se. Site Prep.*, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions.").

## II. Expert Testimony

\*7 Widow asserts the circuit court erred in failing to admit the expert testimony of Burnele Powell.<sup>11</sup> We find this issue is without merit as Edmonds submitted Powell's affidavit as an exhibit to her motion opposing sanctions, and the circuit court indicated on the record that it received and reviewed the affidavit. Further, the court referenced its consideration of the submitted affidavits in its order denying the parties' motions to reconsider.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's orders are

## AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.<sup>12</sup>

WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

## All Citations

Not Reported in S.E. Rptr., 2020 WL 6788280

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> On November 1, 2017, Edmonds filed a notice of appeal with this court, appealing the circuit court's order issuing sanctions against Edmonds and Widow and the circuit court's order following the parties' Rule 59(e), SCRPC, motions. On November 2, 2017, Harwell filed a notice of appeal with this court, appealing the aforementioned circuit court orders, which was assigned a different appellate case number from Edmonds's appeal. On November 8, 2017, Widow filed a notice of appeal with this court, cross-appealing the aforementioned circuit court orders appealed by Harwell. Desa Ballard filed Widow's notice of appeal but

simultaneously filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, which this court granted by order dated November 27, 2017. On February 7, 2018, this court granted a motion to consolidate the three appeals.

2 S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-806(a) (Supp. 2019) (“[W]ithin sixty days after the presentment of the claim, or within fourteen months after the death of the decedent, whichever is later, the personal representative must serve upon the claimant a notice stating the claim has been allowed or disallowed in whole or in part.”).

3 By order dated July 20, 2016, the family court found Widow in contempt and sentenced her to forty-five days’ imprisonment. The family court additionally ordered Widow to pay \$25,000 in attorney’s fees. This contempt action is not the subject of this appeal.

4 At that time, Decedent’s death certificate indicated his marital status as “married but separated” and stated “NA” in the surviving spouse designation, which prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits from the General Assembly as provided in the Mediation Agreement. When Widow attempted to amend the death certificate with the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), DHEC informed her that only Harwell could request a correction to the certificate as he was the prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a court order would be required.

5 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-10 to -100 (Supp. 2019).

6 Widow additionally filed a pro se motion in the family court to set aside the Separation Decree, which incorporated the Mediation Agreement, pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRPC, on May 26, 2016.

7 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(A)(2) (2018) (“It is unlawful for a person: ... to wilfully make a false statement in a certificate, record, or report required to be filed by this chapter or a regulation, or in an application for an amendment to or for a certified copy of the certificate, record, or report, or to wilfully supply false information intending that the information be used in the preparation or amendment of the certificate, record, or report.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(B) (2018) (“A person who violates a provision of item (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (A) is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”).

8 Rule 60(b)(3), SCRPC (“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party ....”).

9 Widow published obituaries in The Sun News and The State newspapers.

10 Edmonds additionally argues the sanction imposed by the circuit court was excessive. Because we reverse the circuit court’s imposition of the sanction, we need not address this issue. See *Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.*, 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

11 In her appellant’s brief, Widow raised five issues on appeal; however, the first four issues solely pertain to criminal contempt sanctions Widow received following a contempt proceeding in the family court. Widow did not appeal the family court contempt order in this appeal. Accordingly, this court is confined to considering only the fifth issue.

12 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

RECEIVED

Dec 17 2020

SC Court of Appeals

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In the Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM CHARLESTON COUNTY

In the Courts of Common Pleas of Beaufort and Florence Counties  
Trial Court Case Nos. 2016-ES-07-00302, 2016-CP-21-01435, and 2015-ES-21-00778  
The Honorable Kenneth E. Fulp, Jr. And  
The Honorable Roger L. Couch

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2017-002290

Deborah B. Harwell, ..... Respondent/Appellant,

v.

Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and as the  
Personal Representative of the Estate of  
David W. Harwell; and the South Carolina  
Department of Health and Environmental Control,  
Division of Vital Records, ..... Defendants,

Of whom Robert Bryan Harwell, individually  
and as the Personal Representative of the  
Estate of David W. Harwell is the ..... Respondent/Appellant,

And the South Carolina Department of  
Health and Environmental Control,  
Division of Vital Records is the ..... Respondent,

v.

Law Office of Deidre W. Edmunds, P.A.  
And Deidre W. Edmunds, Individually, ..... Appellants/Respondents.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I certify that I have served the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and Proof of Service on the  
above-referenced parties by depositing copies in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on  
December 17, 2020 addressed to them or to their attorneys of record as follows:

**Deborah B. Harwell, *Pro Se***  
1459 River Highway  
Mooreville, NC 28117  
Respondent/Appellant

**John Harleston**  
S.C. Department of Health and  
Environmental Control  
2600 Bull Street  
Columbia, SC 29201  
Respondent

**M. Dawes Cooke, Jr., Esq.**  
**Barbara J. Wagner, Esq.**  
**Barnwell, Whaley, Patterson & Helms, LLC**  
288 Meeting Street, Suite 200 (29401)  
Post Office Drawer H  
Charleston, SC 29402  
Attorneys for Appellants/Respondents  
Law office of Deirdre W. Edmonds, PA and Deirdre W. Edmonds, individually

**The Honorable Jenny Abbot Kitchings**  
Clerk, The South Carolina Court of Appeals  
PO Box 11629  
Columbia, SC 29211

  
**Marian D. Nettles, Esquire**  
**NETTLES, TURBEVILLE & REDDECK**  
PO Box 699/261 Kelley Street  
Lake City, SC 29560  
843-374-8511/843-493-2221  
843-374-3211(fax)

**Kevin M. Barth #559**  
**BARTH BALLENGER & LEWIS**  
P.O. Box 107  
Florence, SC 29503  
(843)662-6301  
(843)664-8384(fax)  
[kbarth@bblawsc.co](mailto:kbarth@bblawsc.co)

**Gena Phillips Ervin #4453**  
**ORR ELMORE & ERVIN LLC**  
P.O. Box 2527  
Florence, SC 29503  
(843) 667-6613  
(843) 667-0340(fax)  
[gpe@orrfirm.com](mailto:gpe@orrfirm.com)

**Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant**

LAW OFFICES

NETTLES, TURBEVILLE & REDDECK

P. O. BOX 699  
261 KELLEY STREET  
LAKE CITY, SOUTH CAROLINA 29560

E. LEROY NETTLES  
ELBERT K. TURBEVILLE  
LARRY G. REDDECK  
MARIAN D. NETTLES  
E. LEROY NETTLES III

843-374-8511  
843-493-2221  
FAX: 843-374-3211

December 17, 2020  
(Via Fax 803-734-1499 and U.S. Mail  
and supctfilings@sccourts.org)

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse  
The Supreme Court of South Carolina  
Post Office Box 11330  
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

**RECEIVED**  
**Dec 17 2020**  
**SC Court of Appeals**

RE: *Deborah B. Harwell v. Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of David W. Harwell, and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Division of Vital Records, and Law Office of Deirdre W. Edmonds, PA; and Deirdre W. Edmonds, individually, Appellants/Respondents*

Appellate Case No. 2017-CP-002290

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

I represent the Petitioner in this case. Enclosed please find the following:

- 1) An original and six copies of a Petition for *Writ of Certiorari*
- 2) A proof of service
- 3) A check in the amount of \$250.00 for filing fee.

By copy of this letter, I am serving all Respondents and the Court of Appeals with a copy of the Petition and the proof of service.

With my best regards, I am

Yours very truly,

NETTLES, TURBEVILLE & REDDECK



Marian D. Nettles

Page 2

MDN/mmd

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings (ctappfilings@sccourts.org)  
Kevin M. Barth (kbarth@bblawsc.com)  
Gena Philips Erwin (gpe@orrfirm.com)  
M. Dawes Cooke, Jr. (mdc@barnwell-whaley.com)  
Barbara J. Wagner (bwagoner@barnwell-whaley.com)  
Deborah B. Harwell (adobepalm@aol.com)  
John Harleston (DEHEC) (harlesj@dehec.gov)