

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

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Certiorari to the Court of Appeals  
Appeal from Orangeburg County  
Honorable Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

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**S.C. SUPREME COURT**

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

JOHNATHAN GREEN,

PETITIONER

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APPENDIX

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**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE  
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING  
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

Johnathan Green, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002256

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Appeal From Orangeburg County  
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-219  
Submitted February 18, 2020 – Filed July 22, 2020

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**AFFIRMED**

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Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of  
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant  
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of  
Columbia; and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of  
Orangeburg, for Respondent.

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**PER CURIAM:** Jonathan Green appeals his convictions of two counts of attempted murder and one count of discharging a firearm into a dwelling, arguing the trial court erred in admitting testimony about two prior bad acts because the

testimony was not relevant and did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE; the State failed to prove the incidents by clear and convincing evidence; and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the incidents. He also contends the trial court erred in admitting certain portions of a 911 call because the danger of unfair prejudice from it substantially outweighed the probative value pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in allowing a victim to testify Green previously assaulted and threatened her because the testimony was not relevant and did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE; the State failed to prove the alleged prior incidents by clear and convincing evidence; and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value: *State v. Pagan*, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); *id.* ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); *State v. Sweat*, 362 S.C. 117, 126, 606 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 2004) ("For evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant."); *State v. Wiles*, 383 S.C. 151, 158, 679 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2009) ("Evidence is relevant and admissible if it tends to establish or make more or less probable the matter in controversy." (citing Rules 401 & 402, SCRE)); Rule 401, SCRE (providing relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); Rule 404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent."); *State v. Plyler*, 275 S.C. 291, 296, 270 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1980) ("Evidence of previous difficulties or ill feelings between the accused and the victim and of facts showing the cause of such difficulties or ill will is admissible on the question of motives whe[n] there is some connection of cause and effect between the evidence and the crime." (quoting 40 C.J.S. *Homicide* § 228 (currently located at 41 C.J.S. *Homicide* § 337))); *id.* (finding the challenged evidence "admissible as a circumstance bearing on the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime" because it "tend[ed] to show motive on the part of the accused and [wa]s not so remote in time as to negate its probative value"); *Blakely v. State*, 360 S.C. 636, 639, 602 S.E.2d 758, 759 (2004) ("[E]vidence of previous threats by the defendant is admissible to show malice."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-29 (2015) (defining the offense of attempted murder as when "[a] person who, with

intent to kill, attempts to kill another person with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied"); *Blakely*, 360 S.C. at 639, 602 S.E.2d at 759 ("[U]nder Rule 404(b), SCRE, [evidence of previous threats] is admissible as evidence of intent."); *State v. Gillian*, 373 S.C. 601, 609, 646 S.E.2d 872, 876 (2007) ("If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing."); *State v. Kirton*, 381 S.C. 7, 26, 671 S.E.2d 107, 116 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When considering whether there is clear and convincing evidence of other bad acts, this court is bound by the trial judge's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."); *id.* at 26-27, 671 S.E.2d at 116 ("The determination of a witness's credibility is left to the trial [court, which] saw and heard the witness and is therefore in a better position to evaluate his or her veracity."); *Wiles*, 383 S.C. at 158, 679 S.E.2d at 176 ("[E]ven whe[n] the evidence is shown to be relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence must be excluded." (citing Rule 403, SCRE)); *id.* ("Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to redact portions of a 911 call in which a victim referenced an alleged prior threat by Green and told the operator Green is usually armed because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of that portion of the tape pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE: *Pagan*, 369 S.C. at 208, 631 S.E.2d at 265 ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); *id.* ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); Rule 403, SCRE (providing the trial court may exclude evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value); *State v. Kelley*, 319 S.C. 173, 177, 460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) ("[E]vidence should be excluded when its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect."); *Wiles*, 383 S.C. at 158, 679 S.E.2d at 176 ("Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.").

**AFFIRMED.**<sup>1</sup>

**WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and HILL, JJ., concur.**

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<sup>1</sup> We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

JOHNATHAN GREEN,

PETITIONER

APPELLATE CASE NO 2016-002256

Appeal from Orangeburg County

Honorable Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2020-UP-219

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, counsel for Johnathan Green petitions the Court for rehearing and respectfully submits that this Court overlooked the fact that the January prior bad act allegation took place almost a year before the December shooting for which Petitioner stood trial. The mother of Petitioner’s child alleged that when she went to pick up their child from Petitioner’s mother’s house in January Petitioner grabbed her keys, pulled her to the ground by her hair and punched her. This allegation involved more than just a prior threat. This January allegation is not relevant as to whether Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder in December for shooting at the mother of his child and her boyfriend. There was no connection of cause and effect between the

January allegation and the December shooting. Respectfully, this Court overlooked the fact that the January allegation was too remote in time to be probative of motive, intent or malice in the December shooting.

As to the second incident, the mother of Petitioner's child alleged that in November, prior to the December shooting, Petitioner threatened to "blow her face off." Counsel respectfully submits that this Court overlooked the fact that the State failed to prove this allegation by clear and convincing evidence. The only person to testify about the alleged threat was the mother. The testimony should have been excluded because the State failed to prove the alleged threat by clear and convincing evidence.

Both prior bad act allegations involved only the mother of Petitioner's child. The shooting for which the jury found Petitioner guilty was directed at the mother and the boyfriend. The boyfriend was not involved in the prior allegations. The January allegation was not relevant to the December shooting at both the mother and her boyfriend. The State failed to establish a connection between either of the allegations of prior bad acts and the December shooting which would be probative of motive, intent or malice. Neither prior bad act allegation was proved by clear and convincing evidence. The January allegation is far too remote in time to be probative of the December shooting. Finally, in this trial for two counts of attempted murder the probative value of the prior bad act allegations is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Counsel respectfully seeks rehearing.

1. **The trial judge erred in allowing the witness to testify that on a prior occasion Petitioner attacked her when the testimony was not relevant, did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b), the State failed to prove the alleged prior attack by clear and convincing evidence and the probative value of the alleged prior attack was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE.**

The jury found Petitioner guilty of shooting at the mother of his child, Elise Hogges, and her boyfriend who she later married, Kenduan Minus, on December 13, 2015. Prior to trial Petitioner moved to suppress testimony about three prior acts allegedly committed by Petitioner against Hogges-Minus. During the pre-trial hearing Hogges-Minus testified about an alleged incident almost a year earlier in January of 2015, an alleged incident when Petitioner allegedly pulled a gun on her in front of their daughter and an alleged incident at Thanksgiving. During the pre-trial hearing Hogges-Minus testified that during the alleged incident in January of 2015, Petitioner "... pulled my hair, snatched my hair out and pulled it from scalp." (R. p. 13, lines 19-23). She also testified that, "He bust my tire and threw my keys in the woods." (R. p. 14, line 4). Hogges-Minus admitted that she did not call the police but testified that she went to the sheriff's department and filed a report. (R. p. 15, lines 15-22). The officer who took the report noted that he did not observe any physical injury. (R. p. 26, lines 1-5). The sheriff's department did not press charges against Petitioner for the alleged January incident. (R. p. 26, lines 8-18).

The judge properly suppressed any testimony in regard to the alleged incident of pulling a gun in front of the daughter. (R. p. 30, lines 3-13). In ruling the trial judge addressed the alleged Thanksgiving incident, finding that the incident went to motive which is addressed in issue two below, and then stated, "It kind of goes along with the January event that shows the animus between them. And there are a couple of cases where there's domestic violence you can use that testimony later on, a prior domestic violence even in an assault and battery with intent to kill.

And so I've got some cites here if you are interested, but I - -" (R. p. 31, line 24 – p. 32, lines 1-4). Counsel for Petitioner responded, "I understand Judge. But to call it domestic violence when it's never been charged or there was never a chance for Mr. Green to face an accuser to have his, you know, chance to defend himself because there was never a charge brought." (R. p. 32, lines 5-9). The judge indicated that he was not inclined to suppress the prior bad act. (R. p. 32, lines 13-17).

At trial the prosecutor asked Hogges-Minus about the January incident and the judge noted Petitioner's objection. (R. p. 111, line 20 – p. 112, lines 1-2). Hogges-Minus then was allowed to testify about the alleged January incident. (R. p. 112, lines 7-17). Hogges-Minus told the jury:

We had an agreement to pick my child up from his mom's house. And when I got there, he arrived as I was getting – putting my daughter in the car. And he reached in and snatched my keys out my ignition and in the process of me trying to, you know, get my keys back – I was trying to like protect my daughter from seeing it. And he came around the front of the car and he grabbed my hair. And he pulled me to the ground by my hair and ripped my sewing out. And that's when he punched me. And his mom came off the porch and, you know, she was trying to get him off of me. And she called the police and made a report.

(R. p. 112, lines 7-17).

The trial judge erred in allowing the witness to testify about an alleged incident that took place almost a year before the shooting. The testimony was irrelevant and did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b). There was no connection of cause and effect between the January allegation and the December shooting. The January allegation was too remote in time to be probative of motive, intent or malice in the December shooting. Additionally, the State failed to prove the alleged prior assault by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, any probative value of the alleged prior allegation was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

pursuant to Rules 403, 404(b), SCRE. The testimony constituted inadmissible propensity evidence that should have been excluded.

First, the testimony about an alleged incident that took place almost a year prior was not relevant. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule 401, SCRE. The testimony about an alleged incident in January, almost one year earlier, did not make the existence of any fact of consequence in the attempted murder trial more or less probable. The January allegation, involving only the mother, is not relevant as to whether Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder in December for shooting at the mother of Petitioner’s child and her boyfriend at the time. There was no connection of cause and effect between the January allegation and the December shooting. The testimony should have been excluded as irrelevant.

Second, the testimony did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b). In State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 23–24, 664 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2008), the South Carolina Supreme Court wrote:

Under Rule 404(b), SCRE, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to prove the defendant's guilt for the crime charged. Such evidence is, however, admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent. State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 631 S.E.2d 262 (2006); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). To be admissible, the bad act must logically relate to the crime with which the defendant has been charged. If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing. Id.; State v. Beck, 342 S.C. 129, 135–36, 536 S.E.2d 679, 682–83 (2000). Even if prior bad act evidence is clear and convincing and falls within an exception, it must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Rules 403 and 404(b), SCRE (although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); State v. Gillian, 373 S.C. 601, 646 S.E.2d 872 (2007); State v. Braxton, 343 S.C. 629, 541 S.E.2d 833 (2001). The determination of the prejudicial effect of the evidence must be based on the entire record and the

result will generally turn on the facts of each case. State v. Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 393 S.E.2d 364 cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 227, 112 L.Ed.2d 182 (1990).

The testimony about the alleged January incident constituted inadmissible evidence of an alleged prior bad act. The testimony about the alleged incident that took place almost a year prior did not show motive, identity, common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident or intent.

In State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 31, 842 S.E.2d 654, 658 (2020), the South Carolina Supreme Court wrote:

Historically, to justify a finding that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered for a legitimate purpose, and thus should not be excluded pursuant to Rule 404(b), South Carolina courts have required a logical relevancy or connection between the other crime and some disputed fact or element of the crime charged. *See, e.g., Gaines*, 380 S.C. at 29, 667 S.E.2d at 731 (“To be admissible, the bad act must logically relate to the crime with which the defendant has been charged.”); State v. Brooks, 341 S.C. 57, 61, 533 S.E.2d 325, 327-28 (2000) (“If the court does not clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous criminal transaction and the crime charged, that is, its logical relevancy, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence should be rejected.” (quoting Lyle, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807)).

While the Court in Perry addressed the common scheme or plan exception of Rule 404(b), the logical relevancy analysis should apply to all 404(b) exceptions. The alleged prior January incident involving only Hogges-Minus did not logically relate to the State’s allegation that Petitioner attempted to murder Hogges-Minus and her boyfriend when he saw them together a year after the prior alleged incident. The judge found that the second incident, the alleged threat in November discussed below, “. . . goes along with the January event that shows the animus between them.” (R. p. 31, line 24 – p. 32, lines 1-4). Showing animus is not an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b). There is no connection between the January allegation and the crime charged in December. The January allegation is too remote in time to be probative of motive, intent or malice in the December shooting. The testimony about the January allegation should not have been admitted.

Third, the State failed to prove the alleged prior bad act by clear and convincing evidence. As Petitioner was not convicted of the alleged prior assault, the State was required to prove the alleged prior bad act by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Beck, 342 S.C. 129, 135-36, 536 S.E.2d 679, 682-83 (2000). “Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established. Such proof is intermediate more than a mere preponderance but less than is required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not mean clear and unequivocal.” State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 24, 664 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2008). The only person to testify about the alleged January incident was Hogges-Minus. Hogges-Minus testified that Petitioner’s mother was a witness to the January incident and called the police. (R. p. 112, lines 16-17). Petitioner’s mother, however, while called as a witness by the State at trial, was not questioned about the alleged January incident and was not called as a witness at the pre-trial hearing. The testimony should have been excluded because the State failed to prove the alleged January incident by clear and convincing evidence.

Fourth and finally, the probative value of the alleged prior assault was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rules 403, 404(b), SCRE. “The State must also convince the trial court that the probative force of the evidence when used for this legitimate purpose is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice from the inherent tendency of the evidence to show the defendant's propensity to commit similar crimes. Rule 403, SCRE. Whether the State has met its burden ‘should be subjected by the courts to rigid scrutiny,’ considering the individual facts of and circumstances of each case. 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807. State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 44, 842 S.E.2d 654, 665 (2020). As discussed above, testimony about the alleged incident in January of 2015, was irrelevant and not probative of the attempted murder charges that arose in December of 2015. The admission of the propensity

evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The trial judge erred in allowing the witness to testify that on a prior occasion Petitioner assaulted her when the testimony was not relevant, did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b), the State failed to prove the alleged prior attack by clear and convincing evidence and the probative value of the alleged prior assault was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE.

2. **The trial judge erred in allowing the witness to testify that on a prior occasion Petitioner threatened to blow the witness's face off when the alleged threat did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b), the State failed to prove the alleged prior threat by clear and convincing evidence and the probative value of the alleged prior threat is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE.**

In addition to the alleged incident in January 2015, Petitioner also moved to suppress an alleged prior bad act from Thanksgiving in November of 2015. Hogges-Minus testified at the pre-trial hearing that, "The week of Thanksgiving, he came to my house to try and fix my car. And I told him I didn't want him to do anything for me, that, you know, I didn't want him to do anything for me. And he was just like don't – me I'll blow your face off. And I told him to get out the yard and don't come back no more." (R. p. 14, lines 9-14). Hogges-Minus admitted that she did not call the police after this alleged threat by Petitioner. (R. p. 26, line 24 – p. 27, lines 1-6). The judge ruled:

Now, here with the Thanksgiving incident, it's more descriptive. And I think – but, of course, again, I think it's up to the jury whether or not they believe her in that situation. And right now, all of these motions are just essentially – I can change my mind. These are essentially Motions in Limine. But I'm inclined to let it in. It is close. It goes to the motive for him to be chasing her. It kind of goes along with the January event that shows the animus between them. And there are a couple of cases where there's domestic violence you can use that testimony later on, a prior domestic violence even in an assault and battery with intent to kill. And so I've got some cites here if you are interested, but I - - "

(R. p. 31, line 24 – p. 32, lines 1-4). As noted above, counsel for Petitioner responded, “I understand Judge. But to call it domestic violence when it’s never been charged or there was never a chance for Mr. Green to face an accuser to have his, you know, chance to defend himself because there was never a charge brought.” (R. p. 32, lines 5-9). The judge indicated that he was not inclined to suppress the prior bad act. (R. p. 32, lines 13-17).

At trial the prosecutor asked Hogges-Minus about the Thanksgiving incident and the judge noted Petitioner’s objection. (R. p. 112, lines 18-22). Hogges-Minus then was allowed to testify about the alleged Thanksgiving threat incident. (R. p. 112, line 25 – p. 113, 114, lines 1-3). Hogges-Minus told the jury that Petitioner and his brother came to her house to fix her car and she told him she did not want him to do anything for her. (R. p.112, line 25 – p. 113, lines 1-24). Hogges-Minus testified, “And he looked at me and said, don’t play with me I’ll blow your face off. And then I said that’s the problem right there. I said get out of my yard and don’t come back and leave me alone.” (R. p. 113, line 25 – p. 114, lines 1-3).

The trial judge erred in allowing the witness to testify that on a prior occasion Petitioner threatened her when the testimony did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b). Additionally, the State failed to prove the alleged prior threat by clear and convincing evidence and finally the probative value of the alleged prior assault was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rules 403, 404(b), SCRE. The testimony constituted inadmissible propensity evidence.

First, the testimony did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b). As discussed above in State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 23–24, 664 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2008), the South Carolina Supreme Court wrote:

Under Rule 404(b), SCRE, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to prove the defendant's guilt for the crime charged. Such evidence is, however, admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent. State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 631 S.E.2d 262 (2006); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). To be admissible, the bad act must logically relate to the crime with which the defendant has been charged. If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing. Id.; State v. Beck, 342 S.C. 129, 135–36, 536 S.E.2d 679, 682–83 (2000). Even if prior bad act evidence is clear and convincing and falls within an exception, it must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Rules 403 and 404(b), SCRE (although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); State v. Gillian, 373 S.C. 601, 646 S.E.2d 872 (2007); State v. Braxton, 343 S.C. 629, 541 S.E.2d 833 (2001). The determination of the prejudicial effect of the evidence must be based on the entire record and the result will generally turn on the facts of each case. State v. Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 393 S.E.2d 364 cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 227, 112 L.Ed.2d 182 (1990).

The testimony about the alleged threat constituted inadmissible evidence of an alleged prior bad act. The testimony about the alleged threat did not show motive, identity, common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident or intent. The alleged prior threat to Hogges-Minus alone did not logically relate to the State's allegation that Petitioner attempted to murder Hogges-Minus and her boyfriend when he saw them together. Contrary to the trial judge's finding, the alleged threat to Hogges-Minus because she rejected Petitioner's offer of help did not provide a motive for Petitioner to attempt to kill Hogges-Minus and her boyfriend. The motive exception might have been stronger if the prior alleged threat had been made to Hogges-Minus and her boyfriend rather than Hogges-Minus only.

Second, as discussed in regard to the alleged January attack, the State failed to prove the alleged prior threat by clear and convincing evidence. As Petitioner was not convicted of the alleged prior threat, the State was required to prove the alleged prior bad act by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Beck, 342 S.C. 129, 135-36, 536 S.E.2d 679, 682-83 (2000). "Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of

facts a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established. Such proof is intermediate more than a mere preponderance but less than is required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not mean clear and unequivocal.” State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 24, 664 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2008). The only person to testify about the alleged threat was Hogges-Minus. Hogges-Minus testified that Petitioner’s brother was a witness to the alleged threat but he was not called as a witness by the State. The testimony should have been excluded because the State failed to prove the alleged threat by clear and convincing evidence.

Finally, as also discussed above in regard to the alleged January assault, the probative value of the alleged prior threat was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rules 403, 404(b), SCRE. “The State must also convince the trial court that the probative force of the evidence when used for this legitimate purpose is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice from the inherent tendency of the evidence to show the defendant's propensity to commit similar crimes. Rule 403, SCRE. Whether the State has met its burden ‘should be subjected by the courts to rigid scrutiny,’ considering the individual facts of and circumstances of each case. 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807. State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 44, 842 S.E.2d 654, 665 (2020). The testimony about the alleged threat because Hogges-Minus did not accept Petitioner’s offer to help repair her car was not probative of the attempted murder charges involving Hogges-Minus and her boyfriend. The admission of testimony that Petitioner allegedly threatened to “blow her face off” was unfairly prejudicial and constituted inadmissible propensity evidence. In State v. Gilchrist, 329 S.C. 621, 630, 496 S.E.2d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 1998), the South Carolina Court of Appeals wrote:

Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156

(1st Cir.1989) (“[A]ll evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only *unfair* prejudice which must be avoided.”).

The highly inflammatory alleged threat to “blow her face off” tends to suggest a decision on an improper emotional basis. The testimony should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative.

The trial judge erred in allowing the witness to testify that on a prior occasion Petitioner threatened her when the testimony did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b), the State failed to prove the alleged prior threat by clear and convincing evidence and the probative value of the alleged prior assault was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE.

In affirming the convictions this Court did not address the two prior allegations separately but wrote:

As to whether the trial court erred in allowing a victim to testify Green previously assaulted and threatened her because the testimony was not relevant and did not meet an exception pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE; the State failed to prove the alleged prior incidents by clear and convincing evidence; and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) (“The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.”); id. (“An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law.”); State v. Sweat, 362 S.C. 117, 126, 606 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 2004) (“For evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant.”); State v. Wiles, 383 S.C. 151, 158, 679 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2009) (“Evidence is relevant and admissible if it tends to establish or make more or less probable the matter in controversy.” (citing Rules 401 & 402, SCRE)); Rule 401, SCRE (providing relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”); Rule 404(b), SCRE (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent.”); State v. Plyler, 275 S.C. 291, 296, 270 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1980) (“Evidence of previous difficulties or ill feelings between the accused and the victim and of facts showing the cause of such difficulties or ill will is admissible

on the question of motives whe[n] there is some connection of cause and effect between the evidence and the crime." (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 228 (currently located at 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 337)); *id.* (finding the challenged evidence "admissible as a circumstance bearing on the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime" because it "tend[ed] to show motive on the part of the accused and [wa]s not so remote in time as to negate its probative value"); *Blakely v. State*, 360 S.C. 636, 639, 602 S.E.2d 758, 759 (2004) ("[E]vidence of previous threats by the defendant is admissible to show malice."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-29 (2015) (defining the offense of attempted murder as when "[a] person who, with intent to kill, attempts to kill another person with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied"); *Blakely*, 360 S.C. at 639, 602 S.E.2d at 759 ("[U]nder Rule 404(b), SCRE, [evidence of previous threats] is admissible as evidence of intent."); *State v. Gillian*, 373 S.C. 601, 609, 646 S.E.2d 872, 876 (2007) ("If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing."); *State v. Kirton*, 381 S.C. 7, 26, 671 S.E.2d 107, 116 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When considering whether there is clear and convincing evidence of other bad acts, this court is bound by the trial judge's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."); *id.* at 26-27, 671 S.E.2d at 116 ("The determination of a witness's credibility is left to the trial [court, which] saw and heard the witness and is therefore in a better position to evaluate his or her veracity."); *Wiles*, 383 S.C. at 158, 679 S.E.2d at 176 ("[E]ven whe[n] the evidence is shown to be relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence must be excluded." (citing Rule 403, SCRE)); *id.* ("Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.").

As to the relevance of the prior January allegation, counsel respectfully submits that this Court overlooked the fact that there is no evidence to support the finding that the testimony is relevant to the December shooting. The January allegation is too remote in time to be relevant as defined by Rule 401, SCRE. The alleged attack in January of the mother when she was picking up their child does not make it more or less probable that Petitioner shot at the mother and her boyfriend almost a year later in December.

As to Rule 404(b), counsel respectfully submits that this Court overlooked the fact that the alleged attack in January does not logically relate to the State's allegation that Petitioner attempted to murder Hogges-Minus and her boyfriend when he saw them together a year later. The January allegation is too remote in time to be probative of motive, intent or malice in the

December shooting. Counsel respectfully submits that the present case is distinguished from State v. Plyler, 275 S.C. 291, 270 S.E.2d 126 (1980) cited in the opinion. First the alleged attack in the present case is far more inflammatory and prejudicial than the prior verbal altercation in Plyler. Second, and more importantly, the prior verbal altercation in Plyler took place three days prior to the charged crime and was not so remote in time as to negate its probative value. The January allegation in the present case took place almost a year before the charged crime, negating its probative value. Additionally, as noted in Plyler, there must be some connection of cause and effect between the prior allegations and the charged crime. In the present case there is no evidence to support such a connection of cause and effect between the January allegation involving only the mother and the December shooting at mother and her boyfriend at the time.

Counsel additionally respectfully submits that the reliance on Blakely v. State, 360 S.C. 636, 602 S.E.2d 758 (2004) is misplaced as the Court in Blakely did not address the prior threats pursuant to Rule 404(b) requiring clear and convincing evidence of the prior threat. In the present case the State failed to prove either of the prior allegations, neither of which resulted in a conviction or even a charge, by clear and convincing evidence. The case is additionally distinguished from the case cited in the opinion of State v. Kirton, 381 S.C. 7, 27, 671 S.E.2d 107, 117 (Ct. App. 2008), where the Court of Appeals wrote, “Testimony in the record supports the finding made by the trial judge that there was clear and convincing evidence of the prior bad acts, and that finding was not erroneous.” The trial judge in the present case did not make a finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of the prior allegations. Instead, the trial judge in the present case stated:


Now, here with the Thanksgiving incident, it’s more descriptive. And I think – but, of course, again, I think it’s up to the jury whether or not they believe her in that situation. And right now, all of these motions are just essentially – I can change my mind. These are essentially Motions in Limine. But I’m inclined to let it in. It’s

close. It kind of goes along with the January event that shows the animus between them. And there are a couple of cases where there's domestic violence you can use that testimony later on, a prior domestic violence even in an assault and battery with intent to kill. And so I've got some cites here if you are interested, but I - -"

(R. p. 31, line 24 – p. 32, lines 1-4). Counsel for Petitioner responded, "I understand Judge. But to call it domestic violence when it's never been charged or there was never a chance for Mr. Green to face an accuser to have his, you know, chance to defend himself because there was never a charge brought." (R. p. 32, lines 5-9). The judge in the present case failed to make a finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of the prior allegations.

Finally, as to Rule 403, in this trial for two counts of attempted murder the probative value of the prior bad act allegations is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Based on the above arguments, counsel for Petitioner respectfully requests rehearing. This Court should find that the admission of the alleged prior bad acts was improper and warrants reversal and a new trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

  
KATHRINE H. HUDGINS  
Appellate Defender

This 5<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2020.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

\_\_\_\_\_  
Appeal from Orangeburg County

Honorable Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge  
\_\_\_\_\_

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,


v.

JOHNATHAN GREEN,

PETITIONER

\_\_\_\_\_  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
\_\_\_\_\_

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Order “RE: Operation of the Appellate Courts During the Coronavirus Emergency,” dated March 20, 2020, the undersigned hereby certifies a true copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-referenced case upon Joshua A. Edwards, Esquire, at the primary e-mail address listed in the Attorney Information System (AIS); and Johnathan Green, #370274, at Lee Correctional Institution, 990 Wisacky Hwy., Bishopville, SC 29010, this 5<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2020.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Kathrine H. Hudgins  
Appellate Defender  
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

# The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Johnathan Green, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002256

\_\_\_\_\_  
ORDER  
\_\_\_\_\_

After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.

H. B. Warren J.

A. K. E. J.

D. M. L. J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:  
Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire  
Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, Esquire  
Joshua Abraham Edwards, Esquire  
David Michael Pascoe, Jr., Esquire  
The Honorable Edgar W. Dickson

**FILED**  
**Sep 22 2020**